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I. INTRODUCTION
There is overwhelming scientific agreement that human activities
are changing the global climate system and these changes are
already affecting human and natural systems. The observational
record shows that the planet is getting significantly warmer, with
eighteen of the nineteen warmest years on record occurring since
1
2001. Other observed changes include rising sea levels, ocean
warming and acidification, melting sea ice, thawing permafrost,
increases in the frequency and severity of extreme events, and a
1. State of the Climate: National Climate Report for January 2019, NOAA NAT’L CENTERS FOR
ENVTL. INFO., https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/national/ [https://perma.cc/8BDB-CUP9]
(last visited Nov. 30, 2019).
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variety of impacts on people, communities, and ecosystems. There
are multiple lines of evidence linking these changes to
2
anthropogenic influence on climate.
The consequences of climate change have received increasing
attention in recent years, as communities around the world have
been hit hard by climate-related natural disasters. The 2017
Atlantic hurricane season was the costliest on record: seventeen
named storms, including six major hurricanes, pummeled the
Caribbean and southern United States, causing unprecedented
flooding and devastation totaling approximately $370 billion
3
(USD) in worldwide damages. That same year, Southeast Asia
experienced unusually heavy monsoon rains which killed over
1,200 people and affected over 45 million people across
4
Bangladesh, India, and Nepal. There were also a number of
record-breaking wildfires in 2017 and 2018, which claimed
hundreds of lives, thousands of structures, and millions of acres in
5
the Western United States, British Columbia, Europe, and Siberia.
Other disasters include chart-topping heat waves throughout the
Northern Hemisphere, severe droughts in Central and South
America and the Middle East, and record-breaking rainfall and
6
flooding events across all continents. Significant advances in
2. U. S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM (USGCRP), FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE
ASSESSMENT: VOLUME II, 25–26 (2018).
3. Brian K. Sullivan, The Most Expensive U.S. Hurricane Season Ever: By the Numbers,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 26, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-26/themost-expensive-u-s-hurricane-season-ever-by-the-numbers [https://perma.cc/VM95-LVU6].
4. Press Release: 16 Million Children Affected by Massive Flooding in South Asia, with Millions
More at Risk, UNICEF (Sep. 2, 2017), https://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/
media_100719.html [https://perma.cc/L285-MNNH].
5. See, e.g., Luis Gomez, California Wildfires: New Records Set by 2018 Fires, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/opinion/theconversation/sd-california-2018-wildfires-burn-with-historic-impact-20181112-htmlstory.html
[https://perma.cc/E5PV-V6YF]; Dale Kasler, Worst Wildfire Year Since When? More California
Acres Have Burned in 2018 Than the Past Decade, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 16, 2018,
https://www.sacbee.com/latest-news/article221788220.html; Facts and Statistics: Wildfires, INS.
INFO. INST. (2019), https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-wildfires [https://
perma.cc/FJ5C-2R8N]; Melissa Etehad, Wildfires Rage Across Europe as Countries Battle Intense
Heat Wave, L.A. TIMES (Jul. 28, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-wildfires-europe20180728-story.html [https://perma.cc/B56L-GBFM]; Andrew Freedman, Heat Records Fall
in the Arctic as Fires Erupt in Sweden and Siberia, AXIOS (Jul. 19, 2018),
https://www.axios.com/heat-wave-records-wildfires-sweden-norway-siberia-b351dce3-b3ef41ee-b94e-e7833bd224e2.html [perma.cc/KQP2-2V9K].
6. See Daniel Levitt et al., Deadly Weather: The Human Cost of 2018’s Climate Disasters—
Visual Guide, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/ng-interactive/2018/dec/21/deadly-weather-the-human-cost-of-2018s-climate-
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climate change detection and attribution science—the branch of
science which seeks to isolate the effect of human influence on the
climate and related earth systems—have continued to clarify the
extent to which anthropogenic climate change causes both slow
7
onset changes and extreme events.
The spike in deaths and costs associated with extreme events and
the prospect for slow onset changes with irreversible impacts has
inspired a marked increase in the number of lawsuits seeking to
hold different actors—particularly governments and fossil fuel
companies—accountable for their contribution to or failure to take
action on climate change.
For example, state and local
governments across the United States have filed over a dozen
lawsuits against major oil and gas producers, alleging that they
knowingly contributed to climate change by extracting and selling
fossil fuels, obscuring the science of climate change, and fighting
8
policies aimed at mitigating climate change.
In Germany, a
Peruvian farmer has brought a lawsuit against RWE, the German
utility, seeking compensation for damages associated with a melting
glacier the farmer alleges are in part attributable to the defendant’s
9
direct GHG emissions. Lawsuits have also been filed against
various national governments seeking to compel regulations aimed
at curtailing the production and use of fossil fuels and otherwise
10
reducing national GHG emissions. These are among the first, not
the last, of these types of cases.
Attribution science is central to the recent climate litigation, as it
informs discussions of responsibility for climate change. Indeed,
detection and attribution science has long been central to climate
litigation, from the lawsuit filed in 1986 by New York City and Los

disasters-visual-guide [https://perma.cc/LCE7-JCYF]; Jason Samenow, Red-hot Planet: All-time
heat Records Have Been Set All Over the World During the Past Week, WASH. POST (July 5, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/capital-weather-gang/wp/2018/07/03/hot-planetall-time-heat-records-have-been-set-all-over-the-world-in-last-week/ [https://perma.cc/JY6ADQAU].
7. U. S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT,
FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT (2017) [hereinafter NCA4]. For a more detailed
definition, see Section II(A), infra.
8. Michael Burger & Jessica Wentz, Holding Fossil Fuel Companies Accountable for their
Contribution to Climate Change: Where Does the Law Stand?, 74 BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS
397 (2018).
9. Lliuya v. RWE AG, VG Essen 15.12.2016 (2 O 285/15) (Germany).
10. MICHAEL BURGER & JUSTIN GUNDLACH, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, THE STATUS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION 10–26 (2017).
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Angeles challenging the National Highway Transportation Safety
Administration’s decision not to prepare an environmental impact
statement for the model year 1989 Corporate Average Fuel
Economy standard, despite the standard’s potential global warming
11
impacts, through the lawsuit filed in January 2019 by traditional
cultural leaders from the Ksanka Band of the Ktunaxa Nation and
various conservation groups challenging the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service’s decision to approve a silver and copper mine project in
Montana without considering new data concerning the threats
climate change poses to threatened grizzly bear and bull trout
12
populations.
Climate science also plays a central role in
policymaking and planning, particularly where decisions need to
be made about how to allocate the costs of mitigating and adapting
to climate change. Recently, researchers have been developing
methodologies to link harmful impacts that were caused or
exacerbated by climate change to specific emitters, with an eye
towards holding emitters and other responsible parties accountable
13
in court for their contribution to the harms.
As the science
evolves, so too will its role in the courtroom and in policymaking.
This Article offers a comprehensive, of-the-moment survey of the
roles attribution science plays in climate change law and litigation.
Our purpose is to provide legal researchers and climate scientists
alike with a roadmap and a rundown of the dynamic interactions
between attribution science and climate change law, and to
indicate some of the ways the fields might influence one another.
Part II reviews the current state of attribution science with respect
to both slow- and sudden-onset events. Part III describes the role
that attribution science has played in recent litigation as well as
policy-making and planning activities, focusing primarily on
examples from the United States but also drawing on international
examples. Part IV discusses future directions in the law and science
of climate change attribution, addressing questions such as how
attribution science can better support policy-making, planning and
litigation; and how plaintiffs and courts can engage with attribution
11. City of L.A. v. Nat’l Highway Transp. Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
12. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Ksanka KUPAQA XAʾⱠȻIN v. U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Serv., No. 9:19-cv-00020-DWM (D. Mont. Jan. 25, 2019).
13. See, e.g., CLIMATE ACCOUNTABILITY INST., THE CARBON MAJORS DATABASE: CDP
CARBON MAJORS REPORT 2017 (July 2017); B. Ekwurzel et al., The Rise in Atmospheric CO2,
Surface Temperature, and Sea Level from Emissions Traced to Major Carbon Producers, 144 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 579 (2017).
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science to help resolve questions of liability and responsibility for
climate change.
II. SCIENTIFIC UNDERPINNINGS
Since the onset of the Industrial Revolution more than two
centuries ago, human activities—especially fossil fuel combustion,
land use change, and industrial production—have dramatically
impacted earth’s climate.
As a result of human activities,
concentrations of radiatively important agents such as GHGs and
aerosols have increased significantly. Carbon dioxide (CO2)
concentrations, for example, have increased by more than 40
14
percent to levels not seen in at least 3 million years.
These
changes in atmospheric chemistry have triggered widespread
warming and other impacts. Global surface air temperature has
increased by approximately 1.8° F since 1900, and ocean heat
22
15
content has increased by approximately 33.5 ± 7.0 × 10 joules. As
the planet has warmed, Arctic sea ice volume in late summer has
decreased by more than 50 percent, mass loss from land-based ice
sheets has accelerated, and sea levels have risen by approximately 8
16
inches since 19001 foot. Warming is also leading to phenological
changes, such as longer growing seasons, and impacting all human
17
and natural systems. The frequency, intensity and duration of
many types of extreme events are changing dramatically as well.
For example, record breaking high temperatures are now far more
common than record breaking low temperatures, high water levels
on coastlines are increasing dramatically, and the frequency of
hydrometeorological extremes—both droughts and floods—is also
18
increasing in many regions.
As climate change has become more and more manifest, our
understanding of the climate system has advanced dramatically.
14. WMO Greenhouse Gas Bulletin, No. 13 (Oct. 30, 2017).
15. NCA4 (2017), supra note 7, at 11, 82, 365. As a point of reference, the increase in
ocean heat content is approximately 580 times larger than world total primary energy supply
(TPES). See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY [IEA], KEY WORLD ENERGY STATISTICS (2018) (finding that
20
world TPES in 2016 was 13,761 Mtoe, which is equivalent to 5.76 x 10 joules).
16. See NCA4 (2017), supra note 7.
17. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], SPECIAL REPORT: GLOBAL
WARMING OF 1.5°C (Valerie Masson-Delmotte et al. eds., 2018).
18. IPCC, WORKING GROUP II CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 982 (Fields et al
eds., 2014) [hereinafter IPCC AR5 WGII].
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Multiple lines of evidence, including increasingly robust
observational data sets, paleoclimate data, process-models of
increasing complexity, and physical understandings all point to the
central role of human activity in the climate changes described
above. For example, it has become clear that the spatial pattern of
observed warming generally matches our theoretical understanding
and model projections; specifically, high latitude regions are
warming faster than the tropics, and the lower stratosphere is
19
cooling. The spatial pattern, or fingerprint, of the warming is
thus consistent with increases in GHG concentrations, not
alternative explanations such as volcanoes, incoming solar
radiation, or internal climate variability. Our ability to link
anthropogenically-induced global warming to local impacts has also
improved dramatically. The leading scientific body for climate
assessment, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), periodically publishes a synthesis of existing research on
climate change detection and attribution. In its most recent
assessment, the IPCC concluded that “there is new or stronger
evidence for substantial and wide-ranging impacts of climate
20
change” across all climate zones and continents. Similarly, the
Fourth National Climate Assessment (NCA4) prepared by the U.S.
Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) states that
“[e]vidence for a changing climate abounds, from the top of the
21
atmosphere to the depths of the oceans.”
Overall, the existing body of detection and attribution research is
now quite large and the findings are sufficiently robust to support a
wide variety of applications, including many of the policy, planning,
and legal functions outlined in Section III. But there are also
constraints to this research, such as data gaps and uncertainty
about model projections, which make it difficult to identify a clear
causal chain between a particular emitter or activity and specific
impacts or harms associated with climate change.
Below, we summarize the current state-of-the-art in climate
change detection and attribution science. We begin by defining
core concepts and explaining the basic data sources and analytical
techniques used in this research. Next, we discuss the status of
19. Gabriele Hegerl, Francis Zwiers & Claudia Tebaldi, Patterns of Change:
Fingerprint Is Seen in Global Warming?, 6 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 4 (2011).
20. IPCC AR5 WGII at 982.
21. NCA4 (2017), supra note 7, at 36.

Whose
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research with respect to different attribution questions and
different types of observed impacts. For each attribution category,
we discuss the areas where findings are relatively robust and then
identify key challenges and takeaways for the utilization of this
research in climate change law and litigation.
A. Core Concepts and Terminology
Generally speaking, detection and attribution is a two-step
process used to identify a causal relationship between one or more
drivers and a responding system. The first step––detection of
change—involves demonstrating that a particular variable has
22
changed in a statistically significant way without assigning cause.
This is typically accomplished using observational data and
historical records. The second step—attribution—involves sifting
through a range of possible causative factors to determine the role
of one or more drivers with respect to the detected change. This is
typically accomplished by using physical understanding, as well as
models or statistical analysis, to compare how the variable responds
when certain drivers are changed or eliminated entirely.
1. Scope of Detection and Attribution Research
Detection and attribution with regards to climate change can be
broadly defined to encompass a range of research aimed at linking
human activities to observed changes in the climate system and
corresponding impacts on natural and earth systems. This area of
research can be broken down into several interrelated parts or
research streams:
Linking climate change to anthropogenic drivers: How are
human activities affecting the global climate system?
Linking impacts to climate change: How do changes in the
global climate system affect other interconnected natural and
human systems?
Identifying the relative contribution of various emission
sources and land use changes: To what extent have different
sectors, activities, and entities contributed to anthropogenic
climate change?
22. David R. Easterling et al., Detection and Attribution of Climate Extremes in the Observed
Record, 11 WEATHER CLIMATE EXTREMES 17 (2016); Gabriele C. Hegerl et al., Good Practice
Guidance Paper on Detection and Attribution Related to Climate Change, in MEETING REP. OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE EXPERT MEETING ON DETECTION AND
ATTRIBUTION OF ANTHROPOGENIC CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (Thomas Stocker et al. eds., 2010).
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For the purposes of brevity, we refer to these three areas of
research as climate change attribution, impact attribution, and source
attribution, recognizing that these terms may be defined differently
in other papers. This approach is roughly consistent with that
taken by the IPCC in past assessments, specifically the division
between Working Group I (WGI), which synthesizes research on
the physical science basis for anthropogenic climate change, and
Working Group II (WGII), which synthesizes research on the
observed and predicted impacts of climate change. However, there
is no IPCC analog for “source attribution” as that term is defined in
23
this paper, and this third research stream is commonly viewed as a
field distinct from the “detection and attribution” research covered
in the IPCC reports. Nonetheless, source attribution deals with a
fundamental attribution question relevant to some of the law and
policy issues described in Section III and therefore warrants
discussion in this paper.
We also discuss extreme event attribution as a separate category of
attribution research. This is because extreme events do not fit
neatly into the “climate change attribution” or “impact attribution”
categories. Weather is part of the climate system, but extreme
events are often discussed as “impacts” of climate change, and
there are unique challenges associated with efforts to ascertain the
effect of climate change on a particular extreme event. (These
challenges bear similarities to the challenges associated with impact
24
attribution).
The line between “changes in the climate system” and “the
impacts of climate change” is not always clear. The IPCC defines
the global climate system as “the highly complex system consisting of
five major components: the atmosphere, the hydrosphere, the
cryosphere, the lithosphere, and the biosphere, and the
25
interactions between them.” This broad definition is necessary to
23. The IPCC does compile some of this data in the WGI report but there is no
systematic effort to synthesize research on the relative contributions of different actors or
activities to climate change. There is also a third IPCC Working Group (WGIII) that assesses
literature on the scientific, technological, environmental, and social aspects of mitigation of
climate change.
24. E.g., extreme weather events are discussed in the IPCC WGI report as a source of
evidence for climate change attribution, but also in the IPCC WGII report as an example of
how climate change will affect human and natural systems.
25. IPCC, WORKING GROUP I CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 1451 (Stocker et al. eds., 2013)
[hereinafter IPCC AR5 WGI].
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capture the highly interconnected nature of these components:
changes in ocean heat content (hydrosphere), sea ice
(cryosphere), carbon sequestration (biosphere), and volcanic
eruptions (lithosphere) can all affect the atmosphere and vice
versa. The variables studied in this research are often referred to as
26
essential climate variables.
The IPCC defines impacts or effects to include physical impacts such
as floods, droughts, and local sea level rise, as well as any other
“effects on lives, livelihoods, health, ecosystems, economies,
societies, cultures, services, and infrastructure due to the
interaction of climate changes or hazardous climate events
27
occurring within a specific time period.” In many cases, a change
in an essential climate variable (e.g., sea level rise) could be viewed
as a “physical impact” of climate change. For the purposes of this
paper, we classify studies on regional changes in essential climate
variables as “climate change attribution” where the primary goal of
the study is to better understand how humans are affecting the
global climate system, and we classify studies on floods, droughts,
and local sea level rise as “impact attribution” where the primary
goal of the study is to better understand how climate change is
affecting a particular region or locale.
It is also important to note that the IPCC uses a different
definition of “attribution” when discussing research on climate
change attribution (WGI) and impact attribution (WGII): whereas
“attribution in WGI quantifies the links between observed climate
change and human activity, as well as other external climate
drivers,” attribution in WGII “generally links responses of natural
and human systems to observed climate change, regardless of its
28
cause.”
This reflects standard practice in impact attribution
studies, wherein scientists focus exclusively on the relationship
between global climate change and observed impacts without
seeking to identify the relative contribution of human activity as
compared with other external climate drivers.
These different streams of attribution science have begun to
converge in recent years. There have been further advances in
26. The Global Observing System for Climate Essential Climate Variables Data Access Matrix,
NOAA NAT’L CENTERS FOR ENVTL. INFO,
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/gosic/gcos-essential-climate-variable-ecv-data-access-matrix
[https://perma.cc/4ZSH-CMGX] (last visited Dec. 19, 2019).
27. IPCC AR5 WGII, Summary for Policy Makers, supra note 20, at 5.
28. Id. at 4.
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attribution of climate change to anthropogenic activity, as well as
burgeoning studies that go beyond the analysis of essential climate
variables to examine adverse effects on human systems and public
29
health. Simultaneously, other researchers have been compiling
data and developing techniques to identify the relative
contribution of different sectors, activities, and entities to changes
30
in atmospheric GHG concentrations.
Building on all three
research streams, there is now a body of research which aims to link
specific entities and/or activities to specific climate change
31
impacts. Below, we bring the streams together, contextualizing
them within a broader climate science and risk management
context.
2. Data Sources and Analytical Techniques
a. Climate Change, Extreme Event, and Impact Attribution
There are several key sources of information and analytical
techniques which are used in the climate change, impact, and
extreme event attribution studies. These include: physical
32
understanding, observational data, statistical analysis, and models.
Physical understanding refers to scientific understanding of
physical properties and processes. A good example would be the
heat trapping effects of GHGs, which can be tested using laboratory
and modeling experiments. Physical understanding serves as the
basis for developing experiments to evaluate potential interactions
across variables in the climate system and related human and
natural systems.
Observational data is data which can be observed and measured.
Examples include in situ measurements of CO2 concentrations,
surface temperatures, and sea levels; satellite measurements of sea
29. Below, we use the phrase “attribution of harm” to describe studies seeking to link
specific harmful impacts on public health and human systems to anthropogenic climate
change. This is discussed as a subset of “impact attribution.”
30. See, e.g., B. Ekwurzel et al., supra note 13, at 579.
31. See, e.g., Richard Heede, Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions
from Fossil Fuel and Cement Producers, 1854–2010, 122 CLIMATIC CHANGE 229 (2014).
32. See, e.g., Sophie Marjanac & Lindene Patton, Extreme Weather Event Attribution Science
and Climate Change Litigation: An Essential Step in the Causal Chain?, 36 J. ENERGY & NAT. RES.
L. 265, 271–72 (2018) (noting that the “3 pillars of attribution science” are “(i) the quality of
the observational record; (ii) the ability of models to simulate the event; and (iii) our
understanding of the physical processes that drive the event and how they are affected by
climate change.”).
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surface temperature, water vapor, precipitation, and sea ice; and
aircraft measurements of cyclone wind speed. Observational data is
primarily used in conjunction with statistical analysis to detect
changes in the climate system, including changes in the frequency
and severity of extreme events, and corresponding changes in
natural and human systems—specifically, by comparing historical
observational data sets with contemporary observations of a
particular variable and determining whether there has been a
statistically significant change in that variable. A statistically
significant change would be detected in observations if the
likelihood of occurrence by chance alone is determined to be small
33
(e.g., less than 10%).
Statistical analysis refers to mathematical formulas, models, and
techniques that are used in empirical analysis of data. Statistical
analysis is used in both the detection and attribution of climate
change. For attribution, statistical analysis is used to quantify the
probability of an observed change occurring with and without
anthropogenic forcing on the climate. For example, scientists use
34
linear regression methods and variants such as “optimal
fingerprinting” to determine whether a change in a climate
variable is statistically significant or simply part of natural
35
variability. This analysis is part of the detection of climate change
and corresponding impacts, but it can also be used to support
attribution statements (e.g., a finding that the spatial pattern of
warming in the atmosphere was likely caused by anthropogenic
emissions because it is statistically unlikely that the spatial pattern
would have occurred in the absence of anthropogenic forcing on
the climate). This is sometimes referred to as “observation-based”
36
attribution.
In practice, there are very few studies that focus exclusively on
observation-based statistical analysis for attribution due to short
observation records and complex forcing changes over the

33. IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT 121–22 (Rajendra K. Pachauri &
Leo Meyer eds., 2014) [hereinafter IPCC AR5 SYR].
34. Linear regression is a statistical method used to summarize and study relationships
between two continuous (quantitative) variables.
35. K. Hasselmann, Optimal Fingerprints for the Detection of Time-Dependent Climate Change, 6
J. CLIMATE 1957, 1957 (1993).
36. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., ENG’G, AND MED., ATTRIBUTION OF EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS
IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 51 (2016).
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37

historical period. Model approaches (below) are typically used
because: (i) models allow scientists to separate out the effects of
different forcings on the observed variable, and (ii) the observed
record for many variables is too short to support reliable
conclusions, especially given the large variability in the systems
being analyzed. That said, observation-based attribution findings
38
can serve as a useful supplement to model-based findings.
Models use quantitative methods, including predictive equations
and statistical techniques, to simulate interactions within the
climate system.
Scientists can thus set up different model
experiments to evaluate the effect of one or more climate drivers
(like greenhouse gases, aerosols, and solar flux) on one or more
variables. For the purposes of attribution, experiments with
climate models generally involve at least two sets of simulations,
differing only in that one is meant to reflect the world that is, and
the other is meant to reflect a “counterfactual” world without
anthropogenic climate change (or without some component of
anthropogenic climate change). These model simulations are
typically run multiple times and for long duration, allowing
scientists to better understand the most likely outcomes, as well as a
fuller range of potential outcomes. Observational data and physical
understanding provide the basis for calibrating and verifying
models.
Several modeling centers have now developed standardized
climate simulations designed for detection and attribution
specifically, based on different parameters (e.g., researchers can
evaluate the probability of an event or impact occurring both with
and without certain observed changes in the climate, such as
changes in sea surface temperature). Due to advances in parallel
computing and model simplifications, these can be run rapidly and
at high spatial resolution, yielding quick results. Indeed, when the
above packages are combined with forecasts of variables with high
predictability, such as sea surface temperature, results can be made
available in advance of actual events. Furthermore, the tools and
outputs, and models themselves, are increasingly being made
publicly available. This has furthered the proliferation of
37. Id.
38. Andrew D. King et al., Attribution of the Record High Central England Temperature of 2014
to Anthropogenic Influences, 10 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, May 1, 2015, at 1; Gabriele C. Hegerl, Use
of Models and Observations in Event Attribution, 10 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS July 2, 2015, at 1.
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attribution research in recent years, as well as an enormous amount
39
of media coverage and public interest in the topic.
Model-based approaches can support more robust attribution
statements than the use of observational data and statistical analysis
alone. However, models have limitations that should be kept in
mind when considering their use in attribution studies. The
usefulness of a model for attribution depends on how well the
model can reproduce patterns associated with each climate forcing.
However, there are uncertainties in our knowledge about how
individual climate forcings affect the climate system. While
comparing models to observations helps assess model skill,
observations cannot tell us all we need to know, for three reasons.
First, there is some uncertainty in observational measurements.
Second, internal climate variability, unrelated to climate forcing, is
difficult to disentangle from climate forcing. Third, because
multiple anthropogenic and natural forcings have occurred
simultaneously in the past, unpacking the relative contribution of
each forcing is nontrivial.
The above challenges exist to a certain degree even for variables
like global average temperature where the relationship between
rising GHG concentrations and average temperatures is fairly
direct. Inevitably, there will be some degree of uncertainty and
room for error in model results due to the complexity of the
40
physical systems being modeled.
But this does not mean that
model results are unsound. To the contrary, uncertainty is
prevalent across many scientific disciplines, including disciplines
41
that are frequently relied upon in policy, planning, and litigation,
and scientists have tools for managing and communicating
uncertainty.
The IPCC, for example, uses (i) probabilistic
language to describe the assessed likelihood of an outcome or
42
result (very likely, likely, etc.); (ii) terms to describe the availability
of evidence to support particular findings (limited, medium,
39. See, e.g., Jane C. Hu. The Decade of Attribution Science, SLATE (Dec. 19, 2019).
40. E.g., models may underestimate variability, which can lead to overestimation of the
effect of human influence on extreme events, and models may under-sample the range of
plausible outcomes.
41. E.g., epidemiology and forensic science.
42. The IPCC defines these probabilistic terms as follows: virtually certain 99–100%
probability, very likely 90–100%, likely 66–100%, about as likely as not 33–66%, unlikely 0–
33%, very unlikely 0–10%, exceptionally unlikely 0–1%. In some instances, the IPCC also
uses the following terms: extremely likely 95–100%, more likely than not > 50–100%, and
extremely unlikely 0–5%. IPCC AR5 WGI, supra note 25, at 4.
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robust); (iii) terms to describe the level of agreement about
findings (low, medium, or high); and (iv) language describing its
confidence in the findings (very low, low, medium, high, very
43
high). In individual attribution studies, uncertainty is typically
managed and communicated using similar statements about
confidence levels and intervals. For example, a study may conclude
with 90% confidence that climate change made an extreme event
44
at least twice as likely to occur.
Scientists are also constantly
refining the techniques used to reduce uncertainty in their
analyses, such as through additional and lengthened observational
datasets, improvements to models, new analytical methods, and
expert judgment.
The most robust attribution approaches combine good
observations, physical understanding, rigorous statistical analysis,
and detailed models to generate findings, along with clear
communication and transparency with respect to research
parameters, assumptions made, confidence in findings, and
potential areas of uncertainty or bias. Studies that combine sound
science with clear communication can generate findings that are
sufficiently robust to support a wide variety of applications, but the
confidence in and precision of those findings depends on the
nature of the change, event, or impact being studied.
b. Special Considerations for Extreme Event and Impact
Attribution
Attribution becomes increasingly complex and challenging as the
focus of research moves away from long-term, broad-scale changes
in the climate system and towards more localized, discrete extreme
events and climate impacts. One key challenge is conducting the
analysis at the appropriate spatial and temporal scale. Whereas
climate change attribution as defined in Part II(A)(2)(a) above
deals with change at a global or regional scale, typically over a long
period of time, extreme event and impact attribution deal with
more geographically and temporally distinct forms of change (e.g.,
how much has sea level risen in a particular city in the past twenty
years). Natural variability, unrelated to changes in climate forcing,
is larger at fine spatial and temporal scales, making it harder to
43. Id.
44. In this statement, the confidence level is 90% and the confidence interval starts at
“twice as likely” and has no defined upper bound.
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identify signals associated with anthropogenic or other forcings.
Some climate forcings, such as aerosols, also differ both in
concentration and forcing strength at subregional and subannual
scales. Additionally, when models are used to assess extreme events
that occur at finer spatial and temporal scales than the models
themselves, some type of downscaling or bias correction is needed,
which can introduce additional uncertainties.
Impact attribution studies must also account for non-climate
variables—that is, characteristics of human and natural systems that
are not part of the climate system. There are sometimes referred to
as exogenous variables (i.e., phenomena that are not part of the
45
climate system).
Consider a study examining the relationship
between climate change, a heat wave, and public health impacts:
the study would need to account for both climate variables (e.g.,
temperature and humidity) as well as non-climate variables (e.g.,
population risk factors for heat-related morbidity, access to airconditioned facilities and emergency services) to ascertain the
extent to which climate change caused or contributed to observed
health outcomes. Confounding variables, which influence both
dependent and independent variables in a study, are of special
concern as they can lead to spurious associations between a driver
46
and an event or impact.
The number of exogenous and
confounding variables increases as attribution research moves
towards an analysis of discrete impacts on humans, communities,
and ecosystems.
Due to the difficulty of managing many exogenous variables,
most attribution studies focus on just one “link” in the causal chain
of anthropogenic climate change. This is often referred to as singlestep attribution. Examples of single-step attribution include research
linking increases in global average temperatures to changes in the
atmospheric concentration of GHGs, and research linking
increases in local sea level rise to increases in global average
temperature. This focus on single-step attribution is apparent in
IPCC WGII’s approach to impact attribution (which, as noted
45. This may be somewhat of an oversimplification, as many variables which may appear
to be “outside” of the climate system are still, to some extent, interdependent with that
system.
46. In an impact or event attribution study, the dependent variable would be the impact
or event under examination, and the independent variable would be the climate changerelated driver of the impact or event (e.g., increases in GHG concentrations or, in some
studies, increases in climate variables such as mean temperature).
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above, examines how observed climate change is affecting natural
47
and human systems, regardless of its cause).
There is also a growing body of multi-step attribution studies. Such
studies combine the two inquiries described above: scientists will
first seek to identify how one or more core climate variables has
changed in response to human activities, and then explore the
implications of that change with respect to one or more specific
48
impacts.
Multi-step attribution is useful for examining causal
relationships in complex systems, but one potential drawback of
this approach is that additional, “cascading” uncertainty and
potential for error is introduced with each new “step” that is added
to the analysis.
c. Source Attribution
Above, we note that source attribution is a distinct field of
research that employs different methods and is subject to different
constraints. There is some overlap in terms of the data collection
and analytical techniques used for source attribution: scientists will
use observational data to identify sources of GHGs, as well as
physical understanding, statistical analysis, and models to ascertain
the relative contribution of GHGs from a particular source or
source category to anthropogenic climate change. But source
attribution studies also rely on different types of evidence,
particularly documentary evidence of GHG emissions and carbon
49
sequestration impacts.
Documentary evidence refers to information contained in
documents and reports. For the purposes of source attribution, key
sources of documentary evidence include national GHG emissions
inventories, corporate GHG disclosures, securities disclosures, and
other reports prepared by governments and private actors detailing
GHG emissions or carbon sequestration impacts from a particular
activity or source. Because such reports are prepared by humans,
sometimes pursuant to a political or social agenda, they may
47. IPCC AR5 WGII, supra note 20, at 4 n.5.
48. IPCC AR5 WGI, supra note 25, at 867–952; Gabriele Hegerl et al., Good Practice
Guidance Paper on Detection and Attribution Related to Anthropogenic Climate Change, in MEETING
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE EXPERT MEETING ON
DETECTION AND ATTRIBUTION OF ANTHROPOGENIC CLIMATE CHANGE 3 (Thomas F. Stocker et
al. eds., 2010).
49. For a more detailed discussion of the methods and techniques used in source
attribution, see infra Part II(B)(4).
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contain biases or errors of a different type than those found in raw
data.
Source attribution also involves questions that cut across different
social and scientific disciplines. Certainly, there is a physical
science component to source attribution, as the ultimate goal is to
ascertain the physical contribution of the source to anthropogenic
climate change. But there are also social and normative questions
that come into play when attributing emissions (or sequestration)
to a particular source, particularly when trying to assign
“responsibility” for emissions. Consider the many different ways
that emissions can be “divvied up” across different lines—by stage
of economic development, global region, country, sector, company,
consumer, etc. Even within these categories, there are different
ways of assigning emissions responsibility. For example, when
assessing national responsibility for climate change, some have
argued that we should not only look at emissions which are directly
generated within the country (“territorial emissions”) but also
consider emissions embodied in products consumed within the
50
country (“consumption-based emissions”).
Similarly, when
assessing corporate responsibility for climate change, there are
important questions about the relative responsibility of upstream
entities (e.g., fossil fuel producers) and downstream entities (e.g.,
manufacturers of carbon-intensive products and consumers of fossil
fuels) in addition to the entities that directly generate emissions.
Granted, it is entirely possible to avoid such normative questions
when publishing information about source attribution.
For
example, a study could simply provide a breakdown of emissions
across different countries (perhaps both CO2 exporters and CO2
importers), sectors, etc., without reaching any conclusions about
the responsibility of different actors or source categories. But in
practice, when attribution science is related to law and policy, the
question of responsibility is of paramount importance.

50. See, e.g., C40 CITIES CLIMATE LEADERSHIP GROUP, CONSUMPTION-BASED GHG
EMISSIONS OF C40 CITIES (2018), https://www.c40.org/researches/consumption-basedemissions [https://perma.cc/9XVC-MCRX]; Zeke Hausfather, Mapped: The World’s Largest
CO2 Importers and Exporters, CARBON BRIEF (May 7, 2017, 11:52 AM),
https://www.carbonbrief.org/mapped-worlds-largest-co2-importers-exporters
[https://perma.cc/3K2V-EFNE]; DANIEL MORAN ET AL., THE CARBON LOOPHOLE IN CLIMATE
POLICY:
QUANTIFYING THE EMBODIED CARBON IN TRADED PRODUCTS (2018),
https://buyclean.org/media/2016/12/The-Carbon-Loophole-in-Climate-Policy-Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FS95-N9W4].
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B. Survey of Research to Date
1. Climate Change Detection and Attribution
Climate change detection and attribution research examines the
effect of human activities on the global climate system, which is
broadly defined to include the atmosphere, hydrosphere,
cryosphere, lithosphere, biosphere, and the interactions between
these components. The primary research question is: how do
human-induced changes in the chemical composition of the
atmosphere affect other essential climate variables such as
temperature, precipitation, sea level, and sea ice? To answer this
question, researchers must demonstrate that a detected change is
“consistent with the estimated responses to the given combination
of anthropogenic and natural forcing” and “not consistent with
alternative, physically plausible explanations of recent climate
change that exclude important elements of the given combinations
51
of forcings.”
The existing body of research leaves little room for doubt that
the global climate system is changing and human activities are at
least partially responsible for that change; thus, there is no real
question as to whether anthropogenic climate change is occurring.
Scientists have also made considerable progress towards
quantifying the effect of human activities on different components
of the climate system. However, there is still some amount of
uncertainty about the magnitude of the observed changes in the
climate system that are due to different climate forcings—such as
52
GHGs, aerosols, and solar radiation.
In this section, we
51. IPCC, WORKING GROUP I CONTRIBUTION TO THE THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 56 (John T. Houghton et al
eds., 2001). While in one sense attribution is easy to define, complex philosophical
questions lurk in the background, including the question of how one defines causation.
Deterministic causation is a simple binary framing (“A caused B”) whereas probabilistic
causation has a lower threshold of “A made B more likely than in otherwise would have
been.” Mike Hulme, Attributing Weather Extremes to ‘Climate Change’: A Review, 38 PROGRESS IN
PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 499, 500 (2014). Even within the sub-branch of probabilistic
causation, emphasized here, it should be noted that the way a problem is framed can
influence the findings. See for example, the description of necessary vs. sufficient causality
in Alexis Hannart et al., Causal Counterfactual Theory for the Attribution of Weather and ClimateRelated Events, 97 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 99, 103–04 (2016).
52. These uncertainties primarily concern: 1) the magnitude of change in other possible
drivers of climate changes (such as solar radiation changes); 2) the signature of change
expected in the climate system due to human activities and ‘1’ above; and 3) the magnitude
of internal climate variability. IPCC AR5 WGI, supra note 25, at 867–952.
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summarize the state of the terms of observed climate changes and
the attribution of those changes to human activities. We focus here
on mean changes in essential climate variables on a global and
regional scale; changes in extremes and changes in local weather
53
and climate are discussed in subsequent sections.
a. Methods and Parameters
Scientists detect changes in the climate system through in situ
measurements, such as the CO2 readings from the Mauna Loa
Observatory in Hawaii, and remote sensing from satellites and
other platforms. Some of the key types of data collected through
observations include measurements of GHG emissions and
concentrations, atmospheric and surface temperature, water vapor
(humidity), precipitation, sea ice, and sea levels. Scientists have
also developed techniques to better understand past climatic
conditions—for example, scientists can reconstruct paleoclimate
conditions by studying the patterns in tree rings and gas bubbles
54
trapped in ice cores. This information offers important insights,
including: 1) how sensitive different aspects of the climate system
are to different climate forcings at various timescales, and 2) more
robust estimates of natural variability than can be gleaned from the
relatively short observational record.
Once change has been detected, the next step is attribution.
Physical understanding of how the climate system reacts to
different forcings is the foundation of climate change attribution.
Examples of external forcings include GHGs, atmospheric aerosols,
solar radiation, and reflectivity (albedo), all of which influence the
balance of energy in the global climate system. Scientists must also
have physical understanding of natural variability within the global
climate system in order to ascertain whether an observed change in
the system is the result of changes in forcings or natural variability.
Drawing on this physical understanding, scientists have
developed global climate models that reproduce physical processes
in the atmosphere, ocean, cryosphere, and land surface. One of

53. See infra Part II(B)(2) (“Extreme Event Attribution”) and Part II(B)(3) (“Impact
Attribution”).
54. For more information on the development of observational techniques and datasets,
see IPCC, WORKING GROUP I CONTRIBUTION TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
IPCC, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis 93–127 (Susan Solomon et al. eds.,
2007).
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the most important modeling initiatives is the Coupled Model
Intercomparison Project (CMIP), which was launched by the World
Climate Research Programme in 1995 to foster collaboration on
and ongoing improvement of climate models and to provide a
standard set of model simulations to facilitate comparison across
models. Leveraging ongoing advances in physical understanding,
observations, and computational power, climate models now
operate at finer and finer spatial scales, include interactions across
more and more components of the climate system, and generate
thousands of years of model output under different forcings and
initial conditions. As models have grown in sophistication, their
utility for climate attribution has grown—models driven by
historical greenhouse gas emissions and natural forcings (e.g.,
volcanoes and solar variability) can now “reproduce observed
continental-scale surface temperature patterns and trends over
many decades, including the more rapid warming since the mid20th century and the cooling immediately following large volcanic
55
eruptions.”
As noted above, there are challenges associated with
“downscaling” from a global to a regional or local focus. These
challenges are most prevalent in extreme event and impact
attribution, but they also appear, to a lesser extent, in climate
change attribution studies. This is because many of the observed
changes in the global climate system vary on a regional basis—both
due to differences in forcings and the higher natural variability at
56
finer spatial scales.
b. Status of Research
The observational record shows that significant changes in the
global climate system are occurring. As noted in the IPCC’s Fifth
Assessment Report (AR5):

55. The IPCC issued this statement with very high confidence. IPCC AR5 WGI, Summary
for Policymakers, supra note 25, at 15.
56. Above, we define “climate change attribution” as research aimed at determining
“how human activities are affecting the global climate system.” Thus, this section is
concerned only with studies seeking to understand and attribute regional changes in
essential climate variables in order to better understand changes in the global climate
change. This section does not discuss studies that evaluate how climate and weather has
changed in a region or locale in order to ascertain the effect on that region or locale (e.g.,
how much have sea levels risen in New York City?)—rather, those are discussed in the
extreme event and impact attribution sections.
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Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s,
many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to
millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of
snow and ice have diminished, sea level has risen, and the
57
concentrations
of
greenhouse
gases
have
increased.

AR5 contained similarly conclusive findings about climate
change attribution, particularly with respect to the link between
human influence on climate and global warming:
Human influence on the climate system is clear. This is evident from
the increasing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere,
positive radiative forcing, observed warming, and understanding of
58
the
climate
system.

The report also found strong evidence that human activity had
contributed to changes in other essential climate variables, such as
sea level rise and the loss of sea ice, with different levels of
59
confidence for different variables.
Since AR5 was published in 2014, the observational record of
changes in the global climate system has become even more robust,
and the rate of observed change has accelerated for many essential
climate variables. The body of research attributing these changes
to anthropogenic influence on climate change has likewise become
more robust, with more recent attribution studies further
reinforcing some of the key messages from AR5. Below, we
summarize the latest findings in terms of observed changes and
60
attribution to human activity.
i. Chemical Composition of Global Climate System
AR5 found, with very high confidence, that atmospheric
concentrations of CO2, methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O)
57. IPCC AR5 WGI, Summary for Policymakers, supra note 25, at 4.
58. Id. at 15.
59. Id.
60. There have been additional advances in the detection and attribution of long-term,
time averaged climate variables that do not fit neatly into the five directly societally-relevant
categories described here. Examples include fingerprinting of sea level pressure, Nathan P.
Gillett, Francis W. Zwiers, Andrew J. Weaver & Peter A. Stott, Detection of Human Influence on
Sea-level Pressure, 422 NATURE 292, 292–94 (2003), and water vapor, Benjamin D. Santer et al.,
Incorporating Model Quality Information in Climate Change Detection and Attribution Studies, 106
PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 14778, 14778–83 (2009).
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are higher than they have been in 800,000 years, and that the rate
of change in GHG concentrations over the past century is
61
unprecedented in the past 22,000 years.
This was based on
observations from 2011 (the latest data relied upon in AR5),
showing that CO2 concentrations had increased 40% to 391 parts
per million (ppm), methane (CH4) concentrations had increased
150% to 1803 parts per billion (ppb), and nitrous oxide (N2O)
concentrations had increased 20% to 324 ppb, as compared with
62
pre-industrial levels.
This trend has continued since AR5 was
published, with the latest in situ measurements putting CO2
concentrations at 410.5 ppm, methane concentrations at 1862.8
63
ppb, and nitrous oxide concentrations at 332.4 ppb.
Not all of these GHGs remain in the atmosphere, which is part of
why it is necessary to look at multiple interconnected systems when
detecting and attributing global climate change. AR5 found that
the ocean had absorbed about 30% of the emitted anthropogenic
64
CO2, approximately 125–185 gigatons of carbon (GtC).
The
uptake of carbon has caused ocean acidification: the pH of the
ocean surface has decreased by 0.1 since the beginning of the
industrial era, which corresponds with a 26% increase in hydrogen
65
ion concentration (the measure of ocean acidity).
This
acidification is relatively straightforward to attribute to
66
anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions specifically. Terrestrial
61. IPCC AR5 WGI at 385. The IPCC also expressed medium confidence that the rate of
GHG change was unprecedented in the past 800,000 years. These findings were based on
paleoclimate observations from ice cores. Id. At the time AR5 was published, ice core
records only extended back 800,000 years, so it was not possible to reach conclusions about
GHG concentrations before this time. In 2017, scientists extracted a record-breaking 2.7million-year-old ice core which indicated that CO2 levels were also well below current levels
during that time period. Paul Voosen, 2.7-million-year-old Ice Opens Window on Past, 357
SCIENCE 630 (2017).
62. IPCC AR5 WGI at 678.
63. Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide, NOAA NAT’L CENTERS FOR ENVTL. INFO.,
https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/gl_trend.html [https://perma.cc/JKJ5-5GSV]
(last visited Dec. 5, 2019); Global CH4 Monthly Means, NOAA NAT’L CENTERS FOR ENVTL. INFO.,
https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends_ch4/ [https://perma.cc/8AE3-RWTJ] (last
visited Dec. 5, 2019); Nitrous Oxide (N2O)—Combined Data Set, NOAA NAT’L CENTERS FOR
ENVTL. INFO., https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/hats/combined/N2O.html [https://perma
.cc/K483-DBHR] (last visited Dec. 5, 2019).
64. IPCC AR5 WGI, Summary for Policymakers, supra note 25, at 11–12.
65. Id. at 12.
66. Id. Bindoff describes it as ‘very likely.’ Id. at 870. In the same report, another ocean
chemistry change, a global decrease in dissolved oxygen especially in near-coastal waters, was
assessed with medium confidence to be attributable “in part to human influences.” Id.
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ecosystems are also absorbing CO2, but there is significant
uncertainty as to the actual quantity sequestered:
research
indicates that anywhere from 70–250 GtC have accumulated in
67
terrestrial systems.
Accounting for these different absorption
pathways is critical in all aspects of climate change detection and
attribution (including extreme event and impact attribution)
because the effect of GHGs is dependent on where those gases are
stored. Uncertainties about historical storage, or sinks, leads to
some uncertainty about the magnitude of total historical effect of
anthropogenic sources on climate change. More importantly, a
changing climate could weaken important sinks. For example, a
warming ocean is able to absorb less CO2, melting permafrost and
hydrates could release ancient CO2 and methane to the
atmosphere, and changes in vegetation could increase or decrease
the terrestrial carbon sink.
ii. Atmospheric and Surface Temperature
As noted above, AR5 found “unequivocal” evidence that the
climate system is warming, concluding that it was “certain” that
global mean surface temperature (GMST) had increased since the
th
late 19 century, and “virtually certain” that the global troposphere
th
68
With regards to
had warmed since the mid-20 century.
attribution, AR5 noted that observed warming trends were
consistent with physical understanding and models of how rising
atmospheric GHG concentrations would affect the climate system,
and that the trends could not be explained by other forcings or
69
natural variability alone.
AR5 quantified the potential
contribution of human influence as follows:
67. Id. at 12.
68. Id. at 4, 161–62. At that time, the observational record showed that: (i) each of the
last three decades had been successively warmer, in terms of global surface temperatures,
than any preceding decade since 1850, and the first decade of the 21st century was the
warmest on record; and (ii) globally averaged combined land and ocean surface temperature
had increased by 0.85 [0.65–1.06]°C from 1880 through 2012. Id. at 161–62.
69. Id. at 869. For example, in terms of natural variability, Atlantic Multidecadal
Oscillation (AMO) variability can influence trends, but does not explain 1951–2010
warming. In terms of the magnitude of other possible forcings, only solar radiation changes
have been in the direction that would be expected to lead to warming, but the magnitude of
change over the period is too low to have contributed to much of the warming.
Furthermore, the spatial pattern of the observed warming (e.g., lower tropospheric warming
and stratospheric cooling) was also consistent with increases in GHG concentrations, but not
other possible forcings. Id. at 867–952.

BURGER ET AL. FINAL MACRO 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

2/5/2020 2:44 PM

The Law and Science of Climate Change Attribution

83

GHGs contributed a global mean surface warming likely to be
between 0.5°C and 1.3°C over the period 1951–2010, with the
contributions from other anthropogenic forcings likely to be between
–0.6°C and 0.1°C, from natural forcings likely to be between –0.1°C
and 0.1°C, and from internal variability likely to be between –0.1°C
70
and
0.1°C.

Based on these estimates, AR5 concluded that “[i]t is extremely
likely that more than half of the observed increase in global average
surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 was caused by the
anthropogenic increase in greenhouse gas concentrations and
71
other anthropogenic forcings together.”
Since then, the warming trend has continued and a number of
72
NCA4 found,
temperature-related records have been broken.
with very high confidence, that: (i) global surface air temperature had
increased by 1.8°F (~1°C) between 1901 and 2016, and (ii) “[m]any
lines of evidence demonstrate that it is extremely likely that human
influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming
th
73
since the mid-20 century.”
With regards to this attribution
finding, USGCRP noted that there are “no convincing alternative
74
explanations” for the observed warming in the past century.
USGCRP further found, with high confidence, that the likely range of
human contribution to global mean temperature increase from
1951–2010 was 1.1° to 1.4°F (0.6° to 0.8°C) and that the likely
contributions from natural forcing and internal variability to
75
observed warming are minor. There are a number of other recent
studies which have reinforced and strengthened the evidentiary
basis for human-induced warming. Analyses of global and regional
warmth in 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 all found significant
anthropogenic
influence
on
record-breaking
annual

70. Id. at 869.
71. Id. at 17.
72. Nineteen of the twenty hottest years on record have occurred since 2000 (with 1998
being the other hottest year), and 2016 was the hottest year on record with an average land
and sea temperature that was 0.94°C above the 20th century average of 13.9°C. See NOAA,
Climate
Monitoring,
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/climate-monitoring/global/globe/
ytd/201911.
73. NCA4, supra note 7, at 13–14.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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76

temperatures.
One noteworthy study compared observed
temperatures in 2016 to annual global temperatures calculated in
an ensemble of more than 24,000 years of CMIP5 simulations
serving as a “control” for atmosphere (e.g., simulations in which
greenhouse gases are kept at pre-industrial levels) and found that
the observed 2016 temperatures were roughly 1.3°C higher than
the historical average from 1881–1920, whereas the most extreme
heat event in the control simulations was only 0.5°C above the
77
historical average.
The scientists concluded that the recordbreaking heat in 2016 could not have occurred in the absence of
78
anthropogenic forcing on climate.
iii. Oceans and Sea Level Rise
Just as the atmosphere has warmed, so too have the oceans. Two
key detection findings in AR5 were that: (i) “[o]cean warming
dominates the increase in energy stored in the climate system,
accounting for more than 90% of the energy accumulated between
79
1971 and 2010 (high confidence)”; and (ii) “[i]t is virtually certain
that the upper ocean (0–700 m) warmed from 1971 to 2010 . . . and
80
it likely warmed between the 1870s and 1971.” With regards to
attribution, AR5 found that “[i]t is very likely that anthropogenic
forcings have made a substantial contribution to increases in global
81
upper ocean heat content (0–700 m) observed since the 1970s.”
NCA4, which contained more recent measurements of ocean
temperature, found that total ocean heat content has increased by
22
approximately 33.5 ± 7.0 × 10 joules since 1960 and that average
sea surface temperature (SST) has increased by about 1.3°F ± 0.1°F
82
(0.7°C ± 0.08°C ) per century from 1900 through 2016. USGCRP
noted that the effect of anthropogenic forcing on this warming
76. Explaining Extreme Events of 2017 from a Climate Perspective, 100 BULL. AM.
METROLOGICAL SOC’Y (SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT) S1 (2019) [hereinafter BAMS 2017]; Explaining
Extreme Events of 2016 from a Climate Perspective, 99 BULL. AM. METROLOGICAL SOC’Y (SPECIAL
SUPPLEMENT) S1 (2018) [hereinafter BAMS 2016]; Explaining Extreme Events of 2015 from a
Climate Perspective, 97 BULL. AM. METROLOGICAL SOC’Y (SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT) S1 (2016)
[hereinafter BAMS 2015]; Explaining Extreme Events of 2014 from a Climate Perspective, 96 BULL.
AM. METROLOGICAL SOC’Y (SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT) S1 (2015) [hereinafter BAMS 2014].
77. BAMS 2016, supra note 76, at S11–14.
78. Id.
79. IPCC AR5 WGI, Summary for Policy Makers, supra note 25, at 8.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 17.
82. NCA4, supra note 7, at 364–65.
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trend was clear but did not attempt to quantify that effect, possibly
due to uncertainties about the actual magnitude of ocean warming
stemming from a lack of long-term data (particularly with respect
83
to deep ocean warming). A recent study on heat content in the
upper 2000 meters of the ocean found ocean warming
approximately 40–50% faster than what was reported in the IPCC
84
AR5 report.
The increase in ocean heat content has been accompanied by
observed increases in sea levels (and rates of sea level rise) since
the 1800s. The observational record shows that, between 1901 and
2010, global mean sea level rose by approximately 0.19 meters
85
(~7.5 inches). AR5 found with high confidence that the rate of sea
level rise since the mid-19th century has been larger than the mean
rate during the previous two millennia, and that sea level rise has
been accelerating quite substantially during this time period (with
86
the most rapid rate of rise occurring since 1993). The primary
drivers of rising sea levels to date are thermal expansion of the
ocean (caused by increases in ocean heat content) and glacier mass
loss. AR5 found high confidence in anthropogenic influence on
these two drivers in the past half-century, which supported its
conclusion that “[i]t is very likely that there is a substantial
anthropogenic contribution to the global mean sea level rise since
87
88
the 1970s.” NCA4 contained similar findings.
iv. Cryosphere: Sea Ice, Glaciers, Permafrost, and Snowpack
The observational record has shown a substantial decline in
northern hemisphere sea ice, terrestrial glaciers, and snowpack in
89
the past century. But there is considerable geographic variation
in the magnitude and rate of the decline, as not all areas are
warming at the same rate, and there has actually been a small

83. Id. at 366, 367, 381.
84. Lijing Cheng et al., How Fast Are the Oceans Warming?, 363 SCIENCE 128 (2019).
85. IPCC AR5 WGI, Summary for Policy Makers, supra note 25, at 11.
86. Id. For example, AR5 found that it is “very likely that the mean rate of global averaged
-1
-1
sea level rise was 1.7 [1.5 to 1.9] mm yr between 1901 and 2010, 2.0 [1.7 to 2.3] mm yr
-1
between 1971 and 2010, and 3.2 [2.8 to 3.6] mm yr between 1993 and 2010.” Id.
87. Id. at 19.
88. NCA4, supra note 7, at 333 (finding that GMSL had risen by approximately 7–8
inches since 1900, and that human forcings had made a “substantial contribution” (high
confidence) to observed sea level rise).
89. IPCC AR4 WGI, supra note 25, at 319–20; NCA4, supra note 7, at 303.
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90

observed increase in Antarctic sea ice, which is not fully
91
understood. Setting aside that uncertainty, one clear finding of
AR5 was that there are “multiple lines of evidence [which] support
92
very substantial Arctic warming since the mid-20th century.”
There has also been a “considerable reduction in permafrost
thickness and areal extent” in certain northern regions observed
93
over the period 1975 to 2005.
AR5 concluded that anthropogenic influences “very likely
contributed to Arctic sea ice loss since 1979 . . . [,] likely
contributed to the retreat of glaciers since the 1960s and the
increased surface mass of the Greenland ice sheet since 1993
[,] . . . [and] likely [contributed] to observed reductions in
94
Northern Hemisphere spring snow cover since 1970.” Similarly,
NCA4 found with high confidence that it is very likely that human
activities have contributed to sea ice loss, glacier mass loss, and
95
northern hemisphere snow extent decline. However, AR5 noted
that there is low confidence in our scientific understanding of the
extent to which anthropogenic influences have driven the
aforementioned changes in the Antarctic, and both AR5 and NCA4
noted that there had actually been a small observed increase in
Antarctic sea ice in the early 2000s, which would most likely be
96
explained by localized natural variability.
Research shows that these trends have continued and accelerated
since AR5 was published. One recent study found that the
90. At least through approximately the middle of the 2010s, at which point a decline
appears to have commenced. Claire L. Parkinson, A 40-y Record Reveals Gradual Antarctic Sea
Ice Increases Followed by Decreases at Rates Far Exceeding the Rates Seen in the Arctic, 116 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 14414, 14414–23 (2019).
91. Proposed explanations for the increase have included freshening of the waters near
Antarctica (thereby facilitating sea ice formation) such as: Richard Bintanja et al., The Effect
of Increased Fresh Water from Antarctic Ice Shelves on Future Trends in Antarctic Sea Ice, 56 ANNALS
OF GLACIOLOGY 120 (2015); decreasing stratospheric ozone (inducing local cooling through
changes in atmospheric circulation); and natural variability, John Turner et al., Non‐annular
atmospheric circulation change induced by stratospheric ozone depletion and its role in the recent increase
of Antarctic sea ice extent, 36 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 1 (2009).
92. IPCC AR5 WGI, Summary for Policy Makers, supra note 25, at 9.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 19.
95. NCA4, supra note 7, at 333. See also Noah Diffenbaugh et al., Quantifying the Influence
of Global Warming on Unprecendented Extreme Climate Events, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI 4881
(2017), (finding “extremely high statistical confidence that anthropogenic forcing increased
the probability of record-low Arctic sea ice extent”).
96. IPCC AR5 WGI, Summary for Policy Makers, supra note 25, at 19; NCA4, supra note 7,
at 39, ch. 11.
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Greenland Ice Sheet is melting much faster than previously
believed: the pace of ice melt has accelerated four-fold since 2003,
with Greenland losing approximately 280 billion tons of ice per
year between 2002 and 2016—enough to raise the worldwide sea
97
level by 0.03 inches annually.
v. Hydrologic Cycle and Precipitation
Ascertaining the effect of anthropogenic forcings on the
hydrologic cycle and precipitation is one of the most challenging
areas of climate change attribution. Part of the challenge is
detecting change—in some regions spatial gradients of
precipitation are large, while historical rainfall records are
incomplete and contain mixed findings about the extent to which
precipitation patterns have (or have not) changed since the early
1900s. Precipitation is also characterized by large natural variability
across a range of timescales ranging from the intra-annual to the
centennial. The detection findings in AR5 are therefore mixed:
AR5 notes that there is high confidence that average precipitation
98
However,
in mid-latitude land areas has increased since 1951.
there is only medium confidence in precipitation change averaged
over global land areas since 1951, and low confidence in
99
precipitation change prior to 1951.
With respect to attribution, AR5 found that anthropogenic
forcings had likely accelerated the hydrologic cycle, primarily
through increases in temperature which can induce more rapid
evaporation and support heavier rain events. However, the effect
on annual mean regional precipitation was unclear. Specifically,
AR5 found that:
It is likely that anthropogenic influences have affected the global
water cycle since 1960. Anthropogenic influences have contributed
to observed increases in atmospheric moisture content in the
atmosphere (medium confidence), to global-scale changes in
97. Michael Bevis, Accelerating Changes in Ice Mass Within Greenland, and the Ice Sheet’s
Sensitivity to Atmospheric Forcing, 116 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI 1934, 1934 (2019).
98. IPCC AR5 WGI, Summary for Policy Makers, supra note 25, at 4.
99. Id. at 5, 40. A recent paper that integrated climate models, observations, and
reconstructions of climate over the past 1000 years detected an elevated risk of hydroclimatic
drought (a blend of precipitation deficit and greater evaporation potential associated with
warming) consistent with anthropogenic activities as early as the first half of the 20th
century. Kate Marvel et al., Twentieth-Century Hydroclimate Changes Consistent with Human
Influence, 569 NATURE 59 (2019).
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precipitation patterns over land (medium confidence), to intensification
of heavy precipitation over land regions where data are sufficient
(medium confidence), and to changes in surface and sub-surface ocean
100
salinity
(very
likely).

The changes in surface and subsurface ocean salinity are noted
here due to the link between precipitation and salinity: the
observational record shows that regions of high salinity (where
evaporation is prevalent) have become more saline, whereas
regions of low salinity (where precipitation is prevalent) have
become fresher since the 1950s, and these regional trends provide
“indirect evidence that evaporation and precipitation over the
101
oceans have changed.”
NCA4 also contained mixed findings about the effect of rising
GHG concentrations and temperatures on global precipitation
patterns. NCA4 noted that there had been a modest rise in annual
average precipitation across global land areas, but that this increase
could not be deemed statistically significant due to a lack of data
102
coverage in early rainfall records. However, NCA4 did note that
there had been an observed increase in arctic precipitation of
approximately 5 percent since the 1950s, which had been detected
103
and attributed to human activities.
2. Extreme Event Attribution
Extreme event attribution is a branch of climate change
attribution that seeks to understand how human-induced changes
in the global climate system are affecting the frequency, severity,
and other characteristics of extreme events, such as abnormally hot
days, heat waves, tropical cyclones, abnormally heavy rainfall events,
104
This can be contrasted with the
and meteorological droughts.

100. IPCC AR5 WGI, Summary for Policy Makers, supra note 25, at 17 (emphasis in
original).
101. Id. at 8.
102. NCA4, supra note 7, at 46.
103. Id. at 47 (citing Seung-Ki Min et al., Human-Induced Arctic Moistening, 320 SCIENCE
518 (2008)).
104. Meteorological drought is defined based on climate variables, especially
precipitation and temperature (and to a lesser extent solar radiation at the surface, wind,
and atmospheric humidity). Hydrological drought, in contrast, is defined by shortages of
available freshwater resources, such as reservoirs, groundwater, and rivers/streams.
Hydrological drought, in contrast to meteorological drought, is thus linked more closely to
freshwater usage and freshwater needs.
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climate change attribution research described above, which focuses
on changes in long-term mean variables rather than changes in
extremes.
Since 2011, the Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society
(BAMS) has been publishing annual reports on Explaining Extreme
105
Events from a Climate Perspective. The 2016 and 2017 BAMS reports
both contained studies finding that certain extreme events could
not have been possible in a pre-industrial climate, all of which were
106
heat-related events.
Below, we summarize some of the methods
used in this research and the confidence with which scientists have
been able to attribute different types of extreme events to climate
change.
a. Methods and Parameters
Extreme event attribution is rapidly advancing due to improved
understanding of extreme events, improved modeling (including
standardized sets of simulations that can be used by a broad
research community), lengthening observational datasets and reanalyses (blends of observations and models), some of which now
incorporate paleoclimate data like tree rings to develop pre107
more robust remote
observational historical reconstructions,
108
Climate and
sensing data sets, and new analytical techniques.
weather models, in particular, are indispensable to most event
109
attribution studies. But statistical analysis can also be used in lieu
of, or as a supplement to, models for locations with high quality
110
observational records.

105. Explaining Extreme Events from a Climate Perspective, BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL
SOC’Y,
https://www.ametsoc.org/ams/index.cfm/publications/bulletin-of-the-americanmeteorological-society-bams/explaining-extreme-events-from-a-climate-perspective/
[https://perma.cc/7P25-68HT] (last visited Nov. 17, 2019).
106. Id. See also BAMS 2016, supra note 76; BAMS 2017, supra note 76.
107. E.g., Marvel et al., supra note 99.
108. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., ENG’G AND MED., ATTRIBUTION OF EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS
IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (2016) [hereinafter NAS 2016].
109. Id. at 44.
110. See, e.g., IPCC AR5 WGI, supra note 25; Stefan Rahmstorf & Dim Coumou, Increase of
Extreme Events in a Warming World, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 17905 (2011); Geert Jan
van Oldenborgh, How Unusual Was Autumn 2006 in Europe?, 3 CLIMATE PAST 659 (2007); R.
Vautard et al., Extreme Fall 2014 Precipitation in the Cevenees Mountains, in BAMS 2014, supra
note 76, at S56; Geert Jan van Oldenborgh et al., Climate Change Increases the Probability of
Heavy Rains Like Those of Storm Desmond in the UK—An Event Attribution Study in Near-Real Time,
12 HYDRO. EARTH SYST. SCI. DISCUSSIONS 13197 (2015).
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Generally speaking, attribution of extremes is more challenging
than attribution of means for a variety of reasons, including: 1) the
local nature and short duration of many extremes (which makes
them difficult to model given the coarse resolution of climate
models); 2) the relative rarity of extreme events at a given location
(which makes it difficult to detect and attribute a climate change
“signal” amidst the large “noise” of natural variability); and 3) the
cause-and-effect chains for extremes are often highly nonlinear and
111
may include instantaneous and delayed effects.
There are also
some modeling challenges that are particularly relevant for
extreme event attribution. Christiansen (2015) notes models may
be too Gaussian in their extreme events (that is, they don’t produce
enough of them). Furthermore, skewness—a statistical measure
that is sensitive to the tails of the distribution—may vary by season.
Scientists have devised statistical approaches to avoid the problems
and limitations associated with climate models but all rely on
112
simplifying assumptions. Statistical approaches also tend to make
the potentially faulty assumption that historical relationships will
113
Nonetheless, for many
persist as the climate changes further.
111. Sebastian Sippel et al., Warm Winter, Wet Spring, and an Extreme Response to Ecosystem
Functioning in the Iberian Peninsula, in BAMS 2016, supra note 76, at S80 (citing D.A. Frank et
al., Effects of Climate Extremes on the Terrestrial Carbon Cycle: Concepts, Processes, and Potential
Future Impacts, 21 GLOBAL CHANGE BIOLOGY 2861 (2015) and J.A. Arnone et al., Prolonged
Suppression of Ecosystem Carbon Dioxide Uptake After an Anomalously Warm Year, 455 NATURE 383
(2008)).
112. For example, a study may assume that climate change can be represented by a
polynomial trend and that any residual represents natural variability.
113. NAS 2016, supra note 108; Bo Christiansen, The Role of the Selection Problem and NonGuassianity in Attribution of Single Events to Climate Change, 28 J. CLIMATE 9873 (2015). The
above is one example of a much broader collection of approaches to addressing climate
model limitations. Two other examples include: (1) Hannart proposed using (observed)
data assimilation techniques to go beyond climate model ensembles (Hannart et al., supra
note 51); (2) Numerous authors used optimal fingerprinting techniques (Gabriel Hegerl &
Frank Zwiers, Use of Models in Detection and Attribution of Climate Change, 2 WIRES CLIMATE
CHANGE 570 (2011); Nikolaos Christadis & Peter A. Stott, Changes in the Geospatial Height at
500 hPa Under the Influence of External Climatic Forcings, 42 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 10798
(2015)) to develop approaches tailored to specific climate models. Based on some historical
measure of skill by region and extreme event type, individual models can then be included
or rejected in analyses (Andrew D. King et al., The Timing of Anthropogenic Emergence in
Simulated Climate Extremes, 10 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1 (2015)). While such approaches offer
advances relative to simple bias correction or using climate model output directly, there
remains the possibility that (1) the “winning models” miss key processes/succeed for the
wrong reasons, and (2) that they may miss emerging behavior as the planet warms. In both
instances, prior strong performance by an individual model might not be indicative of skill in
the emerging climate.
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variables and locations, extreme event studies can generate
reasonably reliable results.
The results of extreme event studies are sensitive to how the
114
research question is framed,
and what methodological
approaches and datasets are used. Studies may focus on a class of
events, such as the 2017 Atlantic hurricane season, or an individual
event. This second research area, sometimes called single-event
attribution, is growing fast, and there are now hundreds of studies
seeking to identify the “human fingerprint” on major storms,
115
floods, heat waves, and other events.
One critical framing question is how to define the “extreme
event” (or event class) for the purposes of the study. This involves
defining physical thresholds for what constitutes an “extreme” and
determining the appropriate timeframe and spatial scale of the
study, all of which have implications for the results of the study.
For example, if in analyzing a heat extreme scientists select as their
temperature threshold the maximum temperature achieved, and
focus their analysis on the location that reached the highest
temperatures during the heat event, the event may appear more
exceptional, and the study less broadly relevant, than if the
temperature threshold and spatial scale were selected in a more
generic way. More fundamentally, there are often multiple metrics
that could be used to define an extreme event. For example, a heat
wave could be defined based on maximum temperature over the
course of the heat wave, heat wave duration, a combination of
temperature and moisture in the air, or atmospheric circulation
associated with the event. Along similar lines, scientists may tend to
study those events where attribution statements are easiest to make
and/or where data availability and societal interest are high. These
are just a few examples of how event framing can introduce
selection bias into an attribution study, thus compromising the
study results. Fortunately, selection bias is not an insurmountable
obstacle: efforts are underway to standardize how extreme events
are defined and selected for analysis, and this would have the

114. Framing includes how the event is defined, what conditioning is included, and how
the results are presented (frequency vs. intensity, FAR vs. RR, etc.). NAS 2016, supra note
108, at 37.
115.
See, e.g., WORLD WEATHER ATTRIBUTION PROJECT, https://www.worldweath
erattribution.org/ [https://perma.cc/5US8-M5ST] (last visited Dec. 29, 2019).
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added benefit of facilitating more systematic comparison between
116
extreme event studies.
Scientists also have different options for how to go about
analyzing the effect of anthropogenic climate change on the event.
There are two approaches that dominate extreme event attribution
117
studies. The first is a “risk-based” approach, which focuses on the
extent to which climate change has increased the probability (or
risk) of an extreme event threshold (such as temperatures of 95°F)
being crossed. The second is a “storyline” approach, which focuses
on how a variety of factors, including climate change, have affected
the characteristics and magnitude of an individual extreme event in
its entirety. These approaches both have benefits and drawbacks,
as described below.
The risk-based approach to extreme event attribution involves
evaluating the extent to which human influence on climate has
changed the probability of occurrence of an event at or below a
particular threshold (e.g., a heavy rain event of five inches or
118
less).
One key concept in such research is the “fraction of
attributable risk” (FAR), which can be defined as the relative risk
119
(or risk ratio) of an extreme event or class of events occurring
with and without anthropogenic climate change. The risk-based
approach typically involves the use of two or more simulations from
116. NAS 2016, supra note 108, at 15.
117. The binary classification of risk-based vs. storyline approaches in the main text
obscures some other approaches in the literature. As one example, Mann et al. suggested a
modification to traditional frequentist statistical inference approach, that builds in prior
physical understanding and updates based on experience. Michael E. Mann et al., Assessing
Climate Change Impacts on Extreme Weather Events: The Case for an Alternative (Bayesian) Approach,
144 CLIMATIC CHANGE 131 (2017). Mann et al. equate it to the conditional storylines
approach (for example: surface air temperature increase means more extreme temperatures,
and means more moisture in the air), but goes on to propose something quite different.
Mann et al. propose to use our full knowledge and expectations (through Bayesian statistics)
rather than overweighting avoidance of type 1 errors (claiming a relationship where none
exists). Mann et al. note that fear of type one error yields underestimates of risk and of
human contributions to extremes (citing Stefan Rahmstorf et al., Recent Climate Observations
Compared to Projections, 316 SCIENCE 709 (2007)). Mann et al. note that such a precautionary
approach to risk is common in other fields where ‘do no harm’ prevails (citing Gerd
Gigerenzer & Adrian Edwards, Simple Tools for Understanding Risks: from Innumeracy to Insight,
327 BRIT. MED. J. 741 (2003) (discussing this approach in the context of pharmaceuticals)).
So, he says you get more accurate results and additionally, from a risk management and
ethical perspective, more policy sound results.
118. Myles Allen, Liability for Climate Change, 421 NATURE 891, 891 (2003); Hannart et al.,
supra note 51.
119. Risk ratio/relative risk = the ratio of the probability of an outcome in an exposed
group to the probability of an outcome in an unexposed group.
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a climate model or models which differ in that 1) one simulation is
meant to represent the “world that is”—that is with the greenhouse
gas concentrations (and sometimes other forcings and changes in
boundary conditions like a warming ocean as well) as they have
evolved since an earlier reference period, and 2) the other
simulation reflects a “counterfactual world” without anthropogenic
forcing. Because climate models generally cannot reproduce the
observed statistics of the extreme event in question, a
corresponding percentile threshold is often used. For example, if a
location experiences a five-inch rainfall event, and that is estimated
based on observed data to be a once per year event, the
precipitation threshold amount in the model that occurs once per
year is used for the model comparisons. In mathematical terms:
FAR = 1 - P0/P1
Where P1 equals the probability of a climatic event (such as a
heat wave) occurring in the presence of anthropogenic forcing of
the climate system, and P0 equals the probability of the event
occurring if the anthropogenic forcing were not present. If FAR
equals zero, it means that anthropogenic climate change had no
effect on the probability of the event occurring; if FAR equals one,
it means that the event could not have happened in the absence of
anthropogenic climate change; if FAR equals 0.5, it means that
anthropogenic climate change doubled the probability of the event
occurring. In multi-event studies, a FAR of 0.5 can be interpreted
as meaning that half of the events would not have happened in a
world without anthropogenic climate change.
This approach was pioneered by Myles Allen in a 2003 study in
which he introduced the concept of FAR as a potential basis for
120
liability for climate damages.
Many other studies have since
replicated Allen’s approach, estimating the FAR for a range of
extreme events including heat waves, droughts, and floods. While
the term FAR is almost exclusively used in extreme event
attribution, probabilistic analysis is prevalent across all forms of
121
attribution, and the concept of “attributable risk” can in principle
120. Allen, supra note 118.
121. The prevalence of probabilistic analysis in both climate change and impact
attribution is evident in the IPCC’s frequent use of terms such as “likely” and “very likely”
when describing human influence on observed changes and impacts.
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122

be applied to both mean changes in climate and a variety of
climate change impacts. Indeed, the methodology derives from
common approaches used in public health and other risk-focused
123
research. The advantages of this approach are that it is relatively
well-established, understood, and accepted by the scientific
124
community, and it provides quantitative (probabilistic) findings
similar to the sort of epistemological and environmental data that
is often dealt with by policy-makers, planners, and courts.
Drawbacks include: 1) overreliance on climate models, which as
noted earlier, may not be able to simulate some types of extremes
with fidelity in a baseline climate, and could have blind spots with
respect to how climate change may be modifying key processes
influencing the extreme event, and 2) susceptibility to Type II
errors (i.e., false negatives) where the signal-to-noise ratio for an
event is small due to large internal variability of the atmosphere,
which is often the case for dynamically-driven events such as
125
extreme precipitation and storms especially.
As such, it can

122. See, e.g., Thomas Knutson et al., CMIP5 Model-Based Assessment of Anthropogenic
Influence on Record Global Warmth During 2016, in BAMS 2016, supra note 76, at S13.
123. The concept of “attributable risk” actually originated in epidemiological studies
(e.g., studies seeking to identify the extent to which smoking increases the risk of lung
cancer) and is therefore well-suited for evaluating health-related risks. Some efforts have
been made to quantify “attributable risk” for climate change-related health impacts, but most
of these studies are forward-looking, and there is only a small body of research seeking to
determine the attributable risk of observed public health impacts. There is still a strong
need for more quantitative analysis on this topic. See infra Section II(B)(3); Kristie L. Ebi et
al., Monitoring and Evaluation Indicators for Climate Change-Related Health Impacts, Risks,
Adaptation, and Resilience, 15 INT’L. J. ENVTL. RES. PUB. HEALTH 1943 (2018) (discussing the
need to develop quantitative indicators of climate change-related health risks); Wei W. Xun
et al., Climate Change Epidemiology: Methodological Challenges, 55 INT’L. J. PUB. HEALTH 85
(2010) (discussing challenges in attributing epidemiological risks to climate change); Maud
M.T.E. Huynen & Pim Martens, Climate Change Effects on Heat- and Cold-Related Mortality in the
Netherlands: A Scenario-Based Integrated Environmental Health Impact Assessment, 12 INT’L. J.
ENVTL. RES. PUB. HEALTH 13295 (2015) (quantifying the population attributable fractions
(PAF) of mortality due to heat and cold, but projecting future impacts rather than
attributing current impacts); S.J. Yoon et al., Measuring the Burden of Disease Due to Climate
Change and Developing a Forecast Model in South Korea, 128 PUB. HEALTH 725 (2014)
(quantifying influence of climate change on disease burden in South Korea).
124. See NAS 2016, supra note 108, at 3.
125. Kevin Trenberth et al., Attribution of Extreme Climate Events, 5 NATURE CLIMATE
CHANGE 725 (2015).
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underestimate the extent to which anthropogenic influence has
126
increased the probability of an event.
Some probabilistic approaches have adopted conditional riskbased analyses, both to simplify the modeling and to control for
factors other than anthropogenic effects (such as natural
127
variability, as discussed above). Conditional analyses can in some
respects be thought of as a logical outgrowth of the tension
128
between risk based and storyline conceptualizations, since they
attempt to isolate the component of extreme events due to
anthropogenic warming by treating other components as a control.
For example, natural variability of the ocean surface could be
treated as a control through a climate model experiment that used
the same observed sea surface temperature patterns (on the
assumption that patterns are due to natural variability) to drive
both the counterfactual and anthropogenic forcing simulations,
while universally increasing the SSTs by the amount assumed to
correspond to anthropogenic forcing. By comparing the results,
scientists can largely avoid the criticism that natural variability in
ocean temperatures may have led to differences between the two
sets of results. However, one price paid is that by simplifying the
experiment, full probabilistic attribution is no longer possible,
since the experiment was designed so as to ignore the question of
how sea surface temperature patterns may be impacted by
anthropogenic forcing. Also unaddressed is the possibility that the
estimated magnitude of SST warming assumed with the
anthropogenic forcing in the experimental design could be wrong.
As models become more interactive and experimental designs grow
more complex, the problem of what parts to condition become
more and more vexing. Harrington summarized conditioning this
way:
More conditioning on the observations of the event will result in an
attribution statement with higher confidence (as some possible
sources of uncertainty will have been eliminated (Shepherd 2016)),
but it will have less relevance to other extreme events which may
occur in the future (Otto et al. 2016), and may only quantify the

126. FAR is not well defined when the baseline risk is very low; it also is not designed to
be applied to situations with decreasing risk. NAS 2016 , supra note 108, at 28. Furthermore,
when there are multiple causes, FAR can exceed 1.
127. See supra Section II(B)(1).
128. For further discussion of the storyline approach, see infra page 32.
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human influence on one part of a causal chain of physical
phenomena contributing to the severity of a given event. From the
perspective of an in-depth attribution study, multiple perspectives
using varying levels of conditioning may therefore be
129
complimentary.

The “storyline” approach to extreme event attribution provides
an alternative method for evaluating how climate change affected
some or all of the components that come together to form an
130
individual extreme event.
This approach is conditional in the
sense that it takes the unique extreme event as given; rather than
asking whether it could have happened without anthropogenic
forcing, it asks how anthropogenic forcing may have modified the
131
given event.
The storyline approach was first introduced by Trenberth et al.
(2015) as an alternative to the risk-based approach. The approach
begins with the idea that some aspects of climate change are better
understood than others, with warming temperature and
thermodynamics emerging as first order aspects of climate change
that are relatively straightforward to model and understand.
Proponents of the approach have emphasized that, by contrast,
changes in dynamics, or motion, with climate change are poorly
132
understood and poorly simulated by models.
The storyline
approach, focusing only on components that are well understood,
like thermodynamics, allows for higher confidence statements
about a portion of the event that science understands well, albeit it
at the expense of having to forsake complete, quantitative
133
statements. A typical finding from a storyline approach might be
129. Luke James Harrington, Novel Approaches to Quantify the Emergence of Anthropogenic
Climate Change (2017), (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Victoria University of Wellington)
(on file with New Zealand Climate Change Research Institute School of Geography,
Environment and Earth Sciences).
130. The storyline approach was first introduced by Kevin Trenberth. See Trenberth et
al., supra note 125, at 726.
131. Theodore G. Shepherd, A Common Framework for Approaches to Extreme Event
Attribution, 2 CURRENT CLIMATE CHANGE REP. 28, 28 (2016).
132. The National Academies explained: “Changes in atmospheric circulation and
dynamics are generally less directly controlled by temperature, less robustly simulated by
climate models, and less well understood.” NAS 2016, supra note 108, at 6.
133. The reader may note similarities between conditional probabilistic attribution and
the storylines approach. Conditional attribution starts by saying ‘given this . . .’. The “given”
in this context is often sea surface temperatures or sea ice extent, but it can also be a certain
type of atmospheric circulation. The idea is to move part of the conditions, often the most
vexing part, out of the attribution question. This approach still leaves the question open
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“warming of the upper ocean and atmosphere associated with
climate change enabled more rainfall during event Y than
otherwise would have been experienced.” In some studies,
quantitative statements are included as well based on certain
limited assumptions. In the above example, it might be stated that
the warming of the upper ocean and atmosphere due to climate
change—the thermodynamics—were responsible for an X percent
increase in rainfall. Critically though, any quantitative statements,
rather than being comprehensive, are linked to specific aspects of
the climate system identified by the authors, such as water
temperatures in the example above. Furthermore, most storyline
approaches do not endeavor to assess what percentage of the
driver—ocean temperature in the example above is due to human
activity.
As with the probabilistic or risk based approach, several criticisms
134
have been raised of the storyline approach.
First, focusing on a
single event in its entirety (as opposed to the risk-based approach,
in which events that are defined solely based on their exceedance
of a threshold such as 95F, or air pressure at a given height) and
emphasizing changes across only a portion of the event drivers
(e.g., focusing on thermodynamics rather than dynamics) limits the
utility of the storylines approach for traditional policy and legal
applications.
Since each event is treated as unique, the
applications for a class of events is unclear, and emphasis on a
portion of the event’s drivers, often in a qualitative way,
immediately begs the question of how to address remaining drivers
or summarize the event in toto. Second, the storyline approach has
been criticized as oversimplistic due to the compartmentalization
of an event into discrete components. More specifically the basic
premise that within the context of climate change thermodynamics
are well understood, and dynamics are not (or are unlikely to
change in important ways for extreme events), has been
challenged, with some arguing that there is a smooth gradient of
understanding across system components such as thermodynamics

though of whether anthropogenic warming has impacted the part being taken as given. The
storyline approach takes a full, specific event as the given; tries to initially identify all aspects
and drivers; but then focuses on backing out how some of the better understood aspects of
climate change—generally the thermodynamics, may have impacted the event magnitude.
134. Friederike E. Otto et al., The Attribution Question, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 813
(2016).
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135

and dynamics.
Furthermore, thermodynamics and dynamics
interact. For example, a thermodynamic change, such as warming
of the upper ocean, induces changes in the dynamics of
atmospheric circulation such as rising air, which can feed back on
thermodynamics, for example by changing cloud cover and thus
solar radiation received at the surface. Neglecting dynamics thus
inevitably misses ways that thermodynamics can be impacted by
dynamics, thus rendering the thermodynamics analysis
136
incomplete. Another potential drawback of this approach is that
it generates more qualitative findings that may be less useful for
certain applications than the quantitative findings of the risk-based
137
approach.
While there is some debate about the relative merits of these two
approaches, the reality is that they are complementary—they each
provide different insights on the effect of anthropogenic climate
change on event characteristics, and one approach can be used to
fill gaps where the other is unsuitable.
For example, the
probabilistic/risk-based approach may be more justifiable for
analyzing all events below a threshold, for a class of events that are
135. For example, Mann et al. (2017) notes that dynamical changes with warming are
starting to come into focus: more specifically, a growing body of work based on observations
and simple models supports the idea that the latitudinal pattern of mean temperature
changes (including Arctic amplification) may support changes in atmospheric dynamics that
supports wave resonance and ‘stuck’ weather, which enhances the magnitude and duration
of extremes. It should be noted that global climate models generally do not reproduce this
pattern of wave resonance and ‘stuck’ weather with warming. Michael E. Mann et al.,
Influence of Anthropogenic Climate Change on Planetary Wave Resonance and Extreme Weather Events,
7 SCI. REPORTS 45242 (2017).
136. Otto shows how the dynamics and thermodynamics counteracted each other in
2013 German floods. See Otto et al., supra note 134, at 815. Similarly, a study in Western
Australia found dynamics/circulation changes that favor less rain, but thermodynamic
(specifically sea surface temperature) changes that favor increase in rain. Thomas L.
Delworth & Fanrong Zeng, Regional Rainfall Decline in Australia Attributed to Anthropogenic
Greenhouse Gases and Ozone Levels, 7 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 583 (2014).
137. For example, the quantitative findings from risk-based studies may be more suitable
to answering questions about apportioning liability for climate change. A related criticism is
that individual extreme events are complicated, and the storyline approach, through its lack
of a clear methodology, opens doors to claims of cherrypicking. For example, Trenberth et
al. note that during the “Snowmaggendon event” unusually high sea surface temperatures
led to more moisture being available. Trenberth et al., supra note 125, at 727. The authors
are silent on other drivers of snowfall amount, such as storm location and availability of cold
air. In this instance, the approach is arguably justified given the “thermodynamic” links
between sea surface temperature and warming, but especially in the hands of less
knowledgeable researchers, the lack of a clear, replicable methodology may open the door to
perceptions of cherrypicking of event components.
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relatively well simulated by climate models (e.g., 99% temperature
extremes), whereas the storylines approach may be more
appropriate for complex, iconic, multivariate events such as
Hurricane Sandy, which combine everything from extreme storm
138
surge and snowfall to high winds.
Granted, even with both
approaches there is still a fair amount of uncertainty about the
139
human fingerprint on certain events and certain event classes.
This is evident from the fact that the risk-based and storyline
approaches can produce very different findings about the
magnitude of the human influence on certain events, as
140
highlighted in our discussion of specific event studies below.
A recent development in this field is the emergence of and
growing focus on “rapid” and “advance” (or “predictive”) event
attribution. The World Weather Attribution (WWA) project,
founded in 2014, is at the forefront of these efforts: it conducts
“real-time” (i.e., rapid) attribution analysis of extreme weather
141
events that happen around the world. To accomplish this, WWA
and other like entities use seasonal forecasts rather than
observations to simulate extreme weather events under current
climate conditions before the events actually occur. The goals of
this approach are twofold: first, to demonstrate the feasibility of
using forecast for reliable attribution findings, and second, to make
it possible to issue attribution findings for extreme weather events
142
as they occur.
This second function can help facilitate
engagement with the media, policy-makers, and the public while
events are still fresh in everyone’s mind. However, some scientific
rigor may be lost when research is conducted with such alacrity.
For example, there may be less opportunity to test the model’s
ability to simulate the actual event, and there may be little or no
time for traditional peer-review. Nevertheless, as attribution
research continues to mature, and standardization of experiments
138. Elisabeth Lloyd & Naomi Oreskes, Climate Change Attribution: When Is It Appropriate to
Accept New Methods?, 6 EARTH’S FUTURE 311 (2018).
139. To help address uncertainty, the National Academies has noted a need for more
research on: (i) the role of natural variability in extreme events; (ii) the characterization of
uncertainty; (iii) why it is that different approaches have yielded very different findings; (iv)
what methods are used for event section; and (v) how the counterfactual (no anthropogenic
climate change) world is framed. NAS 2016, supra note 108, at 12.
140. See infra section II(B)(2)(b).
141. WORLD WEATHER ATTRIBUTION PROJECT, supra note 115.
142. About World Weather Attribution, https://www.worldweatherattribution.org/
about/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2020).
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enables more multi-model evaluations, rapid—and even
predictive—event attribution will grow in prominence and
robustness.
b. Status of Research
IPCC AR5 summarized the status of observations on extreme
events as follows:
Changes in many extreme weather and climate events have been
observed since about 1950. It is very likely that the number of cold
days and nights has decreased and the number of warm days and
nights has increased on the global scale. It is likely that the frequency
of heat waves has increased in large parts of Europe, Asia and
Australia. There are likely more land regions where the number of
heavy precipitation events has increased than where it has decreased.
The frequency or intensity of heavy precipitation events has likely
increased in North America and Europe. In other continents,
confidence in changes in heavy precipitation events is at most
143
medium.

143. IPCC AR5 WGI, Summary for Policymakers, supra note 25, at 5.
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NCA4 contained similar findings.
With respect to attribution,
both AR5 and NCA4 recognized that the evidence of human
influence on extreme events varies depending on the event and, in
many cases, is difficult to ascertain. Generally speaking, the
confidence with which scientists have been able to attribute
extreme events to climate change has been highest for events that
145
are directly related to temperature. Extreme events that are the
result of more complex interactions between variables (e.g.,
drought) are more difficult to attribute. There is moderate
confidence about extreme precipitation increases. While there is
relatively low confidence about precipitation deficits alone in the
context of drought, there is higher confidence in the combined
impacts of higher temperature and precipitation on drought risk.
For other classes of severe weather, such as tropical cyclones, midlatitude storms, and smaller scale convective events and tornadoes,
confidence is generally lower. However, these generalizations mask
substantial nuance across space and time; for example, high
temperature extremes at individual highly continental locations in
the mid and high latitudes (where internal variability is large) may

144. NCA4, supra note 7, at 207–76.
145. NAS 2016, supra note 108, at 2.
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be difficult to attribute, and high water level extremes may be
difficult to attribute in places where large storm surges are
relatively frequent, rendering the sea level rise signature on coastal
high water levels relatively less prominent.

Figure Source: IPCC, Summary for Policy Makers, in CLIMATE CHANGE
2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 7 (C.B. Field et al. eds,
Cambridge University Press 2014).

Since AR5 was published in 2013, the world has seen a growing
number of record-breaking extreme events and hundreds of new
event attribution studies have been published. The majority of
these studies deal with heat, precipitation, and storm-related
impacts, but a growing number of studies are assessing more novel
types of extremes—as one example, a recent study looked at
146
“extreme winter sunshine” in the United Kingdom.
Notably, of
the 146 studies published in the BAMS reports since 2011,
approximately 70% have found that anthropogenic climate change

146. Nikolaos Christidis et al., Human Contribution to the Record Sunshine of Winter 2014/15
in the United Kingdom, in BAMS 2015, supra note 76, at 47.
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147

was a significant driver of the event studied. The 2016 and 2017
BAMS reports also contained several studies in which the authors
concluded that the event could not have happened in the absence of
anthropogenic climate change. Another meta-analysis of extreme
event attribution studies, published in 2018, found that forty-one of
fifty-nine papers published in 2016 and 2017 found a positive signal
of climate change, and that thirty-two of forty-three papers
published in 2018 found that climate change had increased the
148
event’s likelihood or intensity.
That meta-study also noted that
the only four studies published in 2018 which found that climate
change decreased the likelihood or intensity of the event all dealt
149
with snow and/or cold temperatures. With all this new research,
the evidentiary basis for attributing extreme events to climate
change is growing rapidly.
i. Extreme Heat
The core characteristics of extreme heat events (magnitude,
frequency, and duration) are all highly sensitive to changes in
150
Thus, an increase in the
mean temperatures at a global scale.
magnitude, frequency, and duration of extreme temperature
events is a direct and foreseeable consequence of a warming
climate. Not surprisingly, confidence in attribution findings is
generally greatest for extreme heat events, as compared with other
151
types of extreme events.
NCA4 found, with very high confidence,
that the frequency and intensity of extreme heat events are
increasing in most continental regions around the world,
consistent with the expected physical responses to a warming
152
climate.
One of the earliest extreme event attribution studies dealt with
the European heat wave of 2003.
Applying the risk-based
approach, Stott et al. (2004) found that it was very likely
(confidence level >90%) that human influence had at least
147. See Stephanie C. Herring et al., Abstract, in BAMS 2016, supra note 76, at Sii.
148. RICHARD BLACK & RUSSEL BAUM, ENERGY & CLIMATE INTELLIGENCE UNIT, EVEN
HEAVIER WEATHER 6 (2018).
149. Id.
150. Radley M. Horton et al., A Review of Recent Advances in Research on Extreme Heat Events,
2 CURRENT CLIMATE CHANGE REP. 242, 242 (2016).
151. NAS 2016, supra note 108, at 7; see Stephanie C. Herring et al., Introduction to
Explaining Extreme Events of 2016 From a Climate Perspective, in BAMS 2016, supra note 76, at S2.
152. NCA4, supra note 7, at 19.
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doubled the risk of a heat wave of the sort experienced that
153
summer.
Since then, scientists have developed a robust body of
research linking unusually warm temperatures and heat waves to
154
One meta-analysis of
anthropogenic climate change.
unprecedented extremes on a global level found that:
[H]istorical warming has increased the severity and probability of the
hottest month and hottest day of the year at >80% of the available
observational area. For the most protracted hot and dry events, the
strongest and most widespread contributions of anthropogenic
climate forcing occur in the tropics, including increases in probability
of at least a factor of 4 for the hottest month and at least a factor of 2
155
for
the
driest
year.

The studies contained in recent BAMS reports further reinforce
this conclusion. The BAMS reports covering 2014 through 2017
contained a total of thirty-five studies examining anthropogenic
influence on extreme heat (including terrestrial and marine heat),
and thirty-three of those studies (91%) found that anthropogenic
climate change had increased either the likelihood or the severity
156
of the heat event. Notably, there were several studies in the two
most recent reports (from 2016 and 2017) which concluded that
heat-related events would have been “virtually impossible” in the
absence of anthropogenic influence on climate. One of these
studies focused on record-breaking global annual mean surface
157
temperatures in 2016, while others focused on phenomena that
more closely fit the definition of an “extreme” event, specifically:

153. Peter Stott et al., Human Contribution to the European Heatwave of 2003, 432 NATURE
610, 610 (2004).
154. IPCC AR5 WGI, Summary for Policymakers, supra note 25, at 19 (“There has been
further strengthening of the evidence for human influence on temperature extremes since
the SREX. It is now very likely that human influence has contributed to observed global
scale changes in the frequency and intensity of daily temperature extremes since the mid20th century, and likely that human influence has more than doubled the probability of
occurrence of heat waves in some locations.”).
155. Diffenbaugh et al., supra note 95, at 4881. The researchers noted that the
framework they used in this study was capable of systematically evaluating the role of
dynamic and thermodynamic factors such as atmospheric circulation patterns and
atmospheric water vapor, lending much greater statistical confidence their findings.
156. BAMS 2014, supra note 76; BAMS 2015, supra note 76; BAMS 2016, supra note 76;
BAMS 2017, supra note 76.
157. Thomas Knutson et al., CMIP5 Model-Based Assessment of Anthropogenic Influence on
Record Global Warmth During 2016, in BAMS 2016, supra note 76, at S11.
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extreme heat in Asia, and marine heat waves off the coast of
159
160
Alaska and Australia. All three studies employed the risk-based
approach and found that FAR equals one, meaning the event could
not have happened without anthropogenic influence. The BAMS
editors noted these findings were novel and significant for two
reasons: (i) they show that the influence of anthropogenic climate
change can, at some point, become sufficiently strong to cause an
extreme event which is beyond the bounds of natural variability
alone; and (ii) because of the small sample size of events shown in
the report, it is possible that many other temperature-related
extreme events from recent years also could not have occurred in
161
the absence of anthropogenic climate change.
Dozens of other studies have found that climate change very
likely influenced the probability and/or magnitude of heat-related
events around the world. One study focused on two heat waves in
India and Pakistan in 2015 which are estimated to have caused
162
approximately 3,200 deaths. Looking at both heat and humidity
(such compound assessments of multiple variables are becoming
more common), the researchers found that anthropogenic forcing
had substantially increased the likelihood of the observed heat
163
indices (by approximately 800–100,000%).
Another compound extremes study focused on heat and drought
in Thailand, specifically examining the causal forcings behind a
severe drought, which affected forty-one Thai provinces and caused
an agricultural loss of approximately $500 million, and a
corresponding heat wave which resulted in an estimated six-fold
increase in heat stroke cases as well as extensive forest fires
164
throughout the country.
There, researchers found that record
temperatures could not have occurred without the influence of
anthropogenic influence on climate, and that this increased the
158. Yukiko Imada et al., Climate Change Increased the Likelihood of the 2016 Heat Extremes in
Asia, in BAMS 2016, supra note 76, at S97.
159. John Walsh et al., The High Latitude Marine Heat Wave of 2016 and Its Impacts on
Alaska, in BAMS 2016, supra note 76, at S39.
160. S.E. Perkins-Kirkpatrick et al., The Role of Natural Variability and Anthropogenic Climate
Change in the 2017/18 Tasman Sea Marine Heatwave, in BAMS 2017, supra note 76, at S105.
161. Herring et al., supra note 151, at S1.
162. Michael Wehner et al., The Deadly Combination of Heat and Humidity in India and
Pakistan in Summer 2015, in BAMS 2015, supra note 76, at S81.
163. Id. at S85.
164. Nikolaos Christidis et al., The Hot and Dry April of 2016 in Thailand, in BAMS 2016,
supra note 76, at S128.
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likelihood of low rainfall in the region. A third study looking at
anomalous Arctic warmth in the winter of 2016 concluded that it
“most likely” would not have been possible without anthropogenic
forcing (the FAR ranged from 0.96-0.99 across five observational
166
datasets).
While the above studies provide compelling evidence of human
influence on extreme heat events, it is important to recognize that
quantitative estimates of risk ratios can differ considerably
depending on the method used in the research. This was one key
finding from a study examining the role of anthropogenic warming
167
in the 2015 central and eastern European heat waves.
There,
researchers used a combination of statistical analysis of
observational data and model simulations for attribution purposes.
They found that both approaches provided “consistent evidence
that human-induced climate change has contributed to the
increase in the frequency and intensity of short-term heat waves
and heat stress” in the region, but that risk ratio (or FAR) estimates
at local scales differ considerably depending on the exact
168
methodology applied. It should be noted that the fact that more
heat attribution studies rely on models than rely on observations
does not indicate that models overestimate anthropogenic
influence relative to observations. For example, Sippel and Otto,
using a high resolution climate model simulation, found that
observed upward trends in heat extremes were three times larger
between 1901–2015 than the trend in the climate model driven by
historical forcings, suggesting that using observations would have
produced a change in relative risk that was three times larger than
169
the model yielded. Another study relying exclusively on statistical
analysis of observations to examine the 2010 Russian heat wave
found that the warming in the region observed since the 1960s had

165. Id.
166. Jonghun Kam et al., CMIP5 Model-based Assessment of Anthropogenic Influence on Highly
Anomalous
Arctic Warmth During November–December 2016, in BAMS 2016, supra note 76, at S34, S36.
167. Sebastian Sippel et al., The Role of Anthropogenic Warming in 2015 Central European
Heat Waves, in BAMS 2015, supra note 76, at S51.
168. Id. at S55.
169. See id. at S53–S55. As noted earlier, however, use of observations without models is
somewhat fraught, for reasons including the difficultly of isolating natural variability in
models and (in some cases) data limitations.
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increased the risk of a heat wave of the magnitude observed in 2010
170
by a factor of approximately five, corresponding to a FAR of 0.8.
ii. Drought
While drought is closely connected to increases in temperature, it
is typically more challenging to isolate the effect of anthropogenic
climate change on dryness and drought conditions because
droughts are such highly complex meteorological events (with
many factors affecting their probability, severity, and duration) and
because large internal variability in precipitation makes it more
171
Nonetheless,
difficult to identify a climate change signal.
researchers have made significant advances in drought attribution
in recent years. Of the twelve studies on drought and dryness that
were included in the 2015, 2016, and 2017 BAMS reports, eleven
(92%) found clear evidence of anthropogenic influence on the
172
severity or probability of the observed event.
One persistent finding is that it is easier to attribute the heatrelated aspects of drought to anthropogenic activities than it is to
attribute reductions in rainfall, due to the dynamic nature of the
173
hydrologic cycle. For example, a study of the 2014 drought in the
Horn of Africa found no evidence of anthropogenic influence on
the likelihood of low rainfall, but “clear signals in other drivers of
drought” (namely, higher temperatures and increased net
174
incoming radiation).
One assessment of observed “flash
175
in southern Africa found that these events had
droughts”
increased by 220% from 1961–2016, and that there had also been a
170. Rahmstorf & Coumou, supra note 110, at 17905.
171. In this section, we use the term “drought” to refer to meteorological drought—that
is, drought brought about by dry weather patterns. Studies examining hydrologic drought—
that is, drought brought about by low water levels—would more properly be classified as
“impact attribution studies.”
172. BAMS 2015, supra note 76; BAMS 2016, supra note 76; BAMS 2017, supra note 76.
173. See, e.g., NCA4, supra note 7, at 22: “The human effect on recent major U.S.
droughts is complicated. Little evidence is found for a human influence on observed
precipitation deficits, but much evidence is found for a human influence on surface soil
moisture deficits due to increased evapotranspiration caused by higher temperatures. (High
confidence)”.
174. T. R. Marthews et al., The 2014 Drought in the Horn of Africa: Attribution of
Meteorological Drivers, in BAMS 2014, supra note 76, at S83; see also Eduardo S. P. R. Martins et
al., A Multimethod Attribution Analysis of the Prolonged Northeast Brazil Hydrometeorological Drought
(2012–16), in BAMS 2016, supra note 76, at S65.
175. The term “flash drought” refers to a rapid-onset drought, typically caused by very
dry and hot weather conditions.
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decreasing trend in precipitation from 1948–2016, but also
recognized that “simulations of surface air temperature change are
much more reliable than those for soil moisture and
176
precipitation.”
A model based study which also focused on
drought in southern Africa found that climate change likely
increased the intensity of the 2015–2016 El Niño which in turn
177
contributed to decreases in precipitation in the region.
The numerous studies on the 2011–2017 California drought also
reflect the complexity and dependency of results on
methodological choices. Swain 2014 focused on geopotential
heights (the heights of pressure surfaces above mean sea level)
because droughts are associated with high atmospheric pressure
and blockage of moisture-laden storms, and found that high
178
heights were attributable to anthropogenic warming. Funk 2014,
focusing on warming of ocean temperatures off a portion of the US
West coast, found that the ocean warming did not contribute to
179
drought risk. And Wang and Schubert found conflicting results:
circulation anomalies associated with anthropogenic forcing did
increase drought risk, but humidity increases associated with
180
anthropogenic warming reduced drought risk. However, a more
recent study found that anthropogenic warming had increased
drought risk in California—specifically, that the precipitation
deficits in California were more than twice as likely to yield drought
181
years if they occurred when conditions were warm.

176. Xing Yuan et al., Anthropogenic Intensification of Southern African Flash Droughts as
Exemplified by
the 2015/16 Season, in BAMS 2016, supra note 76, at S86.
177. Chris Funk et al., Anthropogenic Enhancement of Moderate-to-Strong El Niño Events Likely
Contributed
to Drought and Poor Harvests in Southern Africa During 2016, in BAMS 2016, supra note 76, at
S91.
178. Daniel L. Swain et al., The Extraordinary California Drought of 2013-2014: Character,
Context, and the Role of Climate Change, 95 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y (SPECIAL
SUPPLEMENT) S3, S7 (2014) [hereinafter BAMS 2013].
179. Chris Funk et al., Examining the Contribution of the Observed Global Warming Trend to the
California Droughts of 2012/13 and 2013/14, in BAMS 2013, supra note 178, at S11.
180. Hailan Wang & Siegfried Schubert, Causes of the Extreme Dry Conditions Over California
During Early 2013, in BAMS 2013, supra note 178, at S7.
181. Noah Diffenbaugh et al., Anthropogenic Warming Has Increased Drought Risk in
California, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3931, 3931 (2015).
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iii. Heavy Precipitation
Both AR5 and NCA4 found clear evidence that extreme rainfall
events are increasing around the world, and this is generally
182
consistent with expected physical responses to a warming climate.
However, as noted above, the dynamic nature of extreme
precipitation events—which can be very local and brief in nature,
and thus characterized by large variability and difficult to model—
can make it more difficult to attribute specific precipitation events
to anthropogenic climate change than temperature extremes,
particularly where scientists use the risk-based approach to
attribution. In the BAMS reports published for 2014 through 2017,
ten out of eighteen studies on heavy precipitation (56%) identified
183
an anthropogenic influence on event frequency or magnitude.
But to the extent that studies have found a link to anthropogenic
activities, some of the results have been quite striking.
One study of extreme rainfall in China in 2016 found that
anthropogenic forcings, combined with the 2015–2016 strong El
184
Niño cycle, had increased the risk of the rainfall event tenfold.
Other studies looking at extreme rainfall events in China have
similarly found evidence of anthropogenic forcing on extreme
185
rainfall and flood events in that region.
Meredith et al. (2015)
used a high-resolution regional climate model to assess how water
temperature increases in the Black Sea affected a highly-local
186
“convective” precipitation event. They found a 300% increase in
extreme precipitation associated with a non-linear transition in the

182. NCA4, supra note 7, at 19 (“The frequency and intensity of . . . heavy precipitation
events are increasing in most continental regions of the world (very high confidence)”); IPCC
AR5 WGI, Summary for Policymakers, supra note 25, at 7. With each additional degree
Celsius of warming, the atmosphere is capable of holding an additional 7% more water
vapor. Dim Coumou & Stefan Rahmstorf, A Decade of Weather Extremes, 2 NATURE CLIMATE
CHANGE 491 (2012).
183. BAMS 2014, supra note 76; BAMS 2015, supra note 76; BAMS 2016, supra note 76;
BAMS 2017, supra note 76.
184. Qiaohong Sun & Chiyuan Miao, Extreme Rainfall (R20mm, RX5day) in Yangtze–Huai,
China, in June–July 2016: The Role of ENSO and Anthropogenic Climate Change, in BAMS 2016,
supra note 76, at S102.
185. Claire Burke et al., Attribution of Extreme Rainfall in Southeast China During May 2015,
in BAMS 2015, supra note 76, at S92; Chunlüe Zhou et al., Attribution of the July 2016 Extreme
Precipitation Event Over China’s Wuhang, in BAMS 2016, supra note 76, at S107.
186. Edmund P. Meredith et al., Evidence for Added Value of Convection-Permitting Models for
Studying Changes in Extreme Precipitation, 120 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. ATMOSPHERE 12500, 12500
(2015).
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stability of the atmosphere. A lower resolution model would not
be able to resolve this non-linear precipitation change associated
188
with higher sea surface temperatures.
As noted above, the “storyline” approach to attribution was
developed in part to improve attribution for difficult to model
events like extreme precipitation. Researchers used this approach
to examine the effect of anthropogenic climate change on the 2013
floods in Boulder, Colorado, and found that anthropogenic drivers
increased the magnitude of the rainfall for that week by
189
approximately 30%. The scientists also conducted a probabilistic
analysis of potential impacts on flooding and found that this 30%
increase in rainfall approximately doubled the likelihood of flood190
inducing rainfall occurring during that event.
In contrast,
researchers evaluating the Boulder floods under the risk-based
framework found no evidence that anthropogenic climate change
191
had increased the probability of the event occurring.
This
underscores the sensitivity of results to methodological choices
made in extreme event attribution.
iv. Tropical and Extratropical Cyclones
Climate change can fuel tropical cyclones in several ways.
Although key uncertainties remain with respect to how
anthropogenic forcing has influenced some tropical cyclone
determinants (e.g., wind shear and atmospheric aerosols), other
drivers are quite clear. First, sea surface temperatures have warmed
in most places, which—all things being equal—allows the most
intense storms to strengthen, leading to non-linear increase in
storm impacts. Second, a warmer atmosphere can hold more
moisture and thus can lead to heavier rainfall and flooding.

187. See Edmund P. Meredith et al., Crucial Role of Black Sea Warming in Amplifying the
2012 Krymsk Precipitation Extreme, 8 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 615, 615 (2015). This increase was
related to the change in temperature with height; warming water warmed the lower
atmosphere above it, making the lower atmosphere less dense and thereby facilitating
rainfall-conducive rising of air. Id. at 618.
188. See id. at 616. Note that the paper itself did not directly attribute the increasing sea
surface temperatures to anthropogenic forcing.
189. Pardeep Pall et al., Diagnosing Conditional Anthropogenic Contributions to Heavy
Colorado Rainfall in September 2013, 17 WEATHER AND CLIMATE EXTREMES 1, 1 (2017).
190. Id. at 5.
191. See Martin Hoerling et al., Northeast Colorado Extreme Rains Interpreted in a Climate
Change Context, in BAMS 2013, supra note 178, at S17.
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Finally, higher sea levels exacerbate coastal flooding and high-water
levels during storms.
Attribution studies on tropical and extratropical cyclones have
generated mixed results. Many early studies performed using the
risk-based approach found no clear evidence that anthropogenic
forcings altered the probability or severity of the cyclones
192
examined therein. But more recently, there have been numerous
studies in which researchers have identified a fairly large
anthropogenic “fingerprint” on select storm characteristics. One
such study examined 2015 tropical cyclone activity in the western
North Pacific Ocean—looking specifically at the level of
accumulated
cyclone
energy
(ACE)—and
found
that
anthropogenic forcing largely increased the odds of the ACE values
193
that were observed (FAR = 0.81).
There have also been a number of studies on individual tropical
cyclones. Unsurprisingly, for Hurricane Harvey there have been
several studies focused on the storm’s prodigious rainfall totals,
which reached approximately sixty inches. Risser and Wehner,
using a statistical approach known as extreme value analysis, found
194
anthropogenic forcing led to 37% more precipitation over land;
van Oldenborgh et al. 2017 found a 15% increase using a model
and without considering possible changes in atmospheric
195
dynamics.
Allowing for dynamical changes in addition to
196
A
thermodynamics, Wang et al. 2018 found a ~25% increase.
recent Trenberth 2018 paper showed large positive upper ocean
heat content anomalies in advance of Harvey. Upper ocean heat
content anomalies are straightforward to link to anthropogenic
warming, in so far as the authors note that ~92% of

192. See, e.g., Frauke Feser et al., Hurricane Gonzalo and Its Extratropical Transition to a
Strong European Storm, in BAMS 2014, supra note 76, at S54; Lei Yang et al., Anomalous Tropical
Cyclone Activity in the Western North Pacific in August 2014, in BAMS 2014, supra note 76, at
S124.
193. Zhang et al., Influences of Natural Variability and Anthropogenic Forcing on the Extreme
2015 Accumulated Cyclone Energy in the Western North Pacific, in BAMS 2015, supra note 76 at
S133.
194. Mark Risser & Michael Wehner, Attributable Human-Induced Changes in the Likelihood
and Magnitude of the Observed Extreme Precipitation During Hurricane Harvey, 44 GEOPHYSICAL
RES. LETTERS 12457, 12457 (2017).
195. Geert Jan van Oldenborgh, Attribution of Extreme Rainfall from Hurricane Harvey,
August 2017, 12 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 1 (2017).
196. S. Wang et al., Quantitative Attribution of Climate Effects on Hurricane Harvey’s Extreme
Rainfall in Texas, 13 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 1(2018).
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anthropogenically induced warming has gone towards heating the
ocean. The authors go on to note that Hurricane Harvey was able
to tap the anomalous heat in the nearby upper ocean, ultimately
197
converting the energy into extreme rainfall. While this last paper
is not focused on attribution per se, it is emblematic of how
broader science advances, past and present, help inform
attribution studies—much as attribution studies can advance
broader physical understanding. The Trenberth (2018) paper also
makes a critical point about non-linearity and threshold crossing of
impacts; the authors note that even if precipitation increase with
climate change in a storm like Harvey is only 5–15%, that
incremental increase could conceivably generate the bulk of all
costs. Impacts of hurricane winds have also been shown to increase
non-linearly with stronger winds. In the case of the three major
landfalling 2017 Atlantic hurricanes, costs were hundreds of
198
billions of dollars.
In contrast to tropical cyclone findings, few attribution studies to
date have found an anthropogenic signal in extra-tropical cyclones.
One example, Feser et al. (2014), relied on sixty-seven years of
observed data and found a recent storm experiencing extra-tropical
transition was unexceptional in the context of the long-term
199
observational dataset.
3. Impact Attribution
Impact attribution focuses on the consequences and outcomes of
climate change. Many of the phenomena discussed above (e.g.,
loss of sea ice, increases in sea levels, and changes in precipitation)
200
can certainly be described as “impacts” of a changing climate —
but, as noted at the outset of this section, for the purposes of this
paper, we use the IPCC AR5 definition of “impacts”:
In this report, the term impacts is used primarily to refer to the

197. Kevin Trenberth et al., Hurricane Harvey Links to Ocean Heat Content and Climate
Change Adaptation, 6 EARTH’S FUTURE 730, 730 (2018).
198. Willie Drye, 2017 Hurricane Season Was Most Expensive in U.S. History, NAT’L GEO.
(Nov. 30, 2017).
199. Feser et al., supra note 192, at S54.
200. For example, an “impact” of climate change can be defined as “any change in a
physical, biological, or human system that is driven by a long-term climate trend.” Cynthia
Rosenzweig & Peter Neofotis, Detection and Attribution of Anthropogenic Climate Change Impacts,
4 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE 121, 121 (2013).
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effects on natural and human systems of extreme weather and climate
events and of climate change. Impacts generally refer to effects on
lives, livelihoods, health, ecosystems, economies, societies, cultures,
services and infrastructure due to the interaction of climate changes
or hazardous climate events occurring within a specific time period
and the vulnerability of an exposed society or system. Impacts are
also referred to as consequences and outcomes. The impacts of
climate change on geophysical systems, including floods, droughts
201
and sea level rise, are a subset of impacts called physical impacts.

Impact attribution gets closer to what people really care about in
the liability and policy context, and, in particular, the question of
who will be harmed by climate change and to what extent. But
because impact attribution deals with consequences that are farther
along the causal chain, it is harder to issue robust findings about
the connection between anthropogenic influence on climate and
specific on-the-ground impacts.
a. Methods and Parameters
Impact attribution, like climate change attribution, relies on
physical understanding, observational data, statistical analysis, and
models.
However, impact attribution also involves unique
challenges that can make the attribution of impacts more difficult
than the attribution of climate change and extreme weather events.
The most fundamental challenge is that, as research moves
further down the causal chain from human influence on climate
change to discrete impacts on human and natural systems,
researchers must account for an increasing number of non-climate
and exogenous variables which complicate the attribution analysis
(sometimes referred to as “confounding factors”). For example, in
a study seeking to link public health impacts from a heat wave to
anthropogenic forcing, researchers would need to account for land
use decisions, access to cooling, and other adaptations affecting
public health, as well as baseline vulnerability of subsets of the
population to heat impacts (based on factors such as age, preexisting health conditions, and outdoor activity) in order to
ascertain the extent to which anthropogenic climate change was
responsible for those impacts.
The relationship between two variables can also be complex and
non-linear. For example, while the relationship between increasing
201. IPCC AR5 SYR, supra note 33, at 124.
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mortality and each additional degree of warming may be well
understood at moderately high temperatures, there may be limited
knowledge, or observational basis, of just how steeply mortality may
202
rise with temperature once extreme temperatures occur.
Furthermore, there is typically not a linear cause-and-effect
relationship, but rather there is an interconnected web of variables
where a change in any one variable can create cascading effects and
feedback loops. As one example, it has been argued that
anthropogenically-enhanced droughts in agricultural breadbaskets,
203
such as Russia in 2010, had cascading impacts on grain prices that
disproportionately affected food insecure populations around the
globe, ultimately contributing both to malnutrition and civil unrest
204
in regions far away from the original extreme climate event.
Researchers must also account for internal system dynamics in
impact attribution studies. For example, a study of how a species’
population was impacted by anthropogenic forcing might need to
consider the amplitude of long-term population variability due to
natural cycles of predator-prey interactions that could in principle
be independent of climate. For many systems, and places,
standardized long term data sets simply are not available.
Furthermore, establishing causation, as opposed to simply
observing correlation, can present another challenge, especially for
impacts systems where robust models do not exist that allow for
simulation of counterfactual worlds, i.e. realizations other than the
single realization actually experienced in the real world. In the
absence of long-term impact datasets and strong impact models,
attribution impact researchers have had to make assumptions. For
example, across many impact sectors, short-term weather
fluctuations that happened to align with the time period when
impacts data were available have been used to estimate sensitivity to
205
climate change, or impacts of earlier events for which data was

202. Ebi et al., supra note 123, at 085004-3.
203. Rahmstorf & Coumou, supra note 110.
204. See Troy Sternberg, Chinese Drought, Bread and the Arab Spring, 34 APPLIED
GEOGRAPHY 519 (2012).
205. See Oliver Deschênes & Michael Greenstone, The Economic Impacts of Climate Change:
Evidence from Agricultural Output and Random Fluctuations in Weather, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 3761
(2012); Oliver Deschênes & Michael Greenstone, Climate Change, Mortality, and Adaptation:
Evidence from Annual Fluctuations in Weather in the US, 3 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 152
(2011).
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206,207

not available.
This may be problematic, either because longterm responses inherently differ from short-term responses, or
because of changes in the various state variables over time (e.g.,
long term changes in confounding factors like technological
208
innovation or population change).
Treatment of antecedent climate conditions not being included
in the formal attribution analysis requires care as well. For
example, a study of flooding damages along a river due to a specific
heavy rain event might have to consider how prior
meteorological/climate conditions impacted soil moisture, water
levels, and even vegetation, as these prior conditions would affect
flood extent and damage.
Finally, some of the challenges discussed in the extreme events
section apply here as well. For example, the spatial and temporal
scale of an impact—and the driving extreme event—may be too
fine to capture with existing models. In these instances, large
natural variability relative to any anthropogenic signal, absence of
representative local data, and the aforementioned modeling
challenges may hinder impact attribution.
There are a variety of approaches taken in impact attribution
studies. Roughly speaking, most impact attribution studies can be
characterized as either “single-step” or “multi-step” studies (also
known as “direct” and “joint” attribution, respectively). The singlestep studies focus on the relationship between impacts and
observed changes in mean climate variables or extremes, without
going so far as to draw a complete causal connection from the
impact to anthropogenic influence on climate. This is similar to
the approach taken in the IPCC reports: impacts are discussed in
the WGII report but are generally not explicitly linked to human
forcings. One key idea underpinning this approach is that human
206. Maximilian Auffhammer et al., Integrated Model Shows that Atmospheric Brown Clouds
and Greenhouse Gases Have Reduced Rice Harvests in India, 103 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 19668,
19670 (2006).
207. To be sure, there are some examples of studies where long-term impact data
enabled assessment of long-term changes in impacts. See Kristie L. Ebi et al., Detecting and
Attributing Health Burdens to Climate Change, 125. ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 085004-1, 085004-2
(2017) (noting a 2014 study by Bennett et al. on temperature-related mortality in Australia
from 1968 to 2007. Charmian Bennett et al. Shifts in the Seasonal Distribution of Deaths in
Australia, 1968–2007, 58 INT’L J. BIOMETEOROLOGY 835 (2014)).
208. Ebi 2017 provide a strong example: “on a time scale of decades, local food
production may shift successfully to new heat-tolerant technologies or be abandoned
altogether.” Ebi et al, supra note 207, at 085004-2 (internal citations omitted).
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influence is a primary driver of climate change, so we can infer that
many of the impacts where attribution is well advanced are
ultimately caused by anthropogenic climate change—especially
those linked to climate variable, like mean temperature at a
continental scale. This approach has the advantage of simplicity,
but can only generate robust, quantitative findings where the
impact attribution study can be linked to one or more external
studies of an appropriate scale and scope, which establish the role
of human influence in the change in climate variable giving rise to
the impact. In the absence of such studies, scientists may be able to
infer that an impact was “caused” by climate change, but they will
not be able to isolate the proportional contribution of human
influence on that impact. Due to this limitation, many single-step
attribution studies tend to communicate results in a conservative
fashion, focusing on whether there is any human influence on a
particular impact rather than quantifying the magnitude of the
209
influence.
The multi-step or “joint” impact attribution studies, which are
less common, involve at least two attribution steps: first, linking a
change in a mean climate variable or extreme to anthropogenic
210
influence and second, linking impacts to that change.
For
example, a study could link mortality to temperature increases, and
then link temperature increases to greenhouse gas emissions. This
second approach is sometimes referred to as “end-to-end”
211
attribution.
The multi-step approach is preferable in principle,
but in practice the complexity of multi-step attribution analysis,
with its potential for cascading uncertainty, can lead to weak
and/or heavily-caveated attribution statements.
A distinction can also be drawn between impact attribution
studies that contain quantitative analysis of impacts, and impact
attribution studies which only contain a qualitative description of
impacts. In quantitative studies, the analysis often mirrors that of
extreme event studies—the emphasis being on determining the
extent to which climate change increased the risk of certain
impacts. Quantitative impact assessments do not always rely on
209. IPCC AR5 WGI, supra note 25, at 878.
210. For a more detailed explanation of these two approaches, see Dáithi Stone et al., The
Challenge to Detect and Attribute Effects of Climate Change on Human and Natural Systems, 121
CLIMATIC CHANGE 381, 390–91 (2013).
211. See, e.g., Cynthia Rosenzweig et al., Attributing Physical and Biological Impacts to
Anthropogenic Climate Change 453 NATURE 353, 354 (2008).
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models—sometimes they rely on more simple methods, like
extrapolation of observations or historical statistical relationships to
estimate impacts such as changes in crop yield. In the qualitative
studies, scientists will look at a change like increases in surface
temperature, attribute those changes to anthropogenic influence,
and then simply describe how the change in the climate variable
212
affected other variables.
The advantage of the qualitative
approach is that it can provide useful insights into the nature of
possible climate change impacts that have not received a great deal
213
of scientific or public attention to date.
But the qualitative
approach would not be as effective at supporting certain
applications, such as liability claims, precisely because it does not
generate quantitative data.
b. Status of Research
The WGII report for AR5 found strong evidence that “changes in
climate have caused impacts on natural and human systems on all
214
continents and across all oceans” in recent decades. However, it
also found that evidence of climate-change impacts was “strongest
and most comprehensive” for natural systems, whereas evidence
linking impacts on human systems to climate change was more
215
limited. Most of the attribution findings in the WGII report are
the product of “single-step attribution” although the report does
cite to some studies that have conducted multi-step attribution. In
recent years, the BAMS reports have also been expanded to
encompass impacts attribution in addition to extreme event
attribution, and most of the studies in those reports employ single216
step attribution.
Two key areas of focus in impact attribution
studies include the Arctic and the oceans, where changes are
occurring more rapidly and impacts are therefore more apparent.
212. See, e.g., Michael Jacox et al., Forcing of Multiyear Extreme Ocean Temperatures that
Impacted California Current Living Marine Resources in 2016, in BAMS 2016, supra note 76, at
S27.
213. BAMS annual extreme event attribution reports, for example, are increasingly
weighing in on impacts after assessing whether the extreme event can be linked to
anthropogenic forcing. The majority of the papers address the link between the impact and
the extreme event in a qualitative way, with a few exceptions.
214. IPCC AR5 WGII, Summary for Policymakers, supra note 20, at 4.
215. Id.
216. Herring et al., supra note 151, at S3. As noted earlier, in the BAMS reports, the
single-step tends to be the link between anthropogenic warming and climate or extreme
events, with the link to impacts treated less rigorously.
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Impacts from extreme events, particularly heat waves, are also a
major focus of impact attribution studies.
i. Ecosystems, Species, and Ecological Indicators
Much of the existing impact attribution research focuses on
ecological impacts, seeking to understand how climate change is
affecting individual species, ecosystems, and ecological functioning.
The focus of such studies is on natural systems, but there are clear
implications for human systems, insofar as we rely on natural
systems, such as fisheries, for food as well as other ecosystem
services, such as water and air filtration. There is robust evidence
of impacts in this category. In particular, IPCC AR5 found with
high confidence that “[m]any terrestrial, freshwater, and marine
species have shifted their geographic ranges, seasonal activities,
migration patterns, and abundances, and species interactions in
217
response to ongoing climate change.” IPCC AR5 also expressed
high confidence in findings that several recent species extinctions can
218
be attributed to climate change, and very high confidence that
climate-related extremes such as heat waves, droughts, floods, and
219
cyclones were altering ecosystems. IPCC AR5 expressed high and
medium confidence about a number of other region-specific impacts,
such as changes in the timing of critical biological events, increased
220
tree mortality, pest outbreaks, and other ecosystem disturbances.
There are many examples of both single-step and multi-step
attribution of ecological impacts. Most of the multi-step studies
focus on the impact of increasing temperatures on biological
221
systems.
In one of the earliest and most comprehensive metaanalyses, Rosenzweig et al. 2008 conducted a broad assessment of
222
observed changes in natural systems.
The researchers
demonstrated that: (i) regional climate changes were caused by
human forcing, and (ii) observed changes in natural systems were

217. IPCC AR5 WGII, Summary for Policymakers, supra note 18, at 4. Note the absence,
though, of direct attribution of the climate change to anthropogenic forcing, rather than
other possible factors, like natural variability.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 6.
220. IPCC AR5 WGII, Technical Summary, supra note 18, at 44–46.
221. See, e.g., Terry Root et al., Human-Modified Temperatures Induce Species Changes: Joint
Attribution, 102 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7465 (2005); Ebi et al., supra note 207.
222. Cynthia Rosenzweig et al., Attributing Physical and Biological Impacts to Anthropogenic
Climate Change, 453 NATURE 353, 354 (2008).
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consistent with the estimated responses of physical and biological
systems to regional climate change and not consistent with
alternative explanations that exclude regional climate change.
Specifically, they found that approximately 95% of 829
documented physical changes (e.g., glacier reduction and earlier
spring peak of river discharge) and that 90% of 28,800
documented changes in biological systems (e.g., earlier blooming)
223
were in directions consistent with warming.
The researchers
endeavored to explicitly account for confounding variables such as
land use change, management practices, pollution and human
demography shifts.
Many other impact studies have been conducted since 2008 to
improve understanding of exactly how climate change is affecting
biological systems. The 2016 BAMS report contained several
examples of such studies, including three studies finding that
increases in sea surface and ocean temperatures were harming
ocean ecosystems through impacts such as coral reef bleaching and
224
reduced fish stocks, and a study on terrestrial impacts which
found that anthropogenic influence on climate change was actually
driving higher ecosystem productivity on the Iberian Peninsula
through warmer winters coupled with wet springs and increases in
225
CO2 availability.
These studies exemplified the diversity of
approaches in impact attribution: one of the marine studies
focused on the role of anthropogenic forcing in causing ocean
temperatures that had resulted in certain ecological impacts
226
without taking a detailed look at the impacts themselves; another
focused on the extent to which coral reef and seabird communities
were disrupted by record-setting sea surface temperatures and
made an “indirect two-step link to human-induced climate change”
by referencing findings from a companion paper attributing the
227
record-setting temperatures to anthropogenic forcing; and the
223. Id. While those key findings were presented in quantitative terms, each
documented change was handled in a qualitative way (looking at direction of change and
not amount changed).
224. Sophie C. Lewis & Jennie Mallela, A Multifactor Risk Analysis of the Record 2016 Great
Barrier Reef Bleaching, in BAMS 2016, supra note 76, at S144; Jacox et al., supra note 212;
Russel E. Brainard et al., Ecological Impacts of the 2015/16 El Niño in the Central Equatorial
Pacific, in BAMS 2016, supra note 76, at S21.
225. Sippel et al., supra note 111, at S80.
226. Jacox et al., supra note 212.
227. Stott et al., Future Changes in Event Attribution Methodologies, in BAMS 2016, supra note
76, at S156 (referencing Brainard et al., supra note 224).
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third was a multi-step attribution study in which scientists attributed
abnormally warm SST to anthropogenic forcing and then
qualitatively examined the respective role of the abnormally warm
228
SST on coral bleaching.
The multi-step attribution study of the
Iberian Peninsula was noteworthy for the complexity of the model
design, which included counterfactual simulations for both the
climate model and the ecosystem model. The experimental design
supported attribution of ecosystem impacts not only to observed
changes in climate associated with anthropogenic forcing, but also
229
to direct impacts of higher CO2 concentrations on vegetation.
As evident from these and other studies, impacts on marine
ecosystems are a key topic in impact attribution. One reason for
this is ocean temperatures are rising quickly in many regions
relative to natural variability (indicating a high signal to noise
230
ratio).
Not coincidentally, the impacts on marine resources are
more evident, in some cases, than terrestrial impacts, as more and
more species and ecosystems approach climate thresholds that may
not have occurred during their evolutionary history. The effect of
climate change on fishery productivity is also a major concern
231
throughout the world and a key focus of many studies.
ii. Inland Flooding and Hydrologic Impacts
A fair amount of research has also been conducted on the
impacts of climate change on inland or riverine floods, hydrologic
droughts, and changes in streamflow.
Above, we discuss
meteorological droughts as a type of extreme climate event—
hydrologic droughts are more properly classified as “impacts” of
climate change because there are so many confounding factors that
affect their characteristics. The same can be said for floods. While
these are often discussed as “extreme events” in common parlance,
they are more properly classified as impacts of climate change due
to the number of non-climate related confounding factors that
228. Lewis & Mallela, supra note 224.
229. Sippel et al., supra note 111.
230. Thomas Frölicher, et al., Marine Heatwaves Under Global Warming, 560 NATURE 360,
360 (2018).
231. See, e.g., NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., WHAT CAUSED THE SACRAMENTO
RIVER FALL CHINOOK STOCK COLLAPSE? (2009); Jonathan A. Hare et al., Cusk (Brosme brosme)
and Climate Change: Assessing the Threat to a Candidate Marine Fish Species Under the US
Endangered Species Act, 69 ICES J. MARINE SCI. 1753 (2012); Kyle Meng et al., New England Cod
Collapse and the Climate, PLOS ONE, July 27, 2016.
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232

affect flood characteristics. It is also worth bearing in mind that
floods and other hydrologic impacts can be affected by slow-onset
changes such as temperature increases as well as extreme events.
IPCC AR5 found, with medium confidence, that changes in
precipitation, snow melt, and ice are altering hydrological systems
and affecting water resources (both in terms of quality and
233
quantity).
However, IPCC AR5 did not find evidence that, on a
global scale, surface water and groundwater drought frequency had
234
changed in the last few decades, but did discuss research linking
235
IPCC AR5 also
regional drought conditions to climate change.
found with very high confidence that climate-related extremes were
236
disrupting water supply.
Flood attribution studies follow the same pattern as other impact
attribution studies—single-step attribution, as well as storyline
237
approaches dominate existing studies to date.
The climate
variables that are most relevant to inland flood impact analysis
include precipitation, storms, and temperature (which can cause
flooding through, e.g., snowmelt and permafrost thawing). Some
multi-step analyses have also been performed for hydrologic
238
droughts and other hydrologic impacts.
For example, a 2008
study of human-induced changes in the hydrology of the western
United States found that up to 60% of the climate-related trends in
river flow, winter air temperature, and snow pack between 1950
239
and 1999 were human-induced.

232.
These include, for example, geography, topography, hydrology, water
infrastructure, land use decisions, and building design. Note though that precipitation
associated with a flood would be treated as an “extreme event” under our nomenclature.
233. IPCC AR5 WGII, supra note 18, at 44.
234. Id.
235. See, e.g., id. (expressing medium confidence that climate change had increased soil
moisture drought in the Sahel since 1970).
236. Id. at 6.
237. See, e.g., Trenberth et al., supra note 125.
238. See, e.g., Sebastian Sippel & Friederike E. L. Otto, Beyond Climatological Extremes—
Assessing how the Odds of Hydrometeorological Extreme Events in South-East Europe Change in a
Warming Climate, 125 CLIMATIC CHANGE 381 (2014); Pardeep Pall et al., Anthropogenic
Greenhouse Gas Contribution to Flood Risk in England and Wales in Autumn 2000, 470 NATURE
382 (2011); Geert Jan van Oldenborgh et al., The Absence of a Role of Climate Change in the 2011
Thailand Floods, in EXPLAINING EXTREME EVENTS OF 2011 FROM A CLIMATE PERSPECTIVE 1047
[hereinafter BAMS 2011] (2012).
239. Tim Barnett et al., Human-Induced Changes in the Hydrology of the Western United States,
319 SCIENCE 1080, 1080 (2008).
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iii. Coastal Impacts
Climate change is affecting coastlines through sea level rise,
changes in the severity and frequency of storms and extreme
rainfall events, temperature changes (particularly marine
temperatures), and ocean acidification. IPCC AR5 found that
many coastal areas are already experiencing adverse impacts such
as submergence, coastal flooding, coastal erosion, and saltwater
intrusion, all of which are exacerbated by sea level rise, but found
also that the impacts of anthropogenic climate change on
coastlines are difficult to tease apart from human-related drivers
240
such as land use change and in situ adaptations such as sea walls.
Studies attributing coastal impacts to anthropogenic influence on
climate may focus exclusively on physical impacts or may seek to
link physical impacts to economic or public health outcomes.
Findings from recent coastal impact studies suggest that some
coastal areas are already undergoing dramatic transformations
driven primarily by sea level rise. For example, one single-step
study of flooding in Southeast Florida focused on the role of sea
level rise in monthly high tides and found that the probability of a
0.57-meter tidal flood within the Miami region had increased by
more than 500% since 1994 due to a 10.9-centimeter increase in
241
sea levels. The findings from this study are compelling—indeed
both the link between 1) anthropogenic warming and sea level rise
and 2) sea level rise and the frequency of coastal flooding are two
of the most robust aspects of climate change. Nevertheless, this
and similar studies are limited insofar as they do not quantify the
anthropogenic influence on the observed changes in sea level rise
and corresponding impact on floods, nor do they speak to specific
impacts on human systems (e.g., economic damages or public
health outcomes).
iv. Wildfires
Climate change primarily exacerbates wildfire risk through
hotter and drier conditions. Perhaps counterintuitively, in waterlimited regions, an unusually wet growing season, during which
time more vegetation grows which can later become fuel, can set
240. IPCC AR5 WGII, supra note 18, at 364.
241. William V. Sweet et al., In Tide’s Way: Southeast Florida’s September 2015 Sunny-day
Flood, in BAMS 2015, supra note 76, at S25.
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the stage for a large fire season once the vegetation dries out.
Winds, atmospheric humidity, solar radiation, and lightning strikes
also influence fire risk.
While wildfires are sometimes
characterized as “extreme events” related to climate change, they
are far from purely meteorological events; rather, they are a
product of both climatological and terrestrial conditions. For
example, the expansion of human development and electrical
systems into previously-remote forest zones leads to an increase in
ignition, and forest management and fire suppression decisions
242
affect fire frequency and intensity.
As such, the link between
climate change and wildfires is less direct than the link between
climate change and events such as heat waves. IPCC AR5 expressed
medium and low confidence in various studies linking increases in the
243
severity or frequency of wildfires to climate change, with the
higher confidence for wildfires in data-rich North America.
Research performed since then has generated more robust
evidence of a link between anthropogenic climate change and
244
wildfires in North America and Australia.
One of the earliest studies on this topic, published in 2004, found
that human-induced climate change had a detectable influence on
245
Canadian forest fires in recent decades A 2016 end-to-end study
on wildfires in the western United States found that, while there
were numerous factors that aided the recent rise in fire activity,
observed warming and drying had significantly increased fuel
aridity during the fire season, fostering a more favorable
246
environment for wildfires.
They found that anthropogenic
climate change caused over half of the documented increases in
fuel aridity since the 1970s and doubled the cumulative forest fire

242. A. Park Williams et al., Observed Impacts of Anthropogenic Climate Change on Wildfire in
California, 7 EARTH’S FUTURE 892, 892 (2019) (recognizing that the effects of climate change
on wildfire can vary greatly across space and time due to confounding factors such as fire
suppression and ignitions from humans).
243. See, e.g., IPCC AR5 WGII, supra note 18, at 44 (low confidence that climate change had
increased wildfires on Mt. Kilamanjaro); id. at 45 (medium confidence that climate change
increased wildfire frequency in subarctic conifer forests and tundra, and medium confidence
that climate change increased wildfire activity, fire frequency, and duration in forests of
Western U.S. and boreal forests in Canada).
244. NCA4, supra note 7, at 242-245.
245. N.P. Gillett et al., Detecting the Effect of Climate Change on Canadian Forest Fires, 31
GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 1, 1 (2004).
246. John Abatxoglou & A. Park Williams, Impact of Anthropogenic Climate Change on
Wildfire Across Western US Forests, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11770, 11770 (2016).
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247

area since 1984.
The same researchers published a subsequent
study focused on California which found that human-induced
warming had already significantly enhanced wildfire activity in the
state, particularly in the forests of the Sierra Nevada and North
248
Coast. Another end-to-end study focusing on the role of extreme
vapor pressure deficits (VPD) in wildfire risk found that
anthropogenic influences quintupled the risk of extreme VPD for
western North America and had doubled the risk of extreme VPD
249
in extratropical Australia.
Again, the findings from these studies are compelling, but like
many impact studies, they rely on proxies for wildfire risk such as
fuel aridity in order to attribute impacts. Further studies can help
continue to provide answers to help quantify the extent to which
anthropogenic climate change has caused an increase in wildfires
as compared with other confounding factors such as fire
suppression and development in wildfire-prone areas.
v. Air pollution
There have been relatively few attribution studies of air pollution.
250
Vautard 2018 looked indirectly at air pollution in Europe. Rather
than modeling actual air pollution, they modeled changes in the
occurrence of “flow analogues” (i.e. wind and air pressure patterns
associated with observed historical pollution events), finding that
anthropogenic forcing had produced a 10% increase in the
frequency of such events. As climate models become more able to
model air pollution directly, and as awareness grows of how
harmful fire and directly anthropogenic sources of air pollution
(e.g., factories and vehicle emissions) are, we may see more
attribution work on air pollution. Such studies will have to address
the correlation between climate and air pollution, which differs by
region, season, and type of pollutant.

247. Id.
248. A. Park Williams et al., supra note 242, at 892 (more specifically, the authors found
that anthropogenic climate change had contributed to an eightfold increase in summertime
forest-fire area, which in turn had contributed to a fivefold increase in California’s annual
wildfire extent).
249. Simon F.B. Tett et al., Anthropogenic Forcings and Associated Changes in Fire Risk in
Western North America and Australia During 2015/16, in BAMS 2016, supra note 76, at S60–64.
250. See Robert Vautard et al., Attribution of wintertime anticyclonic stagnation contributing to
air pollution in Western Europe, in BAMS 2016, supra note 76, at S70–75.
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vi. Public Health
Public health impacts are another important topic in attribution
research. Here, again, many studies focus on how extreme heat
affects health because the link between climate change and
extreme heat is relatively direct. There has been much discussion
of how other climate-related events and impacts, such as floods and
wildfires, can affect public health, but there is little research linking
anthropogenic forcings to health impacts from those types of
events in a robust, quantitative fashion. As noted in IPCC AR5,
evidence of impacts on public health is not as robust as evidence of
other impacts, and “[a]t present the worldwide burden of human
ill-health from climate change is relatively small compared with
251
However,
effects of other stressors and is not well quantified.”
IPCC AR5 did find more robust evidence of specific types of health
impacts, expressing medium confidence in findings of increased heatrelated mortality and decreased cold-related mortality in some
regions as a result of warming, medium confidence that local changes
in temperature and rainfall have altered the distribution of some
252
water-borne illnesses and disease vectors, and very high confidence
that climate-related extremes were affecting morbidity, mortality,
253
mental health, and human well-being.
Attribution of public health impacts, like other impacts, is
challenging due to data requirements and the complexity of
isolating causal factors that contribute to health outcomes. As
noted by Ebi et al. 2017, robust detection and attribution of health
impacts requires reliable long-term datasets, in-depth knowledge of
the many drivers and confounding factors that affect public health
outcomes, and refinement of analytic techniques to better capture
254
the effect of anthropogenic forcing on health outcomes. Two key
challenges are the fact that high-quality, long-term public health
data is not available for many parts of the world, and there are
many confounding factors that influence public health outcomes in
any given region.
Despite the limitations, Ebi et al. 2017 found that “advances are
possible in the absence of complete data and statistical certainty:
there is a place for well-informed judgments, based on
251.
252.
253.
254.

IPCC AR5 WGII, Summary for Policymakers, supra note 18, at 6.
Id.
Id.
Ebi et al., supra note 207, at 085004-1.
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understanding of underlying processes and matching of patterns of
255
health, climate, and other determinants of human well-being.”
To illustrate this point, the researchers discuss several contexts in
which it is possible to show that a “proportion of the current
burden of climate-sensitive health outcomes can be attributed to
climate change”: (i) heat waves, (ii) the emergence of tick vectors
of Lyme disease in Canada, and (iii) the emergence of Vibrio in
northern Europe. For heat waves, the researchers described several
approaches for estimating the number of heat wave deaths
attributable to anthropogenic climate change. These included two
variants on multi-step attribution that would combine either the
risk-based or storyline approach to extreme event attribution with
an assessment of how changes in exposure to heat waves affect
mortality, as well as a single-step attribution approach which would
combine observations of the changes in the incidence and severity
of heat waves with the exposure analysis. For Vibrio, the researchers
found that it was possible to attribute increases in the incidence of
Vibrio to incremental increases in sea surface temperatures, which
could then be attributed to climate change. For tick vectors and
Lyme disease, the researchers found that there was indirect
evidence that higher temperatures were one of the forces leading
to the expansion of these vectors, but that more detailed analyses
of longer-term surveillance data was needed to actually quantify the
relationship between climate change and tick vectors. One key
takeaway from the authors of that study was that there are many
different approaches to health impact attribution but no standard
practice at this time.
Single-step attribution is still routinely used in health impact
assessments. One such study looked at heat-related mortality in
Sweden and found that mortality from heat extremes in 1980–2009
256
was double what would have occurred without climate change.
As noted, the key limitation to these studies is that they do not
answer the question of how anthropogenic climate change is affecting
public health.

255. Id.
256. Daniel Oudin Åström et al., Attributing Mortality from Extreme Temperatures to Climate
Change in Stockholm, Sweden, 3 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 1050, 1051. (2013). The researchers
accounted for confounding variables such as urbanization and the urban heat island effect,
but did not attempt to quantify human influence on observed increases in extreme heat
events.
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The first fully quantitative end-to-end attribution analysis of heat257
related morality from climate change was published in 2016. This
study combined a climate model with a health impact assessment
model to attribute deaths from the 2003 European heat wave and
found that anthropogenic climate change increased the risk of
heat-related mortality by approximately 70% in Central Paris and
20% in London, and that approximately 506 (± 51) deaths were
attributable to climate change in Paris, and 64 (± 3) deaths were
258
attributable in London.
Where data on public health outcomes is lacking, researchers
may use changes in climate variables as proxies for health impacts.
For example, a study on public health impacts from extreme
temperatures in California’s Central Valley used a temperature
threshold of 40°C as a proxy for heat stress, and found that
anthropogenic forcing had more than doubled the probability of a
prolonged period (13+ days) during which temperatures exceeded
259
that threshold).
Another study took a similar approach to
examining health impacts from the 2015 Egyptian heat wave, using
wet bulb globe temperature as a proxy for human discomfort
caused by high heat and humidity, and found that the wet bulb
temperatures observed during the heat wave were 69% more likely
260
due to anthropogenic climate change. This indirect approach to
impact attribution is essentially the same as extreme event
attribution but with a greater focus on implications for health
outcomes.
By construction, such studies assume a fixed
relationship between the climate or climate extreme metric being
calculated (e.g., a wet bulb temperature threshold) and the societal
impact (additional mortality). This fixed approach may limit the
applicability of the findings across places, subpopulations, and
adaptation/policy contexts.
vii. Agriculture
Agricultural impacts, like public health impacts, are challenging
to attribute to anthropogenic climate change due to gaps in data
257. Daniel Mitchell et al., Attributing Human Mortality During Extreme Heat Waves to
Anthropogenic Climate Change 11 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 1 (2016).
258. Id.
259. Roberto Mera et al., Climate Justice and the Application of Probabilistic Event Attribution
to Summer Heat Extremes in the California Central Valley, 133 CLIMATIC CHANGE 427, 435 (2015).
260. Daniel Mitchell, Human Influences on Heat-Related Health Indicators During the 2015
Egyptian Heat Wave, in BAMS 2015, supra note 76, at S72.
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and the number of confounding factors that influence agricultural
261
productivity. One important finding from the research thus far is
that climate change is having both positive and negative effects on
agriculture depending on the region examined. Based on multiple
studies covering a wide range of regions and crops, IPCC AR5
found with high confidence that “negative impacts of climate change
262
on crop yields have been more common than positive impacts.”
IPCC AR5 also found with very high confidence that climate-related
263
extremes were disrupting the food supply.
Attribution studies on agricultural impacts focus on linking
observed changes in crop productivity to observed changes in
temperature, rainfall, atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations,
and extreme events. Some of the earliest studies on this topic
demonstrated that declining crop yields co-occurred with
264
anthropogenic summer warming at regional scales.
A more
recent end-to-end study on how anthropogenic climate change
affected drought and poor harvests in South Africa during 2016
found that anthropogenic forcings had likely contributed to a
decrease in rainfall corresponding with a decrease in production,
but did not go so far as to quantify precise impacts on crop
265
productivity or economic damages.
viii. Economics and Development
All of the changes in weather, extreme events, and impacts
caused by climate change have implications for the economic
261. Agriculture and ecosystems are directly impacted by CO2 concentrations. There is
also growing research on how other pollutants associated with anthropogenic emissions (or
byproducts of those emissions), like low-level ozone, may impact crops, ecosystems, and
human health. For example, one recent study found a 10% decrease in soy production
associated with and elevated ozone concentrations linked to anthropogenic ozone
precursors. The fact that these chemical reactions are highly sensitive to temperature and
other climate factors points at the challenges of quantifying results. Wolfgang Cramer et al.,
Detection and Attribution of Observed Impacts, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION
979-1037 (Christopher B. Fields et al eds., 2014).
and Vulnerability
262. IPCC AR5 WGII, Summary for Policymakers, supra note 18, at 4.
263. Id. at 6.
264. See David B. Lobell & Christopher B. Field, Global Scale Climate-Crop Yield Relationships
and the Impacts of Recent Warming, 2 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 1 (2007); Lianzhi You et al., Impact
of Growing Season Temperature on Wheat Productivity in China, 149 AGRIC. FOREST METEOROLOGY
1009, 1009 (2007); David B. Lobell et al., Climate Trends and Global Crop Production Since 1980,
333 SCIENCE 616, 616 (2011).
265. Chris Funk et al., supra note 177, at S91.
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health, stability, and social development of communities and
nations. The primary drivers of these economic and development
impacts include: 1) physical impacts on infrastructure and human
settlements (e.g., from sea level rise and storms); 2) impacts on
public health and human productivity; and 3) impacts on food
266
production.
Quantifying these impacts is particularly
challenging, as this requires quantification of all the different types
of impacts discussed above, and more. But some initial efforts have
been made to do so. IPCC AR5 highlighted several examples of
studies drawing a qualitative link between observed climate changes
and/or impacts and the corresponding effect on regional or
national economic outcomes. For example, IPCC expressed high
confidence in the fact that “extreme weather events currently have
267
significant impacts in multiple economic sectors” in Europe.
IPCC AR5 also cited some specific examples of economic and social
impacts from climate-related events, such as the 2008 Zambezi
268
River flooding in Mozambique which displaced 90,000 people.
IPCC also highlighted research linking higher temperatures to
declines in economic growth and per capita income in low-income
269
countries, and linking declining rainfall to the slower growth of
270
Sub-Saharan economies, but this research did not address the
extent to which anthropogenic influence was responsible for
observed impacts.
4. Source Attribution
We use the term “source attribution” in this paper to describe
efforts to identify and attribute climate change to specific sources.
A “source” could be a particular actor (e.g., a country or a
company), a sector, or an activity. As one step in the longer chain
266. For example, the 2017 and 2018 wildfires in California caused billions of dollars of
damage. Facing the prospect of liability for many of those fires, Pacific Gas and Electric
(PG&E), one of the largest utilities in the United States, has filed for bankruptcy. While
there has not yet been a formal attribution study establishing the causal link between
anthropogenic climate change and those fires, initial analyses suggest that unusually warm
temperatures did play a role. Kurtis Alexander, Scientists See Fingerprints of Climate Change All
Over California’s Wildfires, S.F. CHRON (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/
science/article/Scientists-see-fingerprints-of-climate-change-all-13128585.php.
[https://perma.cc/TUK4-TMW6].
267. IPCC AR5 WGII, supra note 18, at 42.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 997.
270. Id.
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to source attribution, we include efforts to unpack the relative
contributions of different sources to greenhouse gas emissions and
concentrations. As noted above, source attribution has been, and
remains, a distinct discipline from what is commonly labeled
271
“detection and attribution” in the climate science community.
However, the distinction is beginning to blur, as recent studies have
endeavored to apply climate change and extreme event attribution
to individual sources. This research is thus a critically important
data point for societal questions about how we should allocate
responsibility for climate change and its impacts among different
actors—and these questions are at the heart of many policy,
planning, and legal debates.
a. Methods and Parameters
As discussed above, the key sources of data used in source
attribution come from direct measurements of emissions, which
can be performed in situ or remotely from satellites, as well as
documentary evidence of emissions contained in corporate
272
reports, government inventories, and other sources. Where
direct emissions data is lacking, scientists can use indirect methods,
such as models, to estimate emissions from sources and activities.
Indirect methods are particularly important for estimating
emissions from land use changes and non-point sources such as
agricultural operations.
As with other areas of attribution, it is challenging to establish a
complete causal chain linking a source’s contribution to climate
change to specific changes in the global climate system and
corresponding impacts on natural and human systems.
Establishing such a causal chain involves going beyond merely
quantifying the emissions contribution of the source and
ascertaining the proportional contribution of those emissions to:
(i) concentrations of greenhouse gases and other forcings, and (ii)
ultimately how those changes in concentrations impact for example
sea level rise, extreme weather events, and the resultant impacts on
ecosystems and/or communities. There are some recent studies
linking specific sources to certain changes in the global climate
system but most of the existing research on “source attribution”
271. See supra Section II(A)(1).
272. These are most often emissions reports, although some historical emissions have
been estimated based on production reports.
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focuses on quantifying emissions from sources and determining the
proportional contribution to increases in atmospheric greenhouse
273
gases.
One complicating factor is that climate change is not a product
of a single pollutant or polluting activity, and different GHGs and
other forcing agents have different effects on climate in terms of
274
magnitude, duration, location, and type of effect.
For example,
aerosols typically reflect sunlight, and to generalize due to this and
other aerosol properties, aerosols tend to offset some of the heattrapping effects of greenhouse gases. Data gaps are a major issue
here: there are no known industry-aerosol databases, although
there have been efforts to estimate national aerosol
275
contributions. This is important because large uncertainty about
the emissions or climate effects of a single important forcing agent
(like aerosols) affects our estimates for other forcing agents.
There is also a good deal of uncertainty about the extent and
timing of historical land use changes and their impact on
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. Some of these
land use changes, like deforestation, also impact climate in other
ways. For example, land use decisions which change the amount of
sunlight absorbed at the surface can have an important or
negligible effect on climate, depending on factors such as the
latitude at which the deforestation occurs, and the reflective
properties of the surface underneath the previously-forested area.
Another complicating factor is that climate change itself directly
impacts the magnitude of sources and sinks for greenhouse gases.
For example, a warmer ocean is less able to uptake carbon dioxide,
and changes in vegetation with climate change could switch some
natural systems from net sources to net sinks, and vice versa.
Nonetheless, scientists can and have endeavored to calculate the
relative contributions of emissions and land use change, and,
within the category of emissions, of different pollutants. In climate
change attribution studies, scientists can bolster emissions data with
actual measurements of atmospheric greenhouse gases (such as
those taken at Mauna Loa) to determine the overall effect of
human activity on climate, with the aforementioned caveats. In
273. See infra Section II(B)(4)(b)(ii).
274. See supra Section II(B)(1).
275. E.g., Ragnhild B. Skeie et al., Perspective Has a Strong Effect on the Calculation of
Historical Contributions to Global Warming, 12 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1 (2017).

BURGER ET AL. FINAL MACRO 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

132

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

2/5/2020 2:44 PM

[Vol. 45:1

source attribution, an estimate of total anthropogenic emissions is
the denominator against which a specific source’s emissions
contribution can be compared. Consider the following equation as
an illustration of this concept:
Cs = Gs/Gg
Here, Cs equals the source’s proportional contribution to climate
change, Gs equals greenhouse gases generated by the source
(including any releases or loss in carbon sequestration caused by
the source), and Gg equals total global greenhouse gases from all
anthropogenic sources.
The measurements of atmospheric
greenhouse gases help scientists quantify Cs, but they do not
provide much if any insight on the magnitude of the source’s
emissions.
Another complicating factor is how to account for historical
emissions when ascertaining the proportional contribution of a
source to climate change. Given that greenhouse gases accumulate
over time, stay in the atmosphere, and can even have lasting
climate effects that extend beyond the time that the added gas is in
the atmosphere, it makes sense to include historical emissions in
source attribution studies. But data about historical emissions is
much more limited, given the absence of satellite-based
observations and other data sources, less rigorous reporting
requirements, and disappearance over time of some emitting
entities and documents.
The steps from 1) emissions estimates to concentration estimates,
and from 2) concentration estimates to climate effects like warming
surface temperature and sea level rise, require the use of models.
Although full climate models are beginning to be applied to
attribution based on individual source estimates, most of the
research described below relies on simplified climate models that
can conduct rapid simulations based on differing source emissions.
These simplified models enable sundry experiments for example
based on individual country emissions, but some fidelity is
sacrificed for the greater speed and simplicity. These models
include assumptions about certain climate parameters (e.g.,
equilibrium climate sensitivity—which can be loosely defined as the
final global warming associated with a certain amount of additional
forcing, often defined as a doubling above preindustrial CO2
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equivalent; and transient response, a measure of more rapid climate
system response).
This question of how to account for historical emissions brings us
back to an earlier point about the role of social science in source
attribution. As explained above, physical sciences alone cannot
fully answer the question of who is “responsible” for emissions
because responsibility can be apportioned in many different ways.
There are presently two primary approaches—assigning
responsibility to national governments and assigning responsibility
to private actors—but there are also questions about how to
276
apportion responsibility under each approach.
International climate negotiations have historically focused on
using national responsibility as the basis for allocating emission
277
reduction burdens.
This focus is evident in the United Nations
276. See supra Section II(A)(2)(c) (national emissions contributions could be calculated
based on emissions generated within national boundaries or emissions embedded within
consumed products; private sector emissions from fossil fuel consumption could be
apportioned to fossil fuel production companies, power plants, or consumers).
277. A Brazilian proposal taken up by the UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Scientific and
Technical Advice (SBSTA) said national historical emissions impacts on temperature should
determine the burden of addressing climate change. A rationale provided was that these
countries had benefitted economically and geopolitically from their emissions. For more
information about the Brazilian proposal and the underlying rationale for this approach, see
Emilio L. La Rovere et al., The Brazilian Proposal on Relative Responsibility for Global Warming, in
BUILDING ON THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: OPTIONS FOR PROTECTING THE CLIMATE (Kevin A.
Baumert et al. eds., 2002); BENITO MULLER ET AL., DIFFERENTIATING (HISTORIC)
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CLIMATE CHANGE (2007); M.G.J. DEN ELZEN ET AL., DUTCH MINISTRY OF
ENV’T, RESPONSIBILITY FOR PAST AND FUTURE GLOBAL WARMING: TIME HORIZON AND NONLINEARITIES IN THE CLIMATE SYSTEM (2002); Nathan Rive et al., Climate Agreements Based on
Responsibility for Global Warming: Periodic Updating, Policy Choices, and Regional Costs, 16 GLOBAL
ENVTL. CHANGE 182 (2006); Kevin A. Baumert & Nancy Kete, Introduction: An Architecture for
Climate Protection, in BUILDING ON THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: OPTIONS FOR PROTECTING THE
CLIMATE (Kevin A. Baumert et al. eds., 2002); Stephen Gardiner, Ethics and Global Climate
Change, 114 ETHICS 555 (2004). More recently, Underdal and Wei reference “accumulated
competitive advantages” via technological innovation and economic growth as the source of
Annex 1 higher wealth today. Arild Underdal & Taoyuan Wei, Distributive Fairness: A Mutual
Recognition Approach, 51 ENVTL. SCI. POL’Y 35, 37 (2015). The Annex 1 countries have argued
against apportionment of responsibility based on historical emissions, on the grounds that,
they were not aware of the effects of greenhouse gas emissions until ~1990, when the IPCC
described these effects in detail. See JYOTI PARIKH & KIRIT PARIKH, CLIMATE CHANGE: A
PARKING PLACE MODEL FOR A JUST GLOBAL COMPACT (2009). Others have countered that
there were many earlier warnings about the perils of greenhouse gas emissions. See, e.g.,
PRESIDENT’S SCI. ADVISORY COMM., RESTORING THE QUALITY OF OUR ENVIRONMENT (1965);
Wallace S. Broeker, Climatic Change: Are We on the Brink of a Pronounced Global Warming?, 189
SCIENCE 460–64; WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
WMO/IAMAP SYMPOSIUM ON LONG-TERM CLIMATIC FLUCTUATIONS, WMO Doc. 421 (Aug.
1975); NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., CARBON DIOXIDE AND CLIMATE: A SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT (1979).
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Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which
places the responsibility for reporting on and reducing emissions
278
on national governments;
the so-called “Brazilian Proposal”
which emerged from UNFCCC negotiations in the mid-1990s and
holds that greenhouse gas emission reduction targets should be set
according to each country’s historical contribution to climate
279
change; and the Paris Agreement which relies on nationally
determined contributions (NDCs) as the primary basis for
280
mitigating emissions.
The UNFCCC reporting framework has
also historically focused on territorial emissions rather than
consumption-based emissions as the metric for gauging national
responsibility.
That said, in recent years there has been a strong push both in
international and domestic fora to: (i) account for consumptionbased emissions as well as territorial emissions at the national level,
and (ii) impose direct responsibility on private actors for emissions
281
and to impose corresponding obligations on those actors. Much
of the focus has been on imposing regulatory requirements or
liability for climate change on fossil fuel producers and electric
generating companies. This brings us to another question about
divvying up responsibility for emissions, which is whether it is
appropriate to assign responsibility for emissions to entities that
extract and sell fossil fuels. Erickson and Lazarous 2013 illustrate
how extraction-based emissions accounting can be contrasted to
“territorial” and “consumption-based” accounting methods in the
282
following figure:

Based on this record, Mattoo and Subramanian (2012) argued for 1970 as the start year.
Aaditya Mattoo & Arvind Subramanian, Equity in Climate Change: An Analytical Review, 40
WORLD DEV. 1083 (2012).
278. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty
Doc No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCC].
279. La Rovere et al., supra note 277.
280. Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
281. See infra Section III(C)(5) for an overview of cases filed against private actors for
their contribution to climate change.
282. PETER ERICKSON & MICHAEL LAZARUS, STOCKLHOLM ENV’T INST., ACCOUNTING FOR
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SUPPLY OF FOSSIL FUELS (2013).
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One might argue that imposing responsibly on upstream
producers, or even midstream electric generators, is unfair because
it lets consumers off the hook, but there are pragmatic and ethical
reasons for focusing on upstream producers and electric
generators. As a practical matter, it is easier to regulate a smaller
group of well-informed companies than a very large group of
poorly informed consumers, and some of the costs imposed on
upstream and midstream entities will flow down to consumers, thus
283
sending the appropriate price signals. As an ethical matter, fossil
fuel producers and energy companies have long known about the
climate risks posed by use of their products, have lobbied against
regulation, and ultimately profit most from the consumption of
fossil fuels.
While most national emissions inventories currently focus on
territorial emissions, researchers have found that it would be
283. See, e.g., JONATHAN RAMSEUR & JANE LEGGETT, CONG. RES. SERV., R45625,
ATTACHING A PRICE TO GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS WITH A CARBON TAX OR EMISSIONS FEE:
CONSIDERATIONS AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS (Mar. 22, 2019).
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relatively easy for countries to produce extraction-based and
284
consumption-based inventories based on readily available data.
In other words, pursuing these alternative accounting
methodologies would not be significantly more expensive or
technically challenging than the territorial approach. These
alternative accounting methodologies also provide valuable insights
that are not captured in the territorial approach—for example, the
consumption-based approach accounts for “leakage” of GHG
emissions to other countries via trade and helps countries
understand the importance of developing policies aimed at
reducing consumption of carbon-intensive products. Ultimately,
though they may carry different legal weight, all three
methodologies are useful in addressing the question of who is
“responsible” for climate change.
b. Status of Research
i. National Emissions Estimates
Countries have been developing and refining national
greenhouse gas emission inventories since the early 1990s,
pursuant to emission reporting requirements laid out in the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
The original agreement called upon developed countries (the
“Annex I” parties) to prepare and periodically update national
emission inventories listing all emissions and removals of direct
GHGs from five sectors—energy; industrial processes and product
use; agriculture; land use, land-use change, and forestry
285
(LULUCF); and waste—in a standardized format. The parties to

284. Glen P. Peters, From Production-Based to Consumption-Based National Emissions
Inventories, 65 ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 13 (2008); Steven J. Davis & Ken Caldeira,
Consumption-Based Accounting of CO2 Emissions, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5687 (2010);
Manfred Lenzen et al., Building EORA: A Global Multi-Region Input–Output Database at High
Country and Sector Resolution, 25 ECON. SYS. RES. 20 (2013); Stavros Afionis et al., ConsumptionBased Carbon Accounting: Does It Have a Future?, 8 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (2017); Glen P.
Peters, et al., A Synthesis of Carbon in International Trade, 9 BIOGEOSCIENCES 3247 (2012);
Kirsten S. Wiebe & Norihiko Yamano, Estimating CO2 Emissions Embodied in Final Demand and
Trade Using the OECD ICIO 2015, (OECD Sci., Tech. Indus., Working Paper 2016/05); Steven
J. Davis et al., The Supply Chain of CO2 Emissions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 18554 (2011);
THOMAS MICHAEL POWER & DONOVAN S. POWER, THE ENERGY FOUNDATION, THE IMPACT OF
POWDER RIVER BASIN COAL EXPORTS ON GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS (2013).).
285.
UNFCCC,
Reporting
Requirements,
https://unfccc.int/process-andmeetings/transparency-and-reporting/reporting-and-review-under-the-
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the UNFCCC eventually introduced emission reporting
requirements for non-Annex I countries as well, accompanied by
programs aimed at addressing capacity and resource constraints in
286
those countries. The UNFCCC secretariat compiles all emissions
287
inventory data in an online database,
and many other
288
organizations use that data to analyze emissions trends.
Due to this international emissions reporting system, there is a
good deal of data on national emissions dating back to the 1990s,
and the dataset has become more comprehensive through the
2000s as developed country parties have also begun reporting
emissions. However, there are still significant gaps in the UNFCCC
data, particularly with respect to historical emissions and
developing country emissions through the mid-aughts.
Governmental agencies, scientific organizations, and researchers
have helped to fill gaps in UNFCCC data through independent
289
research on topics such as historical fossil fuel use by country, but
there is still a fair amount of uncertainty on national emissions
estimates, especially prior to the 1990s.
The UNFCCC reporting approach focuses on emissions
produced within a country. As noted above, another way to
apportion emissions among countries is to focus on embedded
emissions—that is, the emissions embedded within products
consumed in the country. This more downstream approach to
calculating national emissions has gained considerable traction in
recent years. In 2010, researchers constructed a global database of
convention/greenhouse-gas-inventories-annex-i-parties/reporting-requirements
[perma.cc/66SQ-5LNT] (last visited Sep. 11, 2019).
286. UNFCCC, National Reports from Non-Annex I Parties, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE
CHANGE,
https://unfccc.int/process/transparency-and-reporting/reporting-and-reviewunder-the-convention/national-communications-non-annex-i-parties/national-reports-fromnon-annex-i-parties [https://perma.cc/P7E4-ZXAS] (last visited Sep. 11, 2019).
287.
UNFCCC, GHG Data from UNFCCC, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE,
https://unfccc.int/process/transparency-and-reporting/greenhouse-gas-data/ghg-dataunfccc [https://perma.cc/Q7FD-EKQY] (last visited Sep. 11, 2019).
288. See, e.g., CAIT Climate Data Explorer, WORLD RES. INST. http://cait.wri.org/
[https://perma.cc/K784-6M28] (last visited Dec. 30, 2019).
289. See, e.g., Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Centre (CDIAC), U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY,
https://cdiac.ess-dive.lbl.gov/ [https://perma.cc/2W7H-HYZ7] (last visited Dec. 30, 2019);
ESS Dive, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://ess-dive.lbl.gov/ [https://perma.cc/5Y72-QV8L]
(last visited Dec. 30, 2019); CAIT Climate Data Explorer, supra note 288; KEVIN A. BAUMERT
ET AL., NAVIGATING THE NUMBERS: GREENHOUSE GAS DATA AND INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE
CHANGE
POLICY
3139
(2005);
CLIMATE
EQUITY
REFERENCE
CALCULATOR,
https://calculator.climateequityreference.org/
[https://perma.cc/T5XU-89HM]
(last
visited Dec. 31, 2019).
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290

CO2 imports and exports.
The Global Carbon Project has since
developed a similar database that looks at both domestically
produced emissions (“CO2 Production”) and emissions once CO2
embodied in both imports and exports have been included (“CO2
291
Consumption”). Other research institutions have since published
292
their own analyses of emissions embedded in trade products.
Some efforts have also been made to evaluate consumption-based
293
emissions at sub-national levels.
Indeed, new approaches
continue to emerge. For example, Matthews 2016 proposed and
applied the notion of national carbon debts and credits, based on
294
per capita cumulative emissions, relative to a benchmark.
Several efforts have been made to link these national emissions to
specific changes in climate and corresponding impacts. Li et al.
2016 focused on Chinese emissions and found that China
contributes 10 ± 4% of the current global radiative forcing, and
that the relative contribution to global mean surface temperature
295
(GMST) increase was 12 ± 2%.
Skeie et al. 2017 used a climate
model to link the relative emissions contribution from multiple
countries to GMST change, taking into account historical emissions
and focusing on the largest emitters, and found that China was
responsible for 6–13% and the United States was responsible for
296
Skeie et al. noted,
15%–26% of the observed GMST increase.
however, that these findings were very sensitive to the parameters
of the study, including technical decisions such as the timeframe
for the analysis, as well as more normative decisions about the basis
for attributing emissions (e.g., place of extraction vs. place of
burning vs. place of final consumption) and about whether to look
at per capita or total emissions. They also emphasized that, in non-

290. Steven J. Davis et al., The Supply Chain of CO2 Emissions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI.
18554 (2011).
291.
Global Carbon Budget, GLOBAL CARBON PROJECT, https://www.globalcarbon
project.org/carbonbudget/ [https://perma.cc/Q8LU-92FE] (last visited Dec. 31, 2019). See
also Glen Peters et al., Growth in Emission Transfers Via International Trade from 1990 to 2008,
108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8903 (2011); Hausfather, supra note 50.
292. See, e.g., Moran et al., supra note 50.
293. See, e.g., C40 Cities, supra note 50.
294. H. Damon Matthews, Quantifying Historical Carbon and Climate Debts Among Nations, 6
NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 60 (2016).
295. Bengang Li et al., The Contribution of China’s Emissions to Global Climate Forcing, 531
NATURE 357, 357 (2016).
296. Skeie et al., supra note 275.
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linear systems, the proportional contribution to emissions will
differ from the proportional contribution to impacts.
Otto et al. 2017 was the first study to apply the nation-based
emissions framework to individual extreme event attribution,
297
focusing on an Argentina heat wave. A motivation was to quantify
the proportional contribution of nation states to a phenomenon—
specifically a damaging extreme event—that is closer to impacts
and “losses” than phenomena to which source emission approaches
had previously been applied, such as changes in global mean
surface temperature.
The approach makes the simplifying assumption that each
country’s contributions to GMST can be linearly transferred to the
Argentine heat wave. GMST is used as a responsibility indicator
partly on the grounds that it is used in climate policy. Otto et al.
uses two alternate methods to extract the relative contributions to
GMST reported in Skeie et al., each of which has large
298
uncertainties.
One major finding is that the sequence in which
nations are summed in the cumulative approach is hugely
important. It also means that when focusing on one entity’s
emissions, results may be quite different if you remove the entity of
interest from a full account, as opposed to adding that entity only
to a counterfactual experiment. That is: the “How would the
likelihood of the event change if only the region in question has
emitted?” versus “How would the likelihood of the event change if
the region of interest had not emitted?” questions yield very
different results.
Finally, building on efforts to develop national emissions
inventories and link these to climate change impacts, a fair amount
of work has gone into developing “carbon budgets” both on a
global level and for individual countries. Such budgets provide one
possible foundation for holding governments accountable for
mitigating their impact to climate change. The IPCC assessments
and UNFCC targets (limiting warming to 2°C or 1.5°C) are, in turn,
often used as the foundation for establishing budgets. Starting in
the mid-aughts, the UNFCCC COP issued several decisions based

297. Friederike E.L. Otto et al., Assigning Historic Responsibility for Extreme Weather Events, 7
NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 757 (2017).
298. The distribution method assessed the US contribution as 34% (with a 20–54%
uncertainty range), whereas the second approach, known as the gradient method, assessed
the US at 28% (19–45% uncertainty range). Id. at 758.
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on IPCC findings which recognize that industrialized countries
must reduce emissions 25–40% below 1990 levels by 2020 to limit
299
global warming to 2°C. Academic researchers and organizations
like the Global Carbon Project have since put a significant amount
of work into developing more specific national budgets that
300
correspond with the UNFCCC targets.
This work on carbon
budgets is complemented by research examining the adequacy of
national pledges under the Paris Agreement in light of
301
temperature goals.
ii. Corporate Emissions Estimates
There have been a number of efforts to attribute emissions to
corporate actors and business sectors in recent years. Many of
these efforts have focused on tracing emissions to the companies
producing fossil fuels and other carbon-intensive products. Heede
2013 looked at historic production records from ninety producers
of oil, natural gas, coal, and cement found that the emissions from
these sources totaled 914 GtCO2e, equivalent to 64% of cumulative
worldwide emissions of industrial CO2 and methane from 1751–
302
2010. Heede dubbed these producers the “carbon majors” based
on their disproportionately large contribution to global emissions.
He also found that approximately half of the emissions were
generated since 1986—a piece of data which could be used to
contradict claims about unforeseeability (since it is difficult to
argue that companies were unaware of the risks of climate change
by that time). Another noteworthy finding was that substantial
299. See, e.g., Bali Action Plan, U.N. DOC. FCCC/CP/2007/6/ Add.1; UNFCCC, Draft
Resolution, Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term
Cooperative Action under the Convention, Cancun, Mex. Nov. 29–Dec.10, 2010, U.N. DOC.
FCCC/AWGLGA/2010/6.7 (Dec. 10, 2010); Report of the Conference of the Parties on its
Eighteenth Session, held in Doha from 26 November to 8 December 2012, 2013; UNFCCC;
FCCC/CP/2012/8, February 28, 2013.
300. See, e.g., GLOBAL CARBON PROJECT, supra note 291.
301. See, e.g., Yann Robiou de Pont & Malte Meinshausen, Warming Assessment of the
Bottom-Up Paris Agreement Emissions Pledges, 9 NATURE COMMUNICATIONS 4810 (2018).
Scholars from legal, policy, and social sciences disciplines have also written on the topic of
how carbon budgets should be allocated to reflect normative considerations such as justice
and equity, reflecting the fact that this is one area where the law and science interact in
significant ways. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein & Eric Posner, Climate Change Justice (John M. Olin
Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 354, 2007); Catriona McKinnon, Climate
Justice in a Carbon Budget, 133 CLIMATIC CHANGE 375 (2015).
302. Heede, supra note 31. These included fifty investor-owned, thirty-one state-owned,
and nine nation-state producers of fossil fuels and cement. Id.
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emissions had come from fossil fuels sourced from non-Annex I
countries such as China, India, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Iran,
Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Venezuela, Kuwait, Angola, Malaysia, and
Libya, and that this called into question the UNFCCC’s differential
303
treatment of such countries at that time.
Heede’s research
eventually became the basis of the well-known Carbon Majors report,
first published in 2014 and updated in 2017, and an accompanying
304
online database. Notably, the 2017 update found that one
hundred fossil fuel producers were linked to 71% of industrial
305
greenhouse gas emissions since 1988.
Researchers from the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) have
continued research on the carbon majors. Ekwurzel et al. 2017
took Heede’s work a step further, applying his emission findings to
a simplified climate model to assess the impacts of those emission
306
contributions on global temperature change and sea level rise.
They found that emissions from the ninety carbon majors were
responsible for approximately 57% of the observed rise in
atmospheric CO2, approximately 42–50% of the rise in global mean
surface temperature (GMST), and 26–32% of the global sea level
307
rise over the historical period from 1880–2010.
Taking a closer
look at the past few decades, they find that the carbon majors were
responsible for approximately 43% of the rise in atmospheric CO2,
29–35% of the rise in GMST, and 11–14% of the global sea level
308
rise from 1980–2010.
These efforts have been complemented by initiatives such as the
Climate Disclosure Project (CDP), a voluntary system whereby
companies report on emissions in exchange for reputational

303. Heede, supra note 31, at 231.
304. RICHARD HEEDE, CARBON MAJORS: ACCOUNTING FOR CARBON AND METHANE
EMISSIONS 1854–2010: METHODS & RESULTS REPORT (2014); PAUL GRIFFIN ET AL., THE
CARBON MAJORS DATABASE: CDP CARBON MAJORS REPORT 2017 (2017); PAUL GRIFFIN ET AL.,
THE CARBON MAJORS DATABASE: METHODOLOGY REPORT 2017 (2017).
305. GRIFFIN ET AL., CDP CARBON MAJORS REPORT, supra note 304, at 8.
306. Ekwurzel et al., supra note 13. This approach was similar to that applied by Otto et
al., supra note 297, insofar as the researchers went beyond merely estimating the
contribution of sources to global emissions and also looked at the effect on temperature
change and sea level rise (whereas Otto et al. focused on an extreme event).
307. Ekwurzel et al., supra note 13, at 579.
308. Id. The authors note that the calculations are incomplete at this moment in time
since the CO2 already emitted will continue to impact the dependent climate variables in the
future. Along similar lines, growing abatement of aerosol emissions associated with fossil
fuel combustion leads to more warming and sea level rise per unit of fossil fuel combustion.
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309

credit, as well as new legal mandates calling for companies to
report emissions to national and in some cases sub-national
310
governments. The IPCC also compiles emissions data for specific
sectors (energy, transport, buildings, industry, forestry, agriculture,
and waste) and uses this data to help frame discussions on effective
311
mitigation approaches.
III. LEGAL AND POLICY APPLICATIONS
The ability to detect and attribute environmental changes to
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions is useful for a variety of
different law and policy applications. In the broadest sense,
detection and attribution are the scientific tools that policy-makers
and lawyers can use to show the existence, causes, and effects of
climate change. This information can help inform critical policy
decisions, such as the appropriate level for an emissions cap or a
carbon tax. It can also help plaintiffs pursue certain types of legal
actions, such as cases against government actors for failure to act
on climate change.
However, attribution science is not a
panacea—the evidence generated by this field is not always
effective at persuading or compelling policy-makers, courts, or the
312
public to take action on climate change.
This is in part due to
the complexity of and limitations in the science, but there are also
barriers to policy and legal action on climate change that inhere in
the nature of political decision-making and legal doctrine,
313
unrelated to the quality of detection and attribution data.
This
309. CLIMATE DISCLOSURE PROJECT (CDP), https://www.cdp.net [https://perma.cc/
RA5A-K6VX] (last visited Sep. 11, 2019).
310.
See, e.g., GHG Reporting Program, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ghgreporting
[https://perma.cc/U42K-ZMAZ] (last visited Sep. 11, 2019); Mandatory GHG Emissions
Reporting, CAL. AIR RES. BOARD, https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/mandatorygreenhouse-gas-emissions-reporting [https://perma.cc/V32L-GG4H] (last visited Sep. 11,
2019).
311. See IPCC, WORKING GROUP III CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF
THE IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 351–413 (Ottmar
Edenhofer et al. eds., 2014) (drawing most emissions data from the Emissions Database for
Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) project).
312. See, e.g., COMMUNICATING CLIMATE CHANGE INFORMATION FOR DECISION-MAKING
(Silvio Serrao Neumann et al. eds, 2018); Ishani Mukherjee & Michael Howlett,
Communicating about Climate Change with Policymakers, in OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CLIMATE SCIENCE (2016); Sabrina McCormick et al., Science in Litigation, the Third Branch of
U.S. Climate Policy, 357 SCIENCE 979, 979–980 (2017).
313. These include political, social, and economic barriers to policies and programs
aimed at addressing climate change, as well as judicial doctrines that prevent courts from
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section addresses the salience of attribution science to policymaking at various scales of governance, its role in planning and
environmental impact assessment, and the critical role it has played
and will play in climate change litigation.
A. Policy-Making
Attribution science plays a critical role in policy-making. It helps
to build support for actions to address the causes and impacts of
climate change by: (i) demonstrating that anthropogenic climate
change is already underway and resulting in adverse impacts, and
(ii) lending confidence to model projections of how the climate
will change in response to greenhouse gas emissions and how these
changes will affect people and the environment in the decades to
314
come. Indeed, as the body of detection and attribution evidence
has grown, an increasing number of jurisdictions have adopted
greenhouse gas reduction targets and have commenced adaptation
315
planning activities. The greater this body of evidence, the greater
the justification for imposing stringent greenhouse gas reduction
requirements, incentivizing the transition away from fossil fuels,
and making large expenditures to prepare for the effects of climate
change. Having a clear justification is important both for political
reasons and for the purpose of defending mitigation and
adaptation programs in court.
Attribution science can also contribute to more effective
mitigation and adaptation policies. Information about source
attribution is particularly helpful for informing mitigation policy, as
it can be used to determine which actors, activities, or sectors
should be targeted for regulation or to determine the appropriate
level of regulation for any given source category. Meanwhile,
information about impact attribution can help policy-makers
adjudicating climate change-related disputes. See, e.g., Susanne C. Moser, Communicating
Climate Change: History, Challenges, Process and Future Directions, 1 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE 31
(2010); Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to
Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153 (2009).
314. Easterling et al., supra note 22.
315. See Michal Nachmany & Joana Setzer, Global Trends in Climate Change Legislation and
Litigation:
2018 Snapshot, GRANTHAM RES. INST. ON CLIMATE CHANGE & ENV’T,
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Global-trends-inclimate-change-legislation-and-litigation-2018-snapshot-3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B672822Q]; Climate Change Laws of the World Database, GRANTHAM RES. INST. ON CLIMATE CHANGE
& ENV’T, http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/climate-change-laws-of-the-world/ [https:
//perma.cc/HJ26-3U7A] (last visited Dec. 31, 2019).
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identify the most significant climate change-related risks and make
316
prudent decisions about how to allocate resources for adaptation.
For example, the IPCC, the USGCRP, and other authoritative
bodies rely on quantitative detection and attribution studies to
develop and refine their impact assessments, and this information
feeds directly into national and sub-national adaptation planning
317
efforts. Regional modeling, downscaled analyses, and the use of
local impact, adaptation, and vulnerability (“IAV”) studies is
particularly important in this context.
A related function of attribution science is that it can help
decision-makers better understand the cost of unabated climate
change, thus informing decisions about the appropriate level of
regulation (e.g., the right price of a carbon tax) and also aiding in
the justification of regulations. Consider the greenhouse gas
emission and energy efficiency standards promulgated in the
United States by the Obama Administration: for many of these
rules, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
conducted a cost-benefit analysis in which it monetized the effects
of greenhouse gas emission reductions using the federal Social
Cost of Carbon (“SC-CO2”)—a metric developed by the U.S.
government that reflects the potential damages that can be
attributed to the addition of one ton of CO2 into the atmosphere in
318
a particular year, expressed as a range of possible costs.
Using
this metric, the Administration concluded that the total monetized
benefits of the economic, environmental, and public health
319
impacts from these standards significantly outweighed the costs.

316. See Easterling et al., supra note 22; Sebastian Sippel et al., Stakeholder Perspectives on
the Attribution of Extreme Weather Events: An Explorative Enquiry, 7 WEATHER, CLIMATE, SOC’Y
224, 229 (2015).
317. See NCA4, supra note 7, at 114–32; IPCC AR5 WGI, supra note 25, at 867–952; IPCC
AR5 WGII, supra note 18, at 979–1038.
318. See, e.g., EPA, EPA-452-R-15-003, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE CLEAN
POWER PLAN FINAL RULE (Aug. 2015); EPA, EPA-420-R-12-016, REGULATORY IMPACT
ANALYSIS: FINAL RULEMAKING FOR 2017–2025 LIGHT-DUTY VEHICLE GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSION STANDARDS AND CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS (Aug. 2012);
Energy Conservation Program:
Energy Conservation Standards for Commercial
Refrigeration Equipment Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 17,726 (Mar. 28, 2014) (codified at 10
C.F.R. pt. 431(c)).
319. Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Commercial
Refrigeration Equipment Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 17,730.
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This finding served as a key justification for issuing the standards.
While the SC-CO2 and similar metrics for other gases are primarily
based on predictions of future impacts, detection and attribution
studies provide information about present impacts which can help
to improve predictive models and also lend confidence to impact
projections.
Finally, attribution science provides a framing mechanism for
international negotiations, including those conducted under the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(“UNFCCC”) and the Paris Agreement. There are several ways in
which attribution science is useful in this context. First, the
growing body of evidence linking emissions and land use changes
to harmful impacts helps build political support for ambitious
action on climate change, and also provides a basis for critiquing
countries that do not go far enough with their emission reduction
pledges (referred to in the Paris Agreement as “nationally
321
determined contributions”).
Second, attribution science can
help improve decision-making about how to allocate funds for
adaptation insofar as it provides insight into which countries,
regions, sectors, and population groups have the greatest risk of
harm due to anthropogenic climate change. Third, attribution
science can help countries reach agreement on the highly
contentious “loss and damage” framework whereby the countries
that are least responsible for climate change are compensated by
more responsible countries for harmful impacts caused by climate
322
change.
320. Zero Zone Inc. v. Dep’t of Energy, 832 F.3d 654, 678–79 (7th Cir. 2016) (upholding
use of the SC-CO2 in rulemaking establishing energy conservation standards for commercial
refrigeration equipment).
321. Paris Agreement, supra note 280, at art. 14, ¶ 1 (establishing a “global stocktake”
whereby the parties to the agreement “shall periodically take stock of the implementation of
this Agreement to assess the collective progress towards achieving the purpose of this
Agreement and its long-term goals.”). For information about how emission budgets would
serve as benchmarks in the global stocktake, see generally Christian Holz & Xolisa Ngwadla,
The Global Stocktake Under the Paris Agreement: Opportunities and Challenge, EUROPEAN CAPACITY
BUILDING INITIATIVE (Anju Sharma ed., 2016), http://www.eurocapacity.org/downloads/
GST_2016%5B1%5D.pdf [https://perma.cc/ER2Y-DGKE]; see also IPCC, SPECIAL REPORT:
GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C (Valerie Masson-Delmotte et al. eds., 2018), https://www.
ipcc.ch/sr15/ [https://perma.cc/9959-GSRB] (providing a recent example of how
information about climate change impacts can build considerable political support for
climate action).
322. For more on this topic, see Christian Huggel et al., Commentary, Loss and Damage
Attribution, 3 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 694 (2013); Rachel James et al., Characterizing Loss
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This third area—loss and damage—is where attribution science
could potentially play the biggest role. To develop a functional loss
and damage framework, countries would need to answer two types
of questions that can only be answered through a combination of
attribution science and predictive modeling: first, which countries
have already suffered harmful impacts as a result of climate change
and are most certain to do so in the future, and second, to what
323
extent are other countries responsible for those impacts.
As
discussed above, one complicating factor is that there are often
multiple drivers behind harmful impacts linked to climate
change—for example, construction and development practices
within a coastal community can increase the vulnerability of people
and structures in that area to the effects of storms and sea level rise,
and numerous factors, including degree of community cohesion
and economic development, can decrease resilience to them. In
most cases, even the most sophisticated attribution studies cannot
fully resolve the question of how much of the harm incurred by a
community is due to anthropogenic climate change as opposed to
confounding risk factors. The complex and multi-causal nature of
harms related to climate change may therefore make it difficult to
reach consensus on loss and damage issues. As discussed in further
detail below, it may also prove to be an obstacle to lawsuits seeking
compensation from emitters for climate-related damages.
B. Planning and Environmental Impact Assessment
Attribution science also facilitates on-the-ground planning for
the effects of climate change by providing more robust data about
how climate change is already affecting landscapes, ecosystems, and
human systems such as cities, infrastructure, and food production.
This information can feed into scenario planning, informing the
likely and possible ranges of outcomes under different greenhouse
and Damage From Climate Change, 4 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 938 (2014); Daniel Farber, The
Case for Climate Compensation: Justice for Climate Change Victims in a Complex World, 2008 UTAH
L. REV. 377 (2008).
323. For a more detailed discussion of how attribution science can inform the
development of a loss and damage framework, see Christian Huggel et al., Reconciling Justice
and Attribution Research to Advance Climate Policy, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 901 (2016);
Roda Verheyen, Loss and Damage Due to Climate Change: Attribution and Causation—Where
Climate Science and Law Meet, 8 INT’L J. GLOBAL WARMING 158 (2015); Christian Huggel et al.,
Potential and Limitations of the Attribution of Climate Change Impacts For Informing Loss and
Damage Discussions and Policies, CLIMATIC CHANGE (SPECIAL ISSUE) 10.1007 (2015).
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324

gas emission trajectories. Finally, attribution studies that focus on
regional or localized impacts can be used to develop and refine
downscaled projections of climate change impacts within a
particular geographic region, and to improve the accuracy and
precision of the models that are used to develop those
325
projections.
All of this can feed into a more robust analysis of
how climate change is affecting and will affect proposed and
planned actions.
We see this type of analysis being performed in regional resource
management planning, state and local planning, environmental
reviews, and corporate disclosures. For example, during the
Obama Administration, the federal agencies that manage public
lands and natural resources began using detection and attribution
science to better understand how climate change is affecting water
resources, ecosystems, and biodiversity in the United States and to
326
develop appropriate response strategies. Federal, state, and local
agencies are also now using data on observed impacts such as sea
level rise, melting permafrost, and extreme heat events to better
327
understand natural hazards and to inform planning decisions.
324. Easterling et al., supra note 22. See generally Observed and Projected (Longer-term)
Changes in Weather and Climate Extremes, 11 WEATHER CLIMATE EXTREMES (SPECIAL ISSUE) A1
(2016).
325. See, e.g., Mohammad Reza Najafi et al., Attribution of the Observed Spring Snowpack
Decline in British Columbia to Anthropogenic Climate Change, 30 J. CLIMATE 4113 1 (2017); Beena
Balan Sarojini et al., Detection and Attribution of Human Influence on Regional Precipitation, 6
NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 669 (2016); Peihua Qin & Zhenghui Xie, Detecting Changes in
Future Precipitation Extremes Over Eight River Basins in China Using RegCM4 Downscaling, 121 J.
GEOPHYSICAL RES. ATMOSPHERES 6802 (2016); Chunzhen Liu & Jun Xia, Detection and
Attribution of Observed Changes in the Hydrological Cycle under Global Warming, 2 ADVANCES IN
CLIMATE CHANGE RES. 31 (2011); Tim P. Barnett et al., supra note 239, at 1080.
326. See, e.g., PETER BACKLUND ET AL., U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, THE EFFECTS
OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON AGRICULTURE, LAND RESOURCES, WATER RESOURCES, WATER
RESOURCES, AND BIODIVERSITY IN THE UNITED STATES (Margaret Walsh et al. eds., 2008); LEVI
D. BREKKE, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SUR., CLIMATE CHANGE AND WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT:
A FEDERAL PERSPECTIVE, CIRCULAR 1331 (2009); JESSICA WENTZ, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE
CHANGE L., CONSIDERING THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON NATURAL RESOURCES IN
ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW AND PLANNING DOCUMENTS: GUIDANCE FOR AGENCIES AND
PRACTITIONERS (2016).
327. See, e.g., Sea Level Rise, CAL. ADAPT., https://cal-adapt.org/tools/slr-calflod-3d/
[https://perma.cc/5BQD-2EJL] (last visited Sep. 11, 2019); Press Release, NYS Dep’t of
Envt’l Conservation, DEC Announces New Sea Level Rise Projection Regulation for New
York (Feb. 6, 2017), http://www.dec.ny.gov/press/109195.html [https://perma.cc/7XAYBZWJ]; Sea Level Rise Viewer, NOAA, https://coast.noaa.gov/slr/ [https://perma.cc/X48GQFBT] (last visited Nov. 21, 2019); Flood Map Revision Process, FEMA,
https://www.fema.gov/flood-map-revision-processes [https://perma.cc/YZQ5-CU5A] (last
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Attribution science can also help decision-makers better
understand a proposed or planned action’s contribution to global
climate change. Currently, environmental impact assessments
(“EIAs”) and other planning documents express this contribution
by quantifying the anticipated greenhouse gas emissions that will
be generated as a result of the action, and then providing a brief
qualitative description of the types of impacts which can be
expected as a result of climate change. Because the overall
contribution of the action to global greenhouse gases is typically
quite small, no attempt is made to draw a direct link between the
action’s greenhouse gas emissions and specific on-the-ground
impacts of climate change. Improvements in detection and
attribution could facilitate the development and refinement of
metrics that could be used to better explain how a project will
contribute to global climate change. The SC-CO2 and cost metrics
for nitrous oxide (“SC-N2O”) and methane (“SC-CH4”) are good
examples: EIA documents can use these metrics to translate
greenhouse gas emissions into a specific dollar value which serves
as a proxy for on-the-ground impacts (and as discussed above,
improved attribution data can be used to justify and refine these
metrics).
C. Litigation
Evidence linking human influence on climate to the harmful
impacts of climate change plays an important role in lawsuits
seeking to compel action on climate change as well as the legal
defense of programs and regulations aimed at reducing
greenhouse gas emissions or advancing adaptation objectives. The
manner in which such evidence is utilized and the extent to which
it influences case outcomes will depend on the type of case and the
stage of litigation. Below, we present a detailed breakdown of legal
issues and cases involving climate change-related claims and how
attribution science is used in different contexts: 1) establishing
standing to sue; 2) introducing expert scientific testimony and
reports as evidence; 3) challenges to government failures to
regulate GHG emissions; 4) the legal defense of existing GHG
emission standards; 5) lawsuits seeking to hold emitters liable for
visited Nov. 21, 2019). See also ADITI KAPOOR, CLIMATE DEVELOPMENT KNOWLEDGE NETWORK
AND WORLD WEATHER, POLICY BRIEF: CLIMATE ATTRIBUTION SCIENCE: A USEFUL TOOL TO
PLAN FOR EXTREME HEAT EVENTS (2017).
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damages from climate change impacts; and 6) lawsuits involving
328
climate change adaptation, impact assessment, and disclosures.
1. Establishing Standing to Sue Sources of GHG Emissions for
Climate-Related Harms
Standing doctrines address the question of who should have
329
access to courts to adjudicate a particular claim.
Whether a
plaintiff has standing is a jurisdictional question that is addressed at
330
the outset of litigation before the merits are adjudicated.
Standing requirements vary considerably by jurisdiction. Here, we
will focus on the standing jurisprudence of U.S. federal courts—
since this is the context where attribution science has played the
most significant role—recognizing that these federal standards are
331
among the most restrictive in the world.
Federal standing doctrine arises from the Supreme Court’s
determination that Article III of the Constitution limits the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to cases or controversies where the

328. There are certain legal doctrines that may control the outcome of these cases but
more indirectly implicate questions of attribution, such as the political question doctrine, the
foreign affairs preemption doctrine, and the doctrine of legislative displacement. See
discussion infra Section III(C)(5).
329. There is large body of scholarship on the question of standing for climate changerelated damages. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Future Generations: Does
Massachusetts v. EPA Open Standing for Generations to Come?, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2009);
Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 1
(2005); Blake R. Bertagna, Comment, “Standing” Up for the Environment: The Ability of Plaintiffs
to Establish Legal Standing to Redress Injuries Caused by Global Warming, 2006 BYU L. REV. 415
(2006); Christopher L. Muehlberger, Comment, One Man’s Conjecture is Another Man’s
Concrete: Applying the “Injury-in-Fact” Standing Requirement to Global Warming, 76 UMKC L. REV.
177 (2007); Joseph M. Stancati, Note, Victims of Climate Change and Their Standing to Sue: Why
the Northern District of California Got it Right, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 687 (2006–2007); Nigel
Cooney, Note, Without a Leg to Stand on: The Merger of Article III Standing and Merits in
Environmental Cases, 23 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 175 (2007).
330. While standing is a jurisdictional issue, the issues implicated in the standing analysis
may go directly to the merits of the case, which may lead a court to defer its standing analysis
under the case has been fully briefed and all evidence reviewed.
331. See John Dimanno, Beyond Taxpayers’ Suits: Public Interest Standing in the States, 41
CONN. L. REV. 639 (2008); Christopher S. Elmendorf, State Courts, Citizen Suits, and the
Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law by Non-Article III Plaintiffs, 110 YALE L.J. 1003 (2001);
J. Michael Angstadt, Securing Access to Justice Through Environmental Courts and Tribunals: A
Case in Diversity, 17 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 345 (2016); Matt Handley, Why Crocodiles, Elephants, and
American Citizens Should Prefer Foreign Courts: A Comparative Analysis of Standing to Sue, 21 REV.
LITIG. 97, 117 (2002); Niran Somasundaram, State Court Solutions: Finding Standing for Private
Climate Change Plaintiffs in the Wake of Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon, 42
ECOLOGY L.Q. 491 (2015).
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plaintiff has a concrete and personal stake in the outcome of the
332
litigation.
Based on this understanding, the Supreme Court has
held that Plaintiffs must establish that (i) they have suffered an
injury-in-fact—that is, “an invasion of a legally protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or
333
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;” (ii) the injury-in-fact
334
is fairly traceable to the defendants’ allegedly unlawful actions;
and (iii) the injury could be redressed by a favorable court
335
decision. Attribution science is central to standing contests over
each of these prongs.
a. Standing Elements
i. Injury-in-Fact
The types of harms giving rise to standing include injuries to
336
economic, physical, spiritual, aesthetic, and recreational interests.
There is no threshold requirement for the size of the injury—any
337
“identifiable trifle” is sufficient to establish standing.
However,
injury must be “particularized,” meaning that it is not a
338
“generalized grievance” shared by the public at large.
The
requirement of particularized injury has been viewed as a potential
barrier for plaintiffs seeking standing based on injuries caused by
climate change, since such injuries are often shared by the public.
However, some plaintiffs have successfully used impact attribution
research to persuade the courts that their injuries are sufficiently
339
particularized for standing purposes.
It is more difficult to establish an injury-in-fact based on the risk
of future harm. The general rule is that the future harm must be

332. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 556 (1992).
333. Id. at 560 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
334. Id.
335. Id. at 561.
336. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152, 154 (1970).
337. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973).
338. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 171 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974).
339. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525 (2007) (finding state had standing due
to loss of land resulting from sea level rise), Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d
309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (finding state had standing due to loss of snow
pack, the corresponding effect on water supplies and flooding, and the effect of sea level rise
and coastal erosion on coastal property).
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340

“imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”
The term can be
interpreted as entailing a temporal element, a probabilistic
341
element, or both. The Supreme Court has conceded that this is
342
an “elastic concept” and has defined it differently in different
cases. Most recently, the Court has held that the imminence
requirement is met where the harm is “certainly impending” or
343
where there is a “substantial risk” of the harm occurring.
To
establish standing based on the prospect of future environmental
damage, plaintiffs must demonstrate either: (i) a substantial risk of
direct harm (e.g., physical health impacts), or (ii) that they visit the
affected area or use the affected resources for recreational,
spiritual, or aesthetic purposes and/or have concrete plans to do so
344
in the future.
ii. Causation and Redressability
The second and third elements of standing (causation and
redressability) are closely related, sometimes referred to as “two
345
sides of the same coin.”
These requirements have proven to be
the most difficult to prove in cases involving climate-related harms.
For causation, the plaintiff must establish that the injury is “fairly
traceable” to the challenged action “and not the result of the
346
independent action of some third party not before the court.”
Courts often look for factual causation, typically expressed as a “but
for” test: would the plaintiff not have been injured but for the
347
defendant’s action.
In cases brought against governments and
private actors for failure to regulate or abate emissions, the
Supreme Court has found sufficient causation where the emissions

340. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
341. Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107
NW. U.L. REV.169, 179–80 (2012) (noting cases where courts have found a lack of
imminence because the alleged injury would not happen immediately, and cases where
courts have found a lack of imminence because the injury was too “conjectural” and there
was insufficient probability that it would ever occur).
342. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2.
343. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013); Susan B. Anthony List
v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014).
344. Lujan, 504 U.S. 555; Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009).
345. Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. EPA, 90 F.Supp.3d 1177, 1190 (W.D. Wash. 2015).
See also Gonzales v. Gorsuch, 688 F.2d 1263, 1267 (9th Cir. 1982); Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978).
346. Lujan, 504 U.S.at 560 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
347. See, e.g., Duke Power Co, 438 U.S. at 74–75; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758 (1984).
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represent a “meaningful contribution” to global climate change.
What constitutes a “meaningful contribution” to global climate
change is a question that at this point will be determined on a case349
by-case basis.
Finally, the redressability prong requires that it is likely and not
“merely speculative” that the injury would be redressed by a
350
favorable decision.
The prospect of even partial redress may be
351
sufficient.
iii. Procedural Injury
Standing requirements are somewhat relaxed for cases that
352
involve “procedural injuries.” Such injuries occur when agencies
undertake actions without adhering to legally mandated
procedures, such as when a federal agency undertakes a major
action without preparing an environmental impact statement
(“EIS”), promulgates a final rule without adhering to the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)’s notice and comment
requirements, or otherwise fails to implement a process that is
353
required by statute. Courts will sometimes refer to these cases as
354
involving “procedural rights.”
348. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 525 (emissions from all U.S. motor vehicles made a
“meaningful contribution” to global climate change).
349. See, e.g., Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2013)
(emissions from Washington power plants amounting to 6% of state’s total GHG emissions
not a “meaningful contribution” to climate change), reh’g en banc denied, 741 F.3d 1075 (9th
Cir. 2014); Amigos Bravos v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 816 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1136
(D.N.M. 2011) (254,730 metric tons of GHGs per year that might result from the approval of
92 oil and gas leases were not a “meaningful contribution” to global climate change); Juliana
v. United States, 217 F.Supp.3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016) (Motion to Dismiss denied because U.S.
agencies had regulatory authority over at least 14% of global GHGs and this was sufficient for
standing).
350. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
351. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497; Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d,
564 U.S. 410 (2011).
352. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571–72.
353. Christopher T. Burt, Comment, Procedural Injury Standing After Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 276 (1994); F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 NW.
U. L. REV. 55, 69 (2012) (citing Summers, 555 U.S. at 496–97).
354. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7; Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 498 (citing APA § 7607(b)(1))
(noting that that the “right to challenge agency action unlawfully withheld” is a procedural
right created by the APA). In Lujan, the Supreme Court affirmed that procedural rights are
“special” and that “[t]he person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his
concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for
redressability and immediacy.” 504 U.S. at 572 n.7. The Court further explained, “Thus,
under our case law, one living adjacent to the site for proposed construction of a federally
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iv. Standing for States and Associations
Adding an additional layer to the standing analysis is the fact that
states have special standing to sue, both by virtue of their sovereign
status and the breadth of their interests, which encompass the
state’s direct interests, e.g., state property, as well as the interests of
355
Large associations may also have an easier time
their residents.
establishing standing than private individuals due to the number of
members in those associations. This holds true in cases involving
the risk of future harm: an association with many members may be
able to establish that, in aggregate, its members face a “substantial
risk” of harm, where an individual plaintiff would not be able to
make this showing.
Consider the case of Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, a
case involving a challenge to the adequacy of an ozone pollution
standard decided by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in 2007.
The ozone standard was expected to result in a very small increase
in the risk of cancer—one in 200,000, according to NRDC’s
experts. This might not have sufficed as an “imminent” threat to
an individual plaintiff’s interest, but NRDC was able to establish
standing by presenting evidence of the aggregated risk across all of
356
its 490,000 members.
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
explained:
The lifetime risk that an individual will develop nonfatal skin cancer
as a result of EPA’s rule is about 1 in 200,000 by the intervenor’s
lights. Even if a quantitative approach is appropriate—an issue on
which we express no opinion—this risk is sufficient to support
standing. One may infer from the statistical analysis that two to four
of NRDC’s nearly half a million members will develop cancer as a
357
result of the rule.
licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing agency’s failure to prepare an
environmental impact statement, even though he cannot establish with any certainty that the
statement will cause the license to be withheld or altered, and even though the dam will not
be completed for many years.” Id. Notably, the plaintiff must still show that they will suffer a
concrete injury-in-fact that is linked to the procedural injury. Summers, 555 U.S. at 496
(citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n. 7); Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518 (noting that the plaintiff
needs to show that the “procedural step was connected to the substantive result” and that
there is “some possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to
reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant.”). For more on this topic, see
Burt, supra note 353, at 280–81.
355. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497; Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915).
356. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
357. Id.
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However, in Summers v. Earth Island Inst., five Supreme Court
justices rejected a similar argument in the public lands context.
There, the Sierra Club sought standing to challenge U.S. Forest
Service regulations based on potential injury to its members’ use
and enjoyment of national forests. The majority denied standing
because the Sierra Club had failed to establish that any member
had concrete plans to visit a site where the regulations would be
358
applied.
The dissent argued that, because the Sierra Club had
700,000 members, there was a statistical probability that one of
359
their members would be adversely affected by the regulations, but
the majority held that “such speculation does not suffice” for
360
standing purposes.
v. Concluding Notes on Standing
As may be evident from the above discussion, standing
361
jurisprudence is viewed by many as “incoherent” and inevitably
362
The lack of a coherent approach is particularly
subjective.
apparent in cases involving the risk of future harm, where courts
typically conduct a qualitative rather than quantitative assessment
363
of the risk to determine whether it rises to a level of imminence.
Hessick notes that as a likely consequence of their qualitative
analyses, courts have “[g]enerally proven themselves incapable of
364
applying [this standard] in a rigorous way,” and explains that

358. Summers, 555 U.S. at 496.
359. Id. at 505–07.
360. Id. at 499. Summers does not totally foreclose the possibility of standing based on a
probabilistic injury. The probabilistic inquiry in Summers was whether one of the association
members might visit a forest that was affected by the regulation in the near future—this
question is much easier to answer through affidavits than through statistical analysis, since it
depends on the members’ intent. In contrast, the probabilistic inquiry in Nat. Res. Def.
Council v. EPA was whether one of the association members might be harmed by involuntary
exposure to pollution—statistical analysis is both necessary and well-suited to making such
predictions. Faced with a situation more analogous to Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, the Court
may have reached a different conclusion about the statistical probability of injury.
361. Lee & Ellis, supra note 341, at 169, 200; William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing,
98 YALE L. J. 221, 231 (1988).
362. Cass Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III,
91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 188–89 (1992); Albert Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental
Law, 3 WIS. L. REV. 897, 938 (2006); Lee & Ellis, supra note 341, at 200; Hessick, supra note
353, at 73.
363. Hessick supra note 353, at 73.
364. Id.
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“[u]ncertainty about probability forces courts to forego precise
calculations of probabilities and instead to evaluate probability on a
gestalt feeling of the likelihood of a harm occurring. Assessments
365
of this sort, however, are vulnerable to biases.”
As a result of
these factors, it is very difficult to predict whether or how federal
courts will grant standing in climate change cases, particularly
where plaintiffs allege an increased risk of future harm rather than
a present injury. One way or the other, the state of attribution
science is and will be central.
b. Case Law on Standing to Sue for Climate Change-Related
Harms
The role of attribution science in establishing standing, then, is
to determine whether plaintiffs have suffered an injury, or risk of
an injury, that can be linked to anthropogenic climate change, and
therefore linked to emissions that were generated by a private
entity or inadequately regulated by a government entity.
Attribution data is a valuable complement to impact projections as
it can be used to establish an existing injury while also lending
credibility to projections of future harm. This section reviews key
decisions which illustrate how attribution of impacts to
anthropogenic climate change factors into standing analysis.
i. Massachusetts v. EPA
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of standing to bring
climate change-related claims in Massachusetts v. EPA. There, a
group of states, cities, and environmental organizations brought a
lawsuit challenging the EPA’s decision not to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions from motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act. One of
the key questions in the case was whether EPA could decline to
exercise its regulatory authority because there was too much
366
uncertainty about the causes and effects of climate change. The
question of uncertainty was also relevant to the question of
standing—the issue being whether plaintiffs could establish a
sufficiently certain causal link between the failure to regulate and
harms that they had incurred and would incur as a result of climate
365. Id. at 75.
366. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 497, 513–14 (citing EPA, Control of Emissions from New
Highway Vehicles and Engines: Notice of Denial of Petition for Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg.
52922, 52929–31 (Sept. 8, 2003)).
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change. Because this case involved a procedural right—specifically,
the right to challenge agency action unlawfully withheld—the
367
immediacy and redressability requirements were relaxed.
In their briefs, the plaintiffs supported their standing and merits
claims by describing the many harms that they would incur as a
result of climate change—for example, the states were
experiencing and would continue to experience a “loss of stateowned property to rising sea levels. . . added costs to deal with
emergency response measures caused by more frequent intense
storm surge flooding events . . . damage to state-owned historic,
archeological,
and
natural
resources
including
state
forests . . . [and] damage to state-owned facilities and infrastructure
368
along the coast.” These assertions were supported by numerous
369
expert declarations as well as an amicus brief filed by climate
370
scientists in support of the plaintiffs.
In its initial review of the case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit proceeded directly to the merits without resolving the
standing issues separately, noting that this was a case where the
standing inquiry and the merits inquiry clearly overlapped and that
it would be “exceedingly artificial to draw a distinction between the
371
two.”
One concurring judge commented on standing, asserting
that he would have dismissed the case because the plaintiffs only
alleged what he viewed as a “generalized grievance” shared by all
U.S. residents rather than the sort of “particularized grievance”
372
required under standing law.
On review, a five justice majority held that at least one of the
plaintiffs—the state of Massachusetts—had presented sufficient
evidence of actual and imminent harms to establish standing in the
case, specifically the fact that it would suffer serious loss of coastal

367. Id. at 518.
368. Petitioners’ Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Mandamus at 2, Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120).
369. See, e.g., Final Brief for the Petitioners at 2–3, Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (Nos. 03-1361, consolidated with Nos. 03-1362 through 03-1368).
370. Brief of Amici Curiae Climate Scientists David Battisti, et. al. in Support of
Petitioners at 10–18, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120).
371. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
Interestingly, on the merits the court held that there was sufficient uncertainty about the
causes and effects of climate change such that EPA had reasonably declined to exercise its
authority. Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 58.
372. Id. at 60–61 (Sentelle, J., concurring).

BURGER ET AL. FINAL MACRO 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

2/5/2020 2:44 PM

The Law and Science of Climate Change Attribution
373

157

property as a result of sea level rise.
The Court noted that
Massachusetts had a “special position and interest” in the case, in
part because “it actually owns a great deal of the territory alleged to
be affected” by climate change, and in part because of its status as a
374
sovereign state.
The Court referred to data in the petitioners’
affidavits showing that “global sea levels rose between 10 and 20
centimeters over the 20th century as a result of global warming and
have already begun to swallow Massachusetts’ coastal land” and that
“[r]emediation costs alone . . . could reach hundreds of millions of
375
It held that this was a sufficiently particularized injury.
dollars.”
Responding to EPA’s assertion that Massachusetts’ injury was
“conjectural because the land loss that the state expected could not
be quantified,” the Court said that it was unnecessary to determine
“the precise metes and bounds of [the state’s] soon-to-be-flooded
land” because the general trend was clear: Massachusetts was
376
losing land and would continue to lose land to sea level rise.
Turning to the causation and redressability prongs of standing,
the court rejected EPA’s assertion that its decision not to regulate
would contribute “so insignificantly to petitioners’ injuries” and
thus there was “no realistic possibility that the relief sought
would . . . remedy petitioners’ injuries, especially since predicted
increases in emissions from China, India, and other developing
nations will likely offset any marginal domestic decrease EPA
377
regulation could bring about.”
First, the Court noted that,
judged by any standard, U.S. motor vehicle emissions make a
“meaningful contribution” to greenhouse gas concentrations and
global warming (in 1999, they accounted for more than 6% of
378
worldwide carbon dioxide emissions, or 1.7 billion metric tons).
The Court acknowledged that EPA could not by itself reverse global
warming through motor vehicle standards but this did not mean
that the court lacked jurisdiction to decide “whether EPA has a
379
duty to take steps to slow or reduce it.”
The majority explained
that while a favorable decision would not totally remedy the
problem, Massachusetts would not lose as much land as it otherwise
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517.
Id. at 523.
Id. at 521–23.
Id. at 523, n.21.
Id. at 523–24.
Id. at 525.
Id. at 525.
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380

would.
Thus, the majority treated redressability “as a matter of
381
degree rather than an all-or-nothing proposition.”
ii. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co.
In subsequent cases, federal courts have raised questions about
whether to grant standing to petitioners who are: (i) not states
(and therefore have fewer interests of a different nature that could
be affected by climate change), (ii) seeking regulation of emission
sources with a much smaller greenhouse gas footprint than the
U.S. motor vehicle fleet, or (iii) not alleging a procedural injury.
Connecticut v. American Electric Power Company was a case that
involved state plaintiffs but lacked a procedural injury claim.
There, a group of state, city, and non-governmental plaintiffs sued
five power companies, alleging that their contribution to climate
change constituted a public nuisance under both federal and state
common law. The plaintiffs alleged a combination of existing and
future injuries associated with climate change. For example, the
states cited studies showing that climate change was already causing
sea level rise and snowpack melt and that this had an adverse effect
382
on their interests and their residents.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, responding to
a motion to dismiss, held that at least some of the plaintiffs had
standing, finding that both the existing and future harms were
sufficient to establish injury-in-fact. The court began its standing
analysis by explaining that “[t]he procedural posture of a case is
important when assessing standing”, and that when considering a
motion to dismiss, courts should “presume that general factual
383
allegations embrace those facts necessary to support the claim.”
The court further noted that defendants “may certainly test
[plaintiffs’] standing as the litigation progresses by requesting an
evidentiary hearing or by challenging [plaintiffs’] standing on
summary judgment or even at trial” but that the “allegation of a
credible risk” is sufficient at the pleading stage, as “[a]dopting a
more stringent view of [standing requirements] would essentially
384
collapse the standing inquiry into the merits.”
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

Id. at 525–26.
Lee & Ellis, supra note 341, at 192.
Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 318 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
Id. at 333.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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With regards to existing injuries, the court found that that
California’s alleged injuries from sea level rise and snowpack melt
385
“far exceed the ‘identifiable trifle’ required by Article III.” With
regards to whether the future harms were sufficiently imminent,
the court cited precedent holding that, in cases involving exposure
to a harmful substance, it is the exposure that must be imminent
386
and not the onset of disease. The court then explained that the
plaintiffs’ future injury claims in the present case were even “more
compelling” because, according to plaintiffs, the “defendants are
currently emitting large amounts of carbon dioxide and will
continue to do so in the future” and the adverse impacts to the
plaintiffs were “certain to occur because of the consequences,
based on the laws of physics and chemistry, of the documented
387
increase in carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.” Thus, the “future
injuries they predict are anything but speculation and
388
conjecture.”
Turning to the questions of causation and redressability, the
court briefly noted plaintiffs’ allegations that the defendants were
the “five largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the United States”
and that their emissions accounted for 2.5% of global emissions,
but did not examine whether this constituted a “meaningful
389
contribution” to global climate change. The court explained that
the fact that the defendants “contribute to” climate change was
sufficient to allege causation in the context of a motion to dismiss,
and that the significance of the contribution was “an issue best left
to the rigors of evidentiary proof at a future stage of the
proceeding, rather than dispensed with as a threshold question of
390
constitutional standing.”
In other words, the court determined
that this issue should be addressed as part of its evaluation of the
391
factual merits of the nuisance claim.
The court concluded that,
“[f]or purposes of Article III standing, [the Plaintiffs] are not
required to pinpoint which specific harms of the many injuries they
assert are caused by particular Defendants, nor are they required to
385. Id. at 342.
386. Id. at 344.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 345–47.
390. Id. at 347.
391. For more information about how the causation requirement differs in the standing
and nuisance context, see Section III(C)(5).
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show that Defendants’ emissions alone cause their injuries. It is
sufficient that they allege that Defendants’ emissions contribute to
392
their injuries.”
Citing Massachusetts, the court also held that the
possibility of partial redress in this context was sufficient for
393
standing purposes.
On appeal, the Supreme Court announced that the eight justices
hearing the case were equally divided on the standing issue and
394
thus affirmed the Second Circuit’s decision. Four justices would
have granted standing cited Massachusetts and did not perform any
additional analysis, indicating that they viewed that case as
395
controlling even where a procedural injury was not at stake.
Ultimately, the Court unanimously held that the case was nonjusticiable because the federal common law claims had been
displaced by the Clean Air Act’s grant of authority to EPA to
396
regulate greenhouse gas emissions.
The Court did not address
the state law claims.
iii. Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil
In Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil (Kivalina), a Native
Alaskan village sued approximately two dozen fossil fuel and energy
generation companies for their contribution to climate change and
the corresponding damages to the village (specifically, the cost of
relocation), alleging a public nuisance under federal common law.
The district court reviewing this case had a very different
perspective on standing than the Second Circuit in American Electric
Power. It found that Kivalina lacked standing because it had not
demonstrated that its injuries were “fairly traceable” to the
defendants’ actions because there were many other actors
397
responsible for the emissions leading to damages in the village.
The court reached this conclusion even though the emissions at
issue were significantly larger than those at issue in American Electric
Power—specifically, Kivalina alleged that the defendant companies
were jointly responsible for more than 1.2 billion tons of direct
greenhouse gas emissions annually, as well as an unspecified
392. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 347.
393. Id. at 348.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 429.
397. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 880–81 (N.D. Cal.
2009), aff’d on other grounds, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
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quantity of indirect (downstream) greenhouse gas emissions
generated by the combustion of fossil fuels extracted and sold by
398
these companies.
As Kivalina put it, the defendants were
responsible for a “substantial portion” of global greenhouse gas
399
emissions.
Kivalina’s complaint also included a detailed
description of how greenhouse gas emissions were contributing to
global climate change and, in turn, to localized impacts on
Kivalina, such as melting permafrost and rising sea levels, which
400
would force the village to relocate in the near future.
The district court found that Kivalina had not alleged facts
sufficient to be granted standing. On the question of whether a
“contribution” to a problem may be sufficient to establish standing,
it held that a contribution was not in-and-of-itself sufficient
evidence of harm and that plaintiffs had failed to show a
“substantial likelihood” that the conduct of any one of the
401
defendants actually harmed the village.
The court explained
that:
In view of the Plaintiffs’ allegations as to the undifferentiated nature
of greenhouse gas emissions from all global sources and their
worldwide accumulation over long periods of time, the pleadings
makes clear that there is no realistic possibility of tracing any
particular alleged effect of global warming to any particular emissions
by any specific person, entity, group at any particular point in time.
Plaintiffs essentially concede that the genesis of global warming is
attributable to numerous entities which individually and cumulatively
over the span of centuries created the effects they now are
experiencing. Even accepting the allegations of the Complaint as
true and construing them in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, it is
not plausible to state which emissions—emitted by whom and at what
time in the last several centuries and at what place in the world—
“caused” Plaintiffs’ alleged global warming related injuries. Thus,
Plaintiffs have not and cannot show that Defendants’ conduct is the
“seed of [their] injury.” To the contrary, there are, in fact, a
multitude of “alternative culprit[s]” allegedly responsible for the
402
various chain of events allegedly leading to the erosion of Kivalina.

398. Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial at paras. 18–122, Native Vill. of
Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. CV 08 1138).
399. Id. at para. 3.
400. Id. at paras. 123–62, 181–184.
401. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 at 880, aff’d on other grounds 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir.
2012).
402. Id. at 880–81.
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The district court did not specifically address whether there was
some threshold at which standing could be established to sue
emitters based on damages caused by climate change, but the
court’s analysis suggests that it would have reached the same
decision regardless of the magnitude of the emissions.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s
decision in American Electric Power and dismissed the case due to
403
legislative displacement, rather than a lack of standing.
iv. Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit grappled more
directly with the question of what constitutes a sufficient
contribution to climate change as part of the standing causation
analysis in Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon. There, the
court, responding to an appeal of a motion for summary judgment,
held that two non-profits did not have standing to challenge
Washington State’s failure to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
from five oil refineries, because they had not shown that the
refineries’ emissions made a meaningful contribution to global
404
The non-profits alleged that their
greenhouse gas levels.
members would experience adverse health impacts and property
damage as a result of climate change, as well as aesthetic and
recreational injuries because changes in precipitation patterns,
reductions of glaciers, changes in wildlife habitat, and forest fires
405
The court
would affect natural areas that they routinely visit.
held that these injuries were sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact
prong of the standing analysis but that the plaintiff had failed to
establish causation.
Specifically, the court found that the plaintiffs’ causation
argument “consist[ed] of a series of links strung together by
conclusory, generalized statements of ‘contribution,’ without any
403. Native Vill. of Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 869. Justice Pro, in a concurring opinion, stated
that he would have dismissed the case for lack of standing: “It is one thing to hold that a
State has standing to pursue a statutory procedural right granted to it by Congress in the
CAA to challenge the EPA’s failure to regulate greenhouse gas emissions which
incrementally may contribute to future global warming. See Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516–
20 (2007). It is quite another to hold that a private party has standing to pick and choose
amongst all the greenhouse gas emitters throughout history to hold liable for millions of
dollars in damages.”
404. Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2013), reh’g en banc
denied, 741 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2014).
405. Id. at 1140–41.
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plausible scientific or other evidentiary basis that the refineries’
406
emissions are the source of their injuries.” The court explained
that:
Greenhouse gases, once emitted from a specific source, quickly mix
and disperse in the global atmosphere and have a long atmospheric
lifetime. Current research on how greenhouse gases influence global
climate change has focused on the cumulative environmental effects
from aggregate regional or global sources. But there is limited
scientific capability in assessing, detecting, or measuring the
relationship between a certain GHG emission source and localized
407
climate impacts in a given region.

With regards to the defendants, the court noted that the
refineries were responsible for 101.1 million metric tons of CO2
annually (5.9% of total greenhouse gas emissions produced in the
state of Washington), and that unlike the much larger quantity of
emissions at issue in Massachusetts v. EPA (1.7 billion tons), the
effect of those emissions on global climate change was
“scientifically indiscernible, given the emission levels, the dispersal
of GHGs world-wide, and the absence of any meaningful nexus
between Washington refinery emissions and global GHG
408
concentrations now or as projected in the future.”
Thus, the
court concluded that the causal chain was “too tenuous to support
409
standing.”
The Bellon decision and other cases discussed above raise two
important questions. First, at what threshold do emissions from a
source represent a “meaningful contribution” to global climate
change such that an adequate causal nexus can be found between
those emissions and localized climate impacts? Or, in the words of
the Bellon court, at what point is the effect of the emissions on
global climate change sufficiently “scientifically discernible”?
406. Id. at 1142.
407. Id. at 1143.
408. Id. at 1145. The court noted that the Bellon case also differed from Massachusetts
because no procedural right was implicated and there was no state plaintiff that should be
granted “special solicitude” in the standing analysis, but found that even if it “assume[d] that
the Plaintiffs’ members are entitled to a comparable relaxed standard, the extension of
Massachusetts to the present circumstances would not be tenable.”
409. Id. at 1144. See also Barnes v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 655 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2011)
(finding that it was not possible to establish a link between greenhouse gas emissions from
an increase in aviation activities caused by airport expansion and specific harmful impacts of
climate change).
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Detection and attribution research can help to answer this
question, but there are also legal and policy judgments embedded
in any determination of what constitutes a “meaningful” or
“significant” contribution.
Second, should this inquiry be
conducted as part of the standing analysis, or is the question so
closely tied to the merits that the issue should, in all or some subset
of cases, be deferred to that later stage of the litigation? We return
to this question in Section IV.
v. Comer v. Murphy Oil
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also grappled with
the question of standing for non-governmental entities to sue fossil
fuel companies in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA. There, residents and
owners of lands and property along the Mississippi Gulf coast filed
a class action lawsuit against energy, fossil fuel, and chemical
companies alleging that the greenhouse gas emissions generated by
these companies contributed to global warming, which in turn
caused a rise in sea levels which exacerbated the effects of
410
The plaintiffs asserted claims for damages
Hurricane Katrina.
based on state common law actions of public and private nuisance,
trespass,
negligence,
unjust
enrichment,
fraudulent
411
misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy.
Unlike in American
Electric Power, the plaintiffs did not pursue any federal common law
412
action nor did they seek injunctive relief.
As in other cases, the
defendants argued that the plaintiffs had not established an
adequate causal connection between defendants’ conduct and
plaintiffs’ harm.
The district court in Mississippi initially held that plaintiffs lacked
413
standing,
but the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the
landowners had Article III standing to bring their nuisance,
414
The court noted that fully
trespass, and negligence claims.
addressing the defendants’ causation arguments would require the
court to address the merits of plaintiffs’ claims and was therefore

410. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 2009).
411. Id. at 859–60.
412. Id. at 860.
413. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL 6942285, at *1
(S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007), rev’d sub nom Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir.
2009).
414. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d at 87980.
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“misplaced at this thresholds standing stage of the litigation.” It
further explained that “the Article III traceability requirement
need not be as close as the proximate causation needed to succeed
on the merits of a tort claim” and that “an indirect causal
416
relationship will suffice” for the purposes of Article III standing.
The Fifth Circuit thus took a very different approach from the
Ninth Circuit in Bellon, noting that it must take the plaintiff’s
allegations that the defendants’ emissions caused their injuries as
true at the pleading stage, recognizing that the plaintiffs would be
required to support those assertions at a later stage in the
417
litigation.
The decision did not stand for long: the Fifth Circuit granted a
rehearing en banc shortly after issuing the decision, and
subsequently lost its quorum to decide the case before hearing it.
The court ultimately held that it must dismiss the appeal due to
lack of quorum and thus, the vacatur of the original panel decision
418
remained in place.
vi. Juliana v. United States
More recently, in Juliana v. United States, a federal district court in
Oregon held that plaintiffs suing the U.S. government for
affirmatively contributing to climate change and failing to control
emissions from fossil fuel development and use had adequately
419
alleged that they had standing to sue. The court, responding to a
motion for dismiss, noted that “general factual allegations” were
420
sufficient to establish Article III standing.
The court found that
the plaintiffs had established sufficiently personalized and concrete
injuries—such as lost income for a ski resort employee, and
harmful impacts to a family farm—that were fairly traceable to the
greenhouse gas emissions resulting from U.S. fossil fuel production
421
and use.
The court distinguished the case from Bellon on two
grounds:

415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.

Id. at 864.
Id.
Id.
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1055 (5th Cir. 2010).
Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1248 (D. Or. 2016).
Id. at 1268.
Id. at 1267–68.
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(1) The procedural posture of the case was different: Bellon
involved a motion for summary judgment, which is typically
filed after the parties have completed discovery, whereas the
Juliana court was responding to a motion to dismiss, which is
filed shortly after the complaint is filed and which can only be
422
granted where there is no genuine issue of material fact.
(2) The emissions at issue in Juliana (from all U.S. fossil fuels)
were significantly larger than the emissions at issue in Bellon
(from five refineries), and by no means represented a “minor
423
contribution” to climate change.
The court also rejected the idea put forth by the district court in
Kivalina—that causation between emissions and impacts cannot be
established where there are “a multitude of alternative culprits”
that are also responsible for climate change—and found that “a
causal chain does not fail simply because it has several links,
provided those links are not hypothetical or tenuous and remain
424
plausible.” It summarized the causal chain as follows:
DOT and EPA have jurisdiction over sectors producing sixty-four
percent of United States emissions, which in turn constitute roughly
fourteen percent of emissions worldwide; they allow high emissions
levels by failing to set demanding standards; high emissions levels
425
cause climate change; and climate change causes plaintiffs’ injuries.

Finally, with regards to redressability, the court noted that the
requested remedy—ordering the U.S. government to “prepare and
implement an enforceable national remedial plan to phase out
fossil fuel emissions”—would “slow or reduce” the harm caused to
426
plaintiffs, and that was sufficient for standing.
The court subsequently denied a motion for summary
judgement, again declining to find that plaintiffs lacked standing to
sue, and citing many of the considerations noted above. The court
acknowledged that a different standard applies when reviewing a
motion for summary judgment (which is typically filed after the
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.

Id. at 1245.
Id.
Id. at 1268.
Id. at 1246.
Id. at 1247.
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parties have completed discovery) as compared with a motion to
427
dismiss.
At this stage, plaintiffs must establish that there is a
428
“genuine question of material fact as to the standing elements.”
The court found that the affidavits and expert testimony submitted
by plaintiffs during discovery met this requirement, and noted that
it would revisit all elements of standing after the factual record had
429
been fully developed at trial.
The district court’s summary judgment decision was reversed by
the Ninth Circuit in early 2020 based on the appellate court’s
determination that plaintiffs had not satisfied the redressability
430
prong of Article III standing.
Specifically, the court concluded
that it could not provide the redress plaintiffs were seeking—an
order requiring the government to develop a plan to phase out
fossil fuel emissions and reduce atmospheric CO2—because
providing such relief would implicate policy choices reserved for
the elected branches of government and thus violate the separation
431
of powers doctrine.
Importantly, the Court of Appeals did find
that the plaintiffs had satisfied the injury and causation
requirements of Article III standing, for the purposes of summary
judgment, because the plaintiffs had claimed concrete and
particularized injuries and there was a genuine factual dispute as to
whether federal policies were a “substantial factor” in causing the
432
plaintiffs’ injury. In reaching this conclusion, the court cited the
U.S.’s historical and current contribution to global emissions and
evidence submitted by plaintiffs that federal subsidies and leases
433
had increased those emissions. It also rejected the government’s
reliance on Bellon to argue that the causal chain is too attenuated
427. Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1086 (D. Or. 2018), mandamus
dismissed sub nom. In re United. States, No. 18-505, 2019 WL 3462578 (U.S. July 29, 2019).
428. Id. at 1086–87.
429. Id. at 1096. See infra section III(C)(5) for a more detailed discussion of the expert
testimony submitted during discovery.
th
430. Juliana v. United States, No. 18-36082 (9 Cir. Jan. 17, 2020).
431. This is similar to the separation of powers arguments cited by some judges in
dismissing lawsuits brought against fossil fuel companies. See Section III(C)(5) infra. In
Juliana, the plaintiffs argued that the court need not itself make policy decisions in issuing an
order to the government to take action, since the court defer to the elected branches of
government to decide how to implement the order. The court disagreed, finding that the
plaintiff’s requested relief would require it to pass judgment on the sufficiency of the
government’s implementation of the order, which would necessarily entail a broad range of
policymaking. Juliana, No. 18-36082 at *26.
432. Juliana, No 18-36082 at *19-21.
433. Id.
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for standing purposes, noting that the plaintiff’s alleged injuries
arose from “a host of federal policies, from subsidies to drilling
permits, spanning over 50 years” (whereas Bellon involved a failure
434
to regulate five oil refineries).
Thus, the Court of Appeals’
decision was not based on any deficiencies in the underpinning
science or causal chain linking government inaction to climate
impacts.
vii. Foreign Jurisdictions
Some foreign courts have also grappled with the question of what
constitutes a “meaningful contribution” to climate change for
standing purposes. For example, in Dual Gas Pty Ltd. v. Environment
Protection Authority, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal
in Australia made the following observations when determining
whether plaintiffs had standing to sue the government’s approval
of a new power plant:
[D]espite the global nature of the GHG issue, there must still be a
materiality threshold in relation to the type or size of the works or
emissions that is relevant to whether a person’s interests are
genuinely affected, as opposed to being too remote or too general.
The emission of a few tonnes of GHG from a small factory in
Gippsland would not in our view give rise to standing under s 33B(1)
to an objector in Mildura even though it represents an incremental
GHG increase. It is unnecessary for us to determine where the line of
materiality might be drawn. As we noted in our introduction, the
DGDP is a major power station that will generate up to 4.2 million
tonnes of GHG per annum over a 30 year projected life cycle and
increase Victoria’s GHG emissions profile by 2.5% over 2009 levels.
In our view, this clearly raises potential issues of material interest or
concern to all Victorians, and creates an almost unique level of
“affected interests” and standing compared to the more usual sort of
435
works approval matters that come before the Tribunal.

Of course, standing requirements in states and most, if not all,
foreign jurisdictions are not as stringent as standing requirements
in U.S. federal courts. In some decisions, there is no standing

434. Id. at 20.
435. Dual Gas Pty Ltd. v Env’t Protection Authority [2012] VCAT 308, ¶ 134. (Austl.).
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436

analysis.
In others, the standing analysis is of a more general
nature and does not require plaintiffs to show that they incurred a
particularized harm as a result of the greenhouse gas emissions that
might be controlled as a result of judicial intervention, with the
result that attribution science plays a less critical role in the
437
standing analysis.
Because the standards are more permissive,
standing has not been a significant obstacle to climate change cases
outside of the United States, nor have attribution questions
438
factored heavily in the standing analyses.
The inconsistencies within the case law on standing in the United
States, and as between U.S. courts and foreign jurisdictions,
reinforce the conceptual and practical difficulties that have
bedeviled analysis of climate change litigation. In Massachusetts, 6%
of global GHG emissions was found to be a “meaningful
contribution” sufficient to show causation, and states were granted
439
“special solicitude” in proving standing. In American Electric Power,
2.5% of global GHG emissions was enough for the Second Circuit,
440
and for at least four judges then sitting on the Supreme Court.
In Kivalina, a district court judge focused not on the quantity of
emissions or the question of their significance, but the impossibility
441
of tracing specific impacts to specific emissions.
In Bellon, the
Ninth Circuit determined that 5.9% of Washington State’s GHG
emissions could not be effectively disaggregated from the global co442
mingling of GHGs to establish causation. In Comer, a Fifth Circuit
panel found that allegations that a large number of companies had
made a significant contribution were sufficient to survive a motion
to dismiss. In Juliana, the district court noted that U.S. agencies
had regulatory authority over at least 14% of global GHGs and
443
found it sufficient.

436. See, e.g., Leghari v. Republic Fed’n of Pakistan (2015) W.P. No. 25501/2015. For
more on standing to bring climate-related lawsuits in non-U.S. jurisdictions, see BURGER &
GUNDLACH, supra note 10.
437. See, e.g., Rb Den Haag 24 juni 20015, m.nt. C/09/00456689 HA ZA 3-1396 (Urgenda
Stichting/Staat der Nederlanden) (Neth.) [hereinafter Urgenda District Court Decision
(2015)].
438. See BURGER & GUNDLACH , supra note 10.
439. See supra Section III(C)(1)(b)(i).
440. See supra Section III(C)(1)(b)(iii).
441. See supra Section III(C)(1)(b)(iv).
442. See supra Section III(C)(1)(b)(v).
443. See supra Section III(C)(1)(b)(vi).
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All of which leaves open a number of questions: What quantity
of emissions matters? Which sources or actors are relevant for
calculating contributions? What is the best, or at least an
appropriate, means of aggregating the actors and their emissions
for the purposes of calculating contributions? What is the state of
the science in measuring the relationship between individual
sources/actors and localized impacts? These questions matter for
standing. As discussed further below, they matter on the merits, as
well.
2. Evidentiary Standards for Scientific Testimony and Reports
A threshold consideration regarding the role of attribution
science in the courtroom is whether expert testimony on
attribution is admissible in court. The Daubert standard, first
articulated by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
444
Pharmaceuticals, is the contemporary standard for admissibility in
federal courts and many states have adopted this standard as well.
That standard charges the judge with ensuring that the basis of the
445
expert’s testimony is “scientific knowledge” and outlines the
following factors for making this determination:





Whether the scientific theory or technique can be (and
has been) tested
Whether it has been subjected to peer review and
publication
Whether it has a known error rate
Whether it has a degree of “general
acceptable” within
446
a “relevant scientific community.”

Most states now follow the Daubert standard, but some adhere to
the less exacting Frye v. United States standard (the previous federal
447
standard), which only requires “general acceptance” of the
448
science within the relevant scientific community.
These

444. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
445. Id. at 592.
446. Id. at 592–95.
447. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
448. Michael Morgenstern, Daubert v. Frye: A State-by-State Comparison, THE EXPERT INST.
(Apr.
3,
2017),
https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/daubert-v-frye-a-state-by-statecomparison/ [https://perma.cc/5UF2-F5JQ].

BURGER ET AL. FINAL MACRO 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

2/5/2020 2:44 PM

The Law and Science of Climate Change Attribution

171

standards are typically only evoked when the opposing side
challenges expert testimony.
Most attribution studies accord with the Daubert standard insofar
as they rely on scientific theories that can be tested using models,
statistical analyses, and observations; they are typically published in
peer reviewed journals; they typically discuss known sources of bias
and the potential for Type I and Type II errors; and they are based
on generally accepted techniques. However, defendants in climate
lawsuits may argue that some of the more novel impact and event
attribution techniques do not meet all four requirements, and in
particular, the requirement of “general acceptance” within the
scientific community.
Defendants are also highly likely to
challenge testifying scientists who draw inferences from attribution
studies with respect to impacts not explicitly covered in those
studies, even where the underlying studies would clearly satisfy
449
Daubert.
This highlights the benefits of using attribution studies
of an appropriate scale and scope.
One important question is whether and to what extent
confidence levels will affect the admissibility of and weight given to
attribution studies presented to courts. As noted in Part II,
attribution findings are frequently presented in terms of
confidence levels and intervals—for example, a study may find with
“>90% confidence” that anthropogenic forcing on climate doubled
the risk of an extreme event occurring. The National Academy of
Sciences (“NAS”) Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence notes that a
95% confidence level is the “standard” for scientific studies but
does not recommend a threshold for admissibility in court, nor
does it discuss how confidence levels might affect the weight
450
afforded to a scientific study. Apart from that manual, there does
not appear to be any clear standard for dealing with confidence
levels and intervals in courtrooms. Many, but not all, attribution
studies present findings at the 95% confidence level, consistent
with general scientific practice. This bodes well for the utilization
of the research in courts, but there may be situations where it is
also useful to discuss findings at lower confidence levels (the goal

449. For more on this topic, see Kirsten Engel & Jonathan Overpeck, Adaptation and the
Courtroom: Judging Climate Science, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1 (2013).
450. FED. JUD. CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THIRD EDITION 284–85
(National Academies Press 2011) https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2015/SciMan
3D01.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SEB-JN9L].
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being to identify what is plausible, even if not highly certain). Part
IV presents recommendations on how researchers might frame
their research to satisfy the demands of the courtroom as well as
other applications.
There is no single numeric standard that juries and courts rely on
451
in assessing the weight of scientific expert testimony.
Generally
speaking, judges and juries will consider factors such as
believability, persuasiveness, thoroughness, and whether the
452
evidence has been refuted. Evidence that is indefinite, vague, or
improbable will generally be given less weight than evidence that is
453
direct and unrefuted. The weight afforded to attribution findings
will thus depend on the level of uncertainty underpinning those
findings as well as the extent to which the findings are a subject of
scientific debate.
3. Lawsuits Challenging the Failure to Regulate Greenhouse Gas
Emissions
Environmental and citizen groups in the United States and other
jurisdictions have brought numerous challenges seeking to compel
454
governments to take action to curtail greenhouse gas emissions.
There are three types of lawsuits that fall within this category: (i)
lawsuits challenging the government failure to implement statutory
mandates with respect to air pollution control; (ii) lawsuits
challenging the failure to protect public health pursuant to general
legal mandates recognized in constitutions, public trust doctrines,
human rights law, and other legal sources; and (iii) lawsuits
involving administrative decisions undertaken within an existing
regulatory scheme, typically decisions to grant or refuse an
authorization for a particular activity (such as coal mining or the
construction of an airport). In all three types of cases, attribution
451. Note the burden of proof in civil trials is the “preponderance of evidence” standard,
which requires a plaintiff to convince the trier of fact that the evidence in support of her case
outweighs the evidence offered by the defendant to oppose it.
452. Weight of the Evidence, WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 2008),
https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/weight+of+evidence [https://perma.cc/44V
B-TD4W].
453. Id.
454. Cases involving a common law breach of a government duty owned to plaintiffs are
sometimes referred to as “public liability” cases in contrast to the “private liability” cases
discussed in subsequent sections. See Jutta Brunnée et al, Overview of Legal Issues Relevant to
Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY: TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 23
(Richard Lord et al. eds., Cambridge University Press 2012).
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science comes into play when plaintiffs need to establish a causal
connection between the government’s action or inaction and
concrete harms caused by climate change to succeed on the merits.
a. Lawsuits Challenging the Failure to Implement Statutory
Mandates With Respect to Air Pollution Control
i. Massachusetts v. EPA
The most noteworthy case involving a government failure to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to an existing statutory
scheme for air pollution control was Massachusetts. In the same way
that attribution science helped plaintiffs establish standing in this
case, it also helped them to rebut EPA’s assertion that it there was
455
too much scientific uncertainty about climate change to regulate.
The case history is illuminating. The D.C. Circuit initially
dismissed the case but did not reach consensus on the basis for
dismissal, in part due to disagreements about the scientific
underpinnings of EPA’s views about scientific uncertainty. In
Judge Randel’s plurality opinion, he wrote that EPA had properly
declined to regulate based on its conclusions that there was too
much scientific uncertainty about the causal effects of greenhouse
456
gases on climate change. In reaching this conclusion, the judge
referred to EPA’s reliance on a 2001 National Research Council
(“NRC”) report, which found that “a causal linkage” between
greenhouse gas emissions and global warming “cannot be
457
unequivocally established.”
He summarized the NRC’s findings
as follows:
The earth regularly experiences climate cycles of global cooling, such
as an ice age, followed by periods of global warming. Global
temperatures have risen since the industrial revolution, as have
455. Uncertainty was only one of the rationales proffered by EPA for not regulating
motor vehicle emissions. EPA also argued that: (i) it did not have statutory authority to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions, and (ii) even if did have authority to regulate, there were
“policy considerations” which made it unwise for EPA to exercise that authority at this time.
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 513–514. See also citing EPA, Control of Emissions from New
Highway Vehicles and Engines: Notice of Denial of Petition for Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg.
52922, 52929–31 (Sept. 8, 2003).
456. Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 58. (The court also supported EPA’s determination that
policy considerations weighed against regulating greenhouse gases at this time.)
457. Id. at 57 (citing NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF
SOME OF THE KEY QUESTIONS (2001)).
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atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide. But an increase in carbon
dioxide levels is not always accompanied by a corresponding rise in
global temperatures. For example, although carbon dioxide levels
increased steadily during the twentieth century, global temperatures
decreased between 1946 and 1975. Considering this and other data,
the National Research Council concluded that “there is considerable
uncertainty in current understanding of how the climate system varies
naturally and reacts to emissions of greenhouse gases.” This
uncertainty is compounded by the possibility for error inherent in the
assumptions necessary to predict future climate change. And, as the
National Research Council noted, past assumptions about effects of
future greenhouse gas emissions have proven to be erroneously
458
high.

In light of this perceived uncertainty, Judge Randel concluded
that it was neither arbitrary nor capricious for EPA to decline to
459
Judge Sentelle,
regulate greenhouse gas emissions at the time.
concurring in the decision to dismiss the case, asserted that the
460
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case on standing grounds.
Judge Tatel dissented, arguing that the NRC report actually did
provide a sufficient basis for a finding that greenhouse gas
emissions endangered public health and welfare and should
461
therefore be regulated under the Clean Air Act.
Notably, the
dissenting judge provided a more detailed synthesis of the NRC
report’s findings, which contradicted Judge Randel’s interpretation
of the report. Some of the key points highlighted were that:
The very first sentence of the NRC report stated that
“Greenhouse gases are accumulating in Earth’s atmosphere as
a result of human activities, causing surface air temperatures
and subsurface ocean temperatures to rise.” The quote used by
Judge Randel (that “a causal linkage” between greenhouse gas
emissions and global warming “cannot be unequivocally
established”) had been taken out of context, and was merely a
recognition that this linkage, as with many other scientific
462
theories, could not be established with 100% certainty.
The NRC report made clear that uncertainties about climate
change related chiefly to the scope and magnitude of impacts
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 58.
Id. at 60–61 (Sentelle, J., concurring).
Id.at 61–82 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
Id. at 63.
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caused by greenhouse gas accumulation, not whether there463was
a correlation between those emissions and global warming.
The NRC report explicitly acknowledged that “national policy
decisions made now and in the longer-term future will
influence the extent of any damage suffered by vulnerable
464
human populations and ecosystems later in this century.”
On review, the Supreme Court acknowledged that uncertainty
might be a reasonable basis for not regulating, but held that EPA
cannot defer regulation unless it issued a formal declaration that
the uncertainty was “so profound that it preclude[d] EPA from
making a reasoned judgment as to whether greenhouse gases
465
contribute to global warming.”
While the Court did not decide
the issue, it did clearly indicate that it might not uphold a
determination of uncertainty from EPA—it noted the “harms
associated with climate change are serious and well-recognized”
and that the “Government’s own objective assessment of the
relevant science and a strong consensus among qualified experts
indicate that global warming threatens, inter alia, a precipitate rise
in sea levels, severe and irreversible changes to natural ecosystems,
a significant reduction in winter snowpack with direct and
important economic consequences, and increases in the spread of
466
disease and the ferocity of weather events.”
ii. Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts, EPA
issued an endangerment finding for GHG emissions from motor
vehicles, finding that such emissions cause or contribute to the
endangerment of public health and welfare. The D.C. Circuit
upheld this determination in Coalition for Responsible Regulation v.
467
EPA. There, an industry group argued that there was “too much
uncertainty” about the science underpinning climate change and
that EPA had improperly relied on external studies from the IPCC,
463. Id. at 64.
464. Id. at 64.
465. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 534.
466. Id. at 499.
467. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA., 684 F.3d 102, 121 (D.C. Cir. 2012),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA., 573 U.S. 302 (2014), and
amended sub nom Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 606 F. App’x 6 (D.C. Cir.
2015). See also Biogenic CO2 Coal. v. EPA, No. 16-1358 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 14, 2016)
(challenging endangerment finding for GHG emissions from aircraft).
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U.S. Global Change Research Program, and U.S. National Research
468
Council in reaching its decision. The court rejected these claims
and held that EPA’s reliance on external studies was entirely
proper—noting that “EPA is not required to re-prove the existence
of the atom every time it approaches a scientific question”—and
held that the scientific body of evidence underpinning the
endangerment finding was “substantial” and therefore legally
469
sound. In reaching this conclusion, the court explained that EPA
had addressed each link in the causal chain connecting
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions to harmful impacts on
public health and welfare and that EPA had provided three lines of
evidence to support the finding:
(i) our “basic physical
understanding” of the greenhouse gas effect, (ii) observational
evidence of past climate change, and (iii) models predicting how
the climate will response to greenhouse gas concentrations in the
470
future.
iii. Other Clean Air Act Cases
Above, we describe how attribution science has played a central
role in the issuance and judicial review of Clean Air Act
endangerment findings. This would also be the case if EPA
exercised its authority to establish National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (“NAAQS”) for GHGs under Section 110 or if EPA
developed a program to control GHG emissions as a source of
471
international air pollution under Section 115 of the Act.
To
establish NAAQS for GHGs, EPA would need to identify thresholds
for ambient concentrations of GHGs that are sufficient to protect
public health and welfare. Similarly, to establish a Section 115
program, EPA would need to establish targets for emission
reductions as necessary to “prevent or eliminate the
endangerment” that those emissions pose to foreign nations. In
either case, it would be necessary to define the appropriate
threshold for emission control based on, among other things, both

468. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc., 684 F.3d at 121.
469. Id. at 120.
470. Id. at 120-121.
471. See Michael Burger et al., Legal Pathways to Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions under
Section 115 of the Clean Air Act, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 359 (2016); Kassie Siegel et al., Strong
Law, Timid Implementation. How the EPA Can Apply The Full Force of the Clean Air Act To Address
The Climate Crisis, 30 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POLICY 185 (2012).
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existing impacts as well as predictions of future impacts of climate
change.
The Clean Air Act and other air pollution control statutes also
provide for the establishment of technology-based emission
standards (e.g., standards reflecting the “best available technology”
472
or the “best system of emission reduction.”).
In this context,
attribution science plays a less pivotal role in the establishment and
judicial review of the standards, since the standards are primarily
based on considerations pertaining to statutory authority,
technological feasibility, and cost. However, challenges to and
defenses of these standards do involve attribution questions to
some extent—for example, when defining the “best system of
emission reduction” for controlling emissions from stationary
sources under the Clean Air Act, EPA must take into account the
public health benefits of the standards as well as technological
473
feasibility and cost.
But to date, attribution science has not
featured prominently in litigation over technology-based and
474
hybrid rules and standards such as the Clean Power Plan.
b. Cases Challenging the Government Failure to Protect Public
Health Pursuant to Constitutional Mandates, Public Trust
Doctrines, Human Rights Law, and Other Legal Sources
A number of cases have been brought challenging the failure to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions and fossil fuel production on
the grounds that government entities have violated more general
mandates pertaining to fundamental rights. In the United States,
there are at least two federal legal sources that have given or could
give rise to such cases: the public trust doctrine, which holds that
government actors have a duty to preserve certain “public trust”
475
resources for future generations; and the theory of substantive
due process, which holds that the federal government must
safeguard fundamental rights that are “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty” or “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
476
tradition.”
States and other jurisdictions also have a variety of

472. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. §7411 (2018).
473. Id.
474. See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. 2015); North Dakota v. EPA,
No. 15-1381 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
475. Ill. Ctr. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
476. McDonald v. City of Chi., III., 561 U.S. 742, 761, 767 (2010).
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different common law, constitutional, and statutory requirements
that oblige government actors to protect public welfare, human
477
rights, or the environment, which can support such claims.
In
these cases, attribution science is primarily used to demonstrate a
causal connection between the under-regulated greenhouse gas
emissions and specific injuries to public health and welfare or the
environment, which, in turn, give rise to the alleged breach of
478
government duty.
i. Juliana v. United States
In Juliana, the plaintiffs asserted that: (i) the U.S. government
had violated “the fundamental right of citizens to be free from
government actions that harm life, liberty, and property” by
“approving and promoting fossil fuel development, including
exploration, extraction, production, transportation, importation,
exportation, and combustion” that had resulted in the degree of
climate change we are now experiencing and are projected to
479
experience in the future; and (ii) the U.S. government also
violated its public trust obligation to its citizens through this
480
conduct. To prove these claims, the plaintiffs would have needed
to establish a causal connection between the emissions that the U.S.
government had approved and/or failed to control and the alleged
violations of their rights and/or the public trust doctrine.
The plaintiffs in Juliana emphasized the magnitude of the
emissions at issue, noting that: (i) territorial emissions from the
U.S. account for approximately 25.5% of the world’s cumulative
CO2 emissions, and this figure would likely be higher using a
consumption- or extraction-based accounting approach; (ii)
emissions from U.S. energy consumption were 5.4 billion metric
477. For example, there have been a number of lawsuits filed under state constitutions
and public trust doctrines due to state inaction on climate change, as well as foreign lawsuits
filed pursuant to national constitutional obligations and human rights laws. See, e.g., Funk v.
Pennsylvania, 71 A.3d 1097 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013); Urgenda District Court Decision (2015);
Leghari v. Pakistan (2015) WP No. 25501/201 (Lahore Hight Court) (Pak.). See also Public
Trust Doctrine, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L., http://climatecasechart.com/principlelaw/public-trust-doctrine/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/DH4B-N93K].
478. In some instances it may also be the case that attribution science plays a role in
positing the efficacy or level of protection available under the alternative scenario sought by
plaintiffs.
479. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1248 (D. Or. 2016).
480. The contours of the public trust doctrine, as interpreted by the plaintiffs and court
in this case, are similar to the duty of care at issue in Urgenda District Court Decision (2015).
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tons of CO2 in 2014; (iii) if the government had acted on expert
recommendations on how to limit emissions issued by EPA in 1990
and the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment in 1991,
then U.S. CO2 emissions would have been reduced by 35% from
1987 levels; and (iv) instead, since 1991, the U.S. government had
“knowingly allowed at least an additional 130,466 million metric
481
tons of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion.” Plaintiffs also
dedicated a substantial portion of their complaint to explaining
precisely how climate change is affecting and will affect their lives,
liberty, and property interests, to support both their standing and
482
merits claims. The overarching theme of the complaint was that
the plaintiffs, all being young people, are “especially vulnerable” to
483
the threats caused by climate change.
It detailed existing and
projected impacts on each of the individual children, such as
adverse impacts on a farm where one of the children works and
484
intends to pursue a livelihood; lost income for a family that works
485
at a ski resort; and asthma attacks from the increased frequency
of forest fires in Oregon (a result of hotter and drier
486
temperatures).
In her decisions denying the U.S. government’s motion to
dismiss and motion for summary judgment, the district court judge
in Oregon held that the plaintiffs’ allegations raised colorable
substantive claims under the U.S. Constitution and the public trust
487
doctrine. The judge found that the substantive due process claim
was supported by plaintiff’s allegations that “the government has
caused pollution and climate change on a catastrophic level, and that
if the government’s actions continued unchecked, they will
permanently and irreversibly damage plaintiff’s property, their
economic livelihood, their recreational opportunities, their health,
and ultimately their (and their children’s) ability to live long,

481. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at paras. 151–163,
Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d. 1224 (D. Or. 2016) (No. 615-cv-01517-TC). This
estimate of the U.S. emissions contribution was based on total emissions from energy
production within the U.S. since 1991.
482. Id. at paras. 16–97.
483. Id. at para. 10.
484. Id. at paras. 23–28.
485. Id. at para. 38.
486. Id. at para. 46.
487. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d. 1224 (D. Or. 2016); Juliana v. United
States, 339 F.Supp.3d 1062 (D. Or. 2018).
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488

healthy lives.”
With this in mind, the judge stated: “I have no
doubt that the right to a climate system capable of sustaining
human life is fundamental to a free and ordered society” and
489
therefore was a constitutionally protected right.
The judge also
found that the plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to establish a
breach of the public trust doctrine, which prohibits government
actors from “depriving a future legislature of the natural resources
490
necessary to provide for the well-being and survival of its citizens.”
She noted that it was unnecessary to determine whether the
atmosphere was itself a public trust resource that must be preserved
for future generations, because the territorial sea owned by the
federal government has already been declared a public trust
resource, and plaintiffs had alleged adequate harms to that
resource caused by ocean acidification and rising ocean
491
temperatures.
As discussed above, the district court’s decision was overturned by
492
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in early 2020.
Finding that
the plaintiffs had failed to establish the redressability prong of
Article III standing, the Court of Appeals remanded to the district
court with orders to dismiss. Nonetheless, the work the parties put
into preparation for an anticipated trial—and the district court’s
decision on the motion for summary judgment—reveals a great
deal about how detection and attribution science would likely
factor into resolution of other cases involving regulatory failures.
In preparation for trial, the plaintiffs submitted more than 1,000
pages of expert reports detailing the fundamental science of
488. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1250.
489. Id.
490. Id. at 1253. But see Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding
that the public trust doctrine is a matter of state, not federal, law) (citing PPL Montana, LLC
v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576 (2012)).
491. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1256 (citing First Amended Complaint ¶ 16 (“An
important part of Kelsey’s diet includes food that comes from the marine waters and
freshwater rivers, including salmon, cod, tuna, clams, mussels, and crab.”); id. ¶ 27 (“Other
food sources for Alex, including crab and seafood, are negatively impacted by ocean
acidification, warming, and sea level rise caused by Defendants.”); id. ¶ 33 (“Ocean
acidification caused by Defendants has already begun to adversely impact shellfish along the
coast, and is predicted to take its toll on crab, mussels, and all shelled seafood.”); id. ¶ 45
(“On the Oregon coast, Sahara enjoys climbing rocks and sand dunes, swimming, and
tidepooling to see marine life. Sahara’s enjoyment of these activities is being increasingly
harmed in the future by sea level rise, greater erosion, enhanced ocean acidification, and
increased water temperatures.”).
492. See infra Section III(C)(1).
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climate change, observed and projected impacts, and the ways in
which the United States and the fossil fuel industry have
493
contributed to the problem.
In some cases, the experts linked
observed impacts directly to the plaintiff’s alleged injuries, but
some of these linkages draw on qualitative inferences about how
broader trends related to climate change have affected or may
affect the plaintiffs. For example, with respect to a plaintiff who
had to move from her home in Cameron, Arizona because the
springs her family depended on for water were drying up, one
expert noted that the “pattern of drought in places like Arizona is
directly linked to climate change” without citing research
specifically attributing the arid conditions in the area to climate
494
change.
Similarly, experts reporting on public health impacts
noted that the youth plaintiffs, like all children, are at a higher risk
of certain health problems such as asthma due to climate change
but did not attribute specific health problems experienced by
495
individual plaintiffs to climate change. In other cases, statements
about impacts on plaintiffs were based on observed trends and
impacts without reference to attribution studies like those
496
described in Section II.
Arguably more robust linkages were
drawn between climate change and alleged injuries based on
downscaled climate impact data—for example, data on historic and
497
projected sea level rise in the town where one plaintiff lived, and
attribution studies linking specific extreme events that affected
498
plaintiffs to anthropogenic climate change.
Regarding the question of source attribution and the U.S.
contribution to climate change, Dr. James Hansen prepared a
lengthy expert report and an accompanying paper on Assessing
493. See U.S. Climate Change Litigation: Juliana v. United States, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE
CHANGE L., http://climatecasechart.com/case/juliana-v-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/
7DBD-37KP] (last visited Jan. 6, 2020).
494. Expert Report of Steven W. Running, Ph.D at 6, Juliana v. United States, 339
F.Supp.3d 1062 (D. Or. 2018) (No. 6:15-cv-1517).
495. Expert Report of Susan E. Pacheco, M.D. and Jerome A. Paulson, M.D., FAAP,
Juliana v. United States, 339 F.Supp.3d 1062 (2018) (No. 6:15-cv-1517).
496. See, e.g., Expert Report of Steven Running, supra note 494, at 9 (“Ski areas like
Hoodoo Pass and Willamette Pass in Oregon, where Plaintiff Zealand recreates and his
family has been employed, and Stevens Pass in Washington, where Plaintiff Aji recreates,
have recently had years with so little snow the areas could not even open for business.”)
497. Expert Report of Dr. Harold R. Wanless at 24, Juliana v. United States, 339
F.Supp.3d 1062 (2018) (No. 6:15-cv-1517).
498. Expert Report of Dr. Kevin Trenberth at 18-22, Juliana v. United States, 339
F.Supp.3d 1062 (2018) (No. 6:15-cv-1517).
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“Dangerous Climate Change”: Required Reduction of Carbon Emissions to
Protect Young People, Future Generations and Nature, which he co499
authored with other scientists and economists.
Hansen cited
research finding that the U.S. is an “unambiguous leader” in
cumulative GHG emissions, having generated approximately 25%
of emissions since 1751 (“more than double that of China, which
falls second in the ranking”), and that the United States alone is
responsible for a 0.15°C increase in global temperature. Dr.
Hansen discussed emission reduction targets for the U.S. based on
500
a global climate budget. Dr. Hansen also discussed impacts such
as sea level rise but did not explicitly quantify the proportional
contribution of the United States to those impacts.
The question of the United States’ responsibility for climate
change was further explored in an expert report from Peter
Erickson, a scientist at the Stockholm Environment Institute. He
noted that the U.S. produces a substantial quantity of “territorial”
emissions but that this is an incomplete indicator of responsibility
501
for climate change.
He called for consideration of the United
States’ consumption emissions, which are approximately 20%
higher than territorial emissions in recent decades, as well as
extraction-based emissions, since the country also bears some
responsibility for emissions from the burning of fossil fuels
502
produced in the United States. His expert testimony contained a
comparison of U.S. emissions under all three accounting
approaches. Erickson also noted that the United States has
contributed to climate change by leasing and subsidizing the
production of fossil fuels, but did not quantify the effect of those
leases and subsidies on climate change (vis-à-vis global mean
temperature change) or its impacts. Notably, Erickson did not
suggest that one accounting approach should dominate—but
rather that all three approaches should be considered when
assessing U.S. responsibility for climate change.
499. Expert Report of James E. Hansen, Juliana v. United States, 339 F.Supp.3d 1062
(2018) (No. 6:15-cv-1517).; see also James E. Hansen et al., Assessing ‘‘Dangerous Climate
Change’’: Required Reduction of Carbon Emissions to Protect Young People, Future Generations and
Nature, 8 PLOS ONE 12 (Dec. 2013).
500. Expert Report of James Hansen, supra note 499, at 26–27.
501. Expert Report of Peter A. Erickson at 3, Juliana v. United States, 339 F.Supp.3d
1062 (D. Or. 2018) (No. 6:15-cv-1517).
502. Id. (“To more fully reflect its contribution to global climate change, it is my opinion
that the Federal Government should also regularly conduct both a consumption-based and
an extraction-based GHG emissions inventory.”).
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The U.S. government also solicited numerous expert reports
primarily aimed at countering the idea that plaintiffs’ injuries
could be traced to U.S. government conduct. With respect to
impact attribution, the defense experts argued that the plaintiffs’
experts have failed to establish a conclusive link between
anthropogenic climate change and the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries
because they infered that climate change caused the injuries based
503
on observations and general trends without accounting for other
confounding factors that may have been responsible for the
504
injuries. The defendants’ experts also addressed the question of
source attribution—that is, the question of U.S. government
responsibility and ability to provide redress for climate changerelated injuries. They argued that the plaintiffs’ experts have failed
to specify the degree to which U.S. government conduct is
505
responsible for climate change or the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries,
503. See, e.g., Notice of Supplemental Disputed Facts Raised By Defendants’ Expert
Reports In Support Of Plaintiffs’ Response In Opposition To Defendants’ Motion For
Summary Judgment, Juliana v. United States, 6:15-cv-01517, Dkt. 338 (Aug. 24, 2018)
(plaintiffs’ health impact experts “never directly link[ed] any of the [psychiatric and medical
consequences of climate change] to any individual plaintiffs. They remain theoretical
possibilities, reported in various studies of natural disasters, but not conclusively identified in
any of the Plaintiffs she examined.”), Juliana v. United States, 339 F.Supp.3d 1062 (D. Or.
2018) (No. 6:15-cv-1517); Expert Report of Dr. Norman I. Klein at 5 (“Drs. Frumkin,
Pacheco, and Paulson confuse general correlations from abstract epidemiological studies
with clinical examination of specific instances of asthma and allergy symptoms), Juliana v.
United States, 339 F.Supp.3d 1062 (D. Or. 2018) (No. 6:15-cv-1517).
504. See, e.g., Expert Report of Norman Klein, supra note 503, at 3 (“[e]ven if the
individual Plaintiffs’ complaints of allergy and asthma symptoms were credited, an
exemption of other potential contributing factors must be evaluated before climate change
could be determined as a contributing, much less primarily contributing, factor to these
specific Plaintiffs.”); Expert Report of Dr. John P. Weyant at 10 (“By failing to analyze the
potential confounding effect of local conditions, Dr. Trenberth reaches conclusions about
the impacts on Plaintiffs that are unsupported and therefore unreliable.”), Juliana v. United
States, 339 F.Supp.3d 1062 (D. Or. 2018) (No. 6:15-cv-1517); Expert Report of Dr. John P.
Weyant at 15 (“When Prof. Running makes claims about injuries to Plaintiffs, he simply
presumes that human-induced climate change is the major cause of the multiple
hydrological and ecological changes that he discusses, despite the fact that population
growth and migration, forest and water management practices, and wildfire and flood
prevention measures are also important determinants of the climate events he analyzed.”),
Juliana v. United States, 339 F.Supp.3d 1062 (D. Or. 2018) (No. 6:15-cv-1517); Expert Report
of Dr. John P. Weyant at 18 (“Complicated interactions are emblematic of the confounding
factors that scientists need to consider when examining the influence of climate change. It is
the part of the reason why Prof. Running’s statement that an increased wildfire season due to
climate change has and will affect many of the Plaintiffs is an overbroad assertion.”), Juliana
v. United States, 339 F.Supp.3d 1062 (D. Or. 2018) (No. 6:15-cv-1517).
505. See, e.g., Expert Report of John Weyant supra note 504, at 11 (“Overall, Dr.
Trenberth’s conclusions are not supported by analysis that allows one to determine how and
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and failed to demonstrate that the U.S. government could provide
adequate redress for the alleged injuries through policy and
506
regulatory actions.
They also disputed the share of global
507
emissions attributable to U.S. government action or inaction.
One expert estimated that the U.S. government is responsible for
no more than 4% of global emissions and that the other 96% of
emissions are generated by: (i) countries other than the U.S., or
(ii) fossil fuel consumption by entities other than the federal
government that would have occurred regardless of federal policies
508
and regulations.
Another expert estimated that, even under a
consumption-based accounting approach, the share of emissions
509
attributable to the U.S. government is only 5%.
Notably, both
experts acknowledged that total U.S. emissions are much higher
than these estimates regardless of whether a territorial-,
consumption-, or extraction-based methodology is used, but they

to what degree Jaime’s experiences with water shortages, wildfires, droughts, or heat waves
are exacerbated by human-induced climate change.”).
506. See, e.g., Expert Report of David G. Victor at 12 , Juliana v. United States, 339
F.Supp.3d 1062 (D. Or. 2018) (No. 6:15-cv-1517) (“US oil and gas producers extract
commodities worth $245b per year. The subsidy embodied in the output is only about 1.9%
of the total market value of production. In my view, subsidies worth that tiny fraction of the
total value are not material to an industry whose prices can swing many multiples of this
percentage in a financial quarter.”); Expert Report of David G. Victor at 19, Juliana v. United
States, 339 F.Supp.3d 1062 (D. Or. 2018) (No. 6:15-cv-1517) (“The effect of oil subsidy
reforms on emissions will be much smaller than suggested by Erickson, because other factors
have a much larger impact on production decisions, the industry is highly competitive and
responsive to changes in market conditions and production costs.”); Expert Report of Dr.
Daniel Sumner at 8 , Juliana v. United States, 339 F.Supp.3d 1062 (D. Or. 2018) (No. 6:15-cv1517) (“I conclude that there is considerable doubt as to whether Dr. Robertson’s proposed
agricultural methods can deliver the amount of GHG abatement that Dr. Robertson claims at
any price.”). See, e.g., Expert Report of David G. Victor at 4, Juliana v. United States, 339
F.Supp.3d 1062 (D. Or. 2018) (No. 6:15-cv-1517) (“The effect of oil subsidy reforms on
emissions will be small to zero.”) ; Expert Report of Dr. James L. Sweeney at 13, Juliana v.
United States, 339 F.Supp.3d 1062 (D. Or. 2018) (No. 6:15-cv-1517) (“If the U.S. halted its
use and production of fossil fuels, the prices of these fuels would fall and other counties
would increase their use of fossil fuels.”).
507. See, e.g., Expert Report of James Sweeney, supra note 506, at 66 (“Plaintiffs and their
experts offer no analysis to link the failure to develop policies to the impacts on GHG
emissions.”); Expert Report of David G. Victor, supra note 506, at 5 (“Stiglitz fails to identify
plausible, real-world actions that the U.S. government could have taken that would have led
to appreciably different outcomes with respect to domestic and international energy
systems.”); Expert Report of James Sweeney, supra note 506, at 56 (“Only a very small fraction
of these sources [of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions are] directly controlled by the federal
government.”).
508. Expert Report of James Sweeney, supra note 506, at 60.
509. Expert Report of David G. Victor, supra note 506, at 4.
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dispute the notion that the U.S. government is responsible for all
510
U.S. emissions.
This was consistent with the approach taken by
defendants in their answer to the original complaint, in which they
admitted key facts about the proportion of global CO2 emissions
generated within the U.S. while maintaining that the U.S.
511
government is not responsible for those emissions.
Reviewing
these materials in the context of the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, the district court found “that plaintiffs have
provided sufficient evidence showing that causation for their claims
is more than attenuated,” that “[t]he ultimate issue of causation
will require perhaps the most extensive evidence to determine at
trial,” and that a “final ruling on this issue will benefit from a fully
developed factual record where the Court can consider and weigh
512
evidence from both parties.”
Thus, even without the “trial of the century,” we can see the
contours of the “battle of experts” such a trial would entail.
Plaintiffs’ primary goal with their expert testimony was to establish
that the defendant is responsible for a meaningful contribution to
climate change—an amount sufficient to prove causal relationships
that satisfy the standing requirements and the even more
demanding standards for showing a violation of public trust
obligations and/or constitutional rights—and that climate change
is the legal cause of specific injuries suffered by the plaintiffs.
Defendants’ primary strategy was to undermine the reliability of
plaintiffs’ proffers, and their tactic was to poke holes in plaintiffs’
expert reports by challenging the science of source attribution and
highlighting the importance of confounding factors.
ii. Other Atmospheric Trust Litigation in the U.S.
There have been a number of similar cases asking state courts to
find that state governments have a public trust duty to address
climate change (frequently referred to as “atmospheric trust”

510. Expert Report of James Sweeney, supra note 506, at 60; Expert Report of David G.
Victor, supra note 506, at 8–10.
511. See, e.g., Federal Defendants’ Answer to the First Amended Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 151, Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062 (D.
Or. 2018) (“Federal Defendants aver that from 1850 to 2012, CO2 emissions from sources
within the United States (including from land use) comprised more than 25 percent of
cumulative global CO2 emissions”).
512. Juliana, 339 F. Supp. 3d at 1062, 1093.
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513

cases).
These cases involve the same sort of inquiry into the
extent to which harmful impacts on a public trust resource can be
linked to under-regulated greenhouse gas emissions. For example,
in Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, youth plaintiffs in New Mexico sought a
judgment establishing that the state had a public trust duty under
state law to protect the atmosphere and that its “failure to
investigate the threat posed by climate change” and to devise a plan
to “mitigate the effects of climate change” was a breach of that
514
duty.
The state district court initially dismissed the case, in part
because it determined that New Mexico regulators had properly
determined that New Mexico regulation of greenhouse gas
515
emissions “would have no perceptible impact on climate change.”
The appellate court took a different approach and found that
Article XX, Section 21 of the New Mexico state constitution
recognizes that a public trust duty exists for the protection of New
516
Mexico’s natural resources, including the atmosphere. However,
the court also concluded that the state had established legislative
and administrative procedures for raising arguments concerning
the duty to protect the atmosphere and that these arguments could
517
not be made through a separate common law cause of action.
Similarly, courts in Washington State and Alaska have affirmed that
those states’ public trust doctrines apply to climate change but

513. See, e.g., Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 335 P.3d 1088 (Alaska
2014); Sinnok v. Alaska, No. 3AN-17-09910, 2018 WL 7501030 (Alaska Super. Ct. 2018);
Butler ex rel. Peshlakai v. Brewer, No. 1 CA–CV 12–0347, 2013 WL 1091209 (Ariz. Ct. App.
Mar. 14, 2013); Filippone ex rel. Filippone v. Iowa Dep’t of Nat. Res., 829 N.W.2d 589 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2013) (declining to extend the public trust doctrine to the atmosphere because the
Iowa Supreme Court had previously declined to extend the doctrine to forested areas and
public alleyways); Aronow v. State, No. A12–0585, 2012 WL 4476642 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1,
2012) (declining to apply the public trust doctrine to the atmosphere because no court in
Minnesota or any other jurisdiction has done so, and because it had previously held that the
public trust doctrine did not apply to land); Chernaik v. Kitzhaber, 328 P.3d 799 (2014);
Svitak ex rel. Svitak v. State, 178 Wash. App. 1020, No. 69710–2–I, 2013, 2013 WL 6632124
(Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2013); Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d
1221 (N.M. 2015); Foster v. Wash. State Dep’t of Ecology, 362 P.3d 959 (2015).
514. Sanders-Reed, 350 P.3d at 1223 (citing plaintiff’s amended complaint to district
court).
515. Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgement and Denying
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgement, Exhibit A, at TR-3, Sanders-Reed ex rel. SandersReed v. Martinez, No. D-101-CV-2011-01514 (N.M. Dist. July 04, 2013).
516. Sanders-Reed, 350 P.3d at 1225.
517. Id.
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deferred to existing legislation and executive processes as the
518
appropriate means to regulate GHGs.
iii. Foreign Jurisdictions
Similar types of “atmospheric trust” cases have also been brought
in foreign jurisdictions to protect rights enumerated in foreign
constitutions, human rights instruments, and international treaties.
Perhaps most famously, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands
recently upheld decisions from the Hague Court of Appeals and
the District Court of the Hague in Urgenda Foundation v. Kingdom of
the Netherlands, finding that the Dutch government had breached its
obligations to its citizens by backing away from the previous
administration’s mitigation commitments, and ordered the
government to limit GHG emissions to 25% below 1990 levels by
2020, consistent with what the court viewed as the country’s fair
contribution towards the U.N. goal of limiting global temperature
519
The Supreme
increases to 2°C above pre-industrial conditions.
Court supported its decision by referring to IPCC assessments of
how climate change is affecting and will affect human and natural
systems and an explanation of why the 25% reduction target is
520
necessary to limit global warming to 2°C.
Detection and
attribution science factored into this analysis in two ways: first, by
providing evidence of the harms incurred by Dutch people as a
result of climate change (impact attribution); and second, by
providing information about the emissions reductions necessary to
meet the 2°C target (contribution attribution).
Similar lawsuits have been brought against governments in the
521
522
523
524
United
Kingdom,
Germany,
Canada,
Belgium,
518. Foster, 362 P.3d 959; Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 335 P.3d 1088
(Alaska 2014) (ruling that claims for relief raised nonjusticiable political questions); Sinnok
v. Alaska, No. 3AN-17-09910, 2018 WL 7501030 (Alaska Super. Ct. 2018).
519.
Urgenda Foundation v. Kingdom of the Netherlands, Hoge Raad,
ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2007 (Dec. 20, 2019) [hereinafter Urgenda decision (2019)]. (English
translation available at http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wpcontent/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2020/20200113_2015-HAZA-C09004566
89_judgment.pdf).
520. Id. at ¶¶ 2.1, 4.1– 4.8, 7.1–7.3.6.
521. Plan B Earth and Others v. Sec’y of State for Bus., Energy, and Indus. Strategy
[2018] EWHC 1892 (Admin), (UK), http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/plan-b-earthothers-v-secretary-state-business-energy-industrial-strategy/ [https://perma.cc/KPY8-HPF6].
522. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Nov. 26, 2018,
(Germany),http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/friends-of-the-earth-germany-assoc
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Switzerland, India, Pakistan, Colombia, and Uganda, as
530
well as the European Parliament and Council. At the time of this
531
Four were
writing, most of these cases are still pending.
iation-of-solar-supporters-and-others-v-germany/[https://perma.cc/E3B4-9TF6];Verwaltung
sgericht [VG] [Berlin Administrative Trial Court] Oct. 31, 2019, No. 00271/17 R/SP,
(Germany), http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/family-farmers-and-greenpeace-germ
any-v-german-government/ [https://perma.cc/4PBK-8DNV].
523.
ENVironnement JEUnesse v. Canada, 2018 QCSC 500-06 (Can.),
http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/environnement-jeunesse-v-canadian-government/
[https://perma.cc/E9NR-EF8D].
524. Tribunal de Première Instance [Civ.] [Tribunal of First Instance] Brussels, 2016,
VZW Klimatzaak v. Kingdom of Belgium, (Belg.), http://climatecasechart.com/non-uscase/vzw-klimaatzaak-v-kingdom-of-belgium-et-al/ [https://perma.cc/E3C9-JWLT].
525. Petition (Summary in English) at ¶ 1(a), Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVGE]
[Federal Administrative Court, Section 1] Nov. 27, 2018, A-2992/2017 (Switz.),
http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/union-of-swiss-senior-women-for-climate-protecti
on-v-swiss-federal-parliament/ [https://perma.cc/Q2SM-SCEQ].
526. Pandey v. India, (2017) National Green Tribunal, http://climatecasechart
.com/non-us-case/pandey-v-india/ [https://perma.cc/VT8P-P6AX].
527. Ali v. Pakistan, Constitutional Petition No. ___ / I of (2016) (SC) (Pak.),
http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/ali-v-federation-of-pakistan-2/ [https://perma.cc
/L228-XQ8T]; Leghari v. Pakistan, (2015) W.P. No. 25501/201 (Lahore High Court) (Pak.),
http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/ashgar-leghari-v-federation-of-pakistan/
[https://perma.cc/JBN3-XGYJ].
528. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], abril 5, 2018, STC4360, No.
11001-22-03-000-2018-00319-01 (Colom.), http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/futuregeneration-v-ministry-environment-others/ [https://perma.cc/53WU-NLJK].
529. Mbabazi and Others v. The Attorney General and National Environmental
Management
Authority,
Civil
Suit
No.
283
of
2012
(Uganda),
http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/mbabazi-et-al-v-attorney-general-et-al/
[https://perma.cc/J5RL-U426].
530. Armando Ferrão Carvalho and Others v. The European Parliament and the
Council, Case No. T-330/18 (EU General Court 2018), http://climatecasechart.com/non-uscase/armando-ferrao-carvalho-and-others-v-the-european-parliament-and-the-council/
[https://perma.cc/JN4R-3K2Q].
531. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Nov. 26, 2018,
(Germany),
http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/friends-of-the-earth-germanyassociation-of-solar-supporters-and-others-v-germany/
[https://perma.cc/E3B4-9TF6];
Verwaltungsgericht [VG] [Berlin Administrative Trial Court] Oct. 31, 2019, No. 00271/17
R/SP,
(Germany),
http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/family-farmers-andgreenpeace-germany-v-german-government/ [https://perma.cc/4PBK-8DNV]; Pandey v.
India, (2017) National Green Tribunal, http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/pandey-vindia/ [https://perma.cc/VT8P-P6AX]; Ali v. Pakistan, Constitutional Petition No. ___ / I of
(2016) (SC) (Pak.), http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/ali-v-federation-of-pakistan-2/
[https://perma.cc/L228-XQ8T]; Mbabazi and Others v. The Attorney General and National
Environmental Management Authority, Civil Suit No. 283 of 2012 (Uganda),
http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/mbabazi-et-al-v-attorney-general-et-al/
[https://perma.cc/J5RL-U426]; Tribunal de Première Instance [Civ.] [Tribunal of First
Instance] Brussels, 2016, VZW Klimatzaak v. Kingdom of Belgium, (Belg.),
http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/vzw-klimaatzaak-v-kingdom-of-belgium-et-al/
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dismissed by courts on procedural grounds or lack of justiciability
532
(e.g., due to lack of standing). Decisions have been issued in the
Pakistan and Colombia cases holding that the government violated
fundamental rights by failing to address the risks posed by climate
change (in both cases, the failure to adapt was discussed along with
533
the failure to mitigate emissions).
Attribution science plays the
same role in these cases as it did in the Urgenda decision—
supporting claims about impacts and the government’s
contribution to those impacts.
c. Cases Challenging Permitting and Licensing Decisions
Plaintiffs have also filed cases challenging permitting and
licensing decisions that could increase fossil fuel production
and/or GHG emissions. For example, petitioners brought a case in
Austria alleging that the government’s authorization of the Vienna
airport expansion would run afoul of emission reductions targets
set forth in Austria’s Climate Protection Law as well as the country’s
534
An
commitments under the newly enacted Paris Agreement.
administrative court initially held in favor of petitioners, but that
[https://perma.cc/E3C9-JWLT]; Armando Ferrão Carvalho and Others v. The European
Parliament and the Council, Case No. T-330/18 (EU General Court 2018),
http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/armando-ferrao-carvalho-and-others-v-theeuropean-parliament-and-the-council/ [https://perma.cc/JN4R-3K2Q].
532. Armando Ferrão Carvalho and Others v. The European Parliament and the
Council, Case No. T-330/18 (EU General Court 2018), http://climatecasechart.com/non-uscase/armando-ferrao-carvalho-and-others-v-the-european-parliament-and-the-council/
[https://perma.cc/JN4R-3K2Q]; Plan B Earth and Others v. Sec’y of State for Bus., Energy,
and Indus. Strategy [2018] EWHC 1892 (Admin), (UK), http://climatecasechart.com/nonus-case/plan-b-earth-others-v-secretary-state-business-energy-industrial-strategy/
[https://perma.cc/KPY8-HPF6]; Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVGE] [Federal Administrative
Court, Section 1] Nov. 27, 2018, A-2992/2017 (Switz.), http://climatecasechart.com/non-uscase/union-of-swiss-senior-women-for-climate-protection-v-swiss-federal-parliament/
[https://perma.cc/Q2SM-SCEQ].
ENVironnement
JEUnesse
v.
Canada,
2018
QCSC
500-06
(Can.),
http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/environnement-jeunesse-v-canadian-government/
[https://perma.cc/E9NR-EF8D].
533. Leghari v. Pakistan, (2015) W.P. No. 25501/201 (Lahore High Court) (Pak.)
http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/ashgar-leghari-v-federation-of-pakistan/
[https://perma.cc/JBN3-XGYJ]; Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], April
5,
2018,
STC4360,
No.
11001-22-03-000-2018-00319-01
(Colom.),
http://
climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/future-generation-v-ministry-environment-others/
[https://perma.cc/53WU-NLJK].
534. Verwaltungsgerichtshof [VwGH] [Administrative Court of Justice] Feb. 2, 2017,
W109 2000179-1/291E (Autstria), http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/in-re-viennaschwachat-airport-expansion/ [https://perma.cc/BEL8-KWXF].
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535

decision was overruled by the Austrian Constitutional Court.
In
Norway, plaintiffs challenged the issuance of licenses for deep-sea
536
oil and gas exploration on similar grounds.
The Oslo District
Court dismissed the challenge, finding, among other things, that
“[e]missions of CO2 abroad from oil and gas exported from
Norway are irrelevant” in analyzing the constitutionality of the lease
537
sale; petitioners have appealed that decision. Swedish plaintiffs
challenged the sale of coal mines and coal-fired power plants in
Germany by Vattenfall—an energy company owned by the Swedish
538
state—again, on similar grounds.
The Stockholm District Court
denied these requests after determining that the plaintiffs had not
539
experienced an injury from the governmental decisions at issue.
Similar lawsuits have been filed in the United Kingdom and
540
Australia. In these types of cases, petitioners can use attribution
data to link the emissions generated from the project to harmful
541
However, as illustrated by the
effects of climate change.
Stockholm District Court’s dismissal on standing grounds, it may be
more difficult to establish injury based on emissions from specific
licensing decisions as compared with cases challenging broader
government failures to act on climate change.
535. Id.; Verfassungsgerichtshof [VfGH] [Constitutional Court] June 29, 2017, E
875/2017, E 886/2017, http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/in-re-vienna-schwachatairport-expansion/ [https://perma.cc/BEL8-KWXF].
536. Greenpeace Nordic Ass’n at 18–19, Case No. 16-166674TVI-OTIR/06, (Oslo District
Court, Jan. 4, 2018), http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/greenpeace-nordic-assn-andnature-youth-v-norway-ministry-of-petroleum-and-energy/ [https://perma.cc/7R8N-EW2Q].
537. Id. at 21.
538.
Tingsrätt [TR] [Stockholm District Court] 2016-09-15 (Sweden),
http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/push-sweden-nature-youth-sweden-et-al-vgovernment-of-sweden/ [https://perma.cc/MX84-N5QW].
539. Id.
540. Ironstone Community Action Group Inc. v. NSW Minister for Planning and Duralie Coal
Pty. Ltd., (2011) NSWLEC 195 (Austl.), http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/ironstonecommunity-action-group-inc-v-nsw-minister-for-planning-and-duralie-coal-pty-ltd/
[https://perma.cc/9YBF-XS5J]; Plan B Earth and Others v. Sec’y of State for Transport,
[2019] EWHC 1070 (Admin) (UK),http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/plan-b-earth-vsecretary-of-state-for-transport/ [https://perma.cc/N9R8-JBY8].
541. See, e.g., Complaint at 3, Tingsrätt [TR] [Stockholm District Court] 2016-09-15
(Sweden), http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/push-sweden-nature-youth-sweden-etal-v-government-of-sweden/ [https://perma.cc/MX84-N5QW]; Complaint at Section 3.6.1,
Verwaltungsgerichtshof [VwGH] [Administrative Court of Justice] Feb. 2, 2017, W109
2000179-1/291E
(Autstria),
http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/in-re-viennaschwachat-airport-expansion/ [https://perma.cc/BEL8-KWXF]. Plaintiffs in these cases also
argued that emissions from the proposed projects would prevent the country from achieving
its fair share of emissions reductions as called for in the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.

BURGER ET AL. FINAL MACRO 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

2/5/2020 2:44 PM

The Law and Science of Climate Change Attribution

191

4. Legal Defense of Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and
Related Actions
As governments introduce an increasing number of laws, policies,
and programs aimed at addressing the causes and impacts of
climate change, the number of lawsuits challenging these actions
542
will also increase.
These are similar to lawsuits challenging the
failure to regulate greenhouse gas emissions—the key difference
being that these lawsuits involve allegations that regulations are too
stringent or that other actions taken to curtail emissions (e.g.,
permit denials) are unjustified. Indeed, both types of claims could
be, and often are, brought with respect to the same regulatory
action, with one side arguing that emission standards are
543
insufficient and another arguing that they are too stringent.
One example of a defense case which involved considerable
attention to attribution science was Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth
544
Dodge Jeep v. Crombie.
In a legal challenge to Vermont’s Low
Emission Vehicle Program, automobile manufacturers and retailers
specifically challenged the scientific basis for the standards, arguing
that the program would impose significant costs but “do nothing
concrete to improve air quality or the health of Vermont
545
residents.”
To support this claim, the petitioners emphasized
that CO2 is unlike other air pollutants in that it disperses globally
throughout the upper atmosphere and then cited this fact as the
542. See, e.g., Société Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine v. [EU] Parliament and Council
(environment and consumers), Case T-16/04 (EU General Court 2010),
http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/societe-arcelor-atlantique-et-lorraine-v-euparliament-and-council-environment-and-consumers/
[https://perma.cc/VD3V-7VTM];
Essent Belgium NV v. [Flemish region of] Vlaams Gewest, Case C-492/14 (Netherlands
2016),
http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/essent-belgium-nv-v-flemish-region-ofvlaams-gewest/ [https://perma.cc/JNQ7-N66U]; Maia Filho v. Federal Environmental
Agency (IBAMA), Special Appeal 1000.732 – RO (Brazil 2015), http://
climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/maia-filho-v-environmental-federal-agency-ibama/
[https://perma.cc/AZ4L-TTM8]; Gloucester Resources Limited v. Minister for Planning,
[2019] NSWLEC 7 (Australia 2019), http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/gloucesterresources-limited-v-minister-for-planning/ [https://perma.cc/XDW3-WLJY] (in a legal
challenge appealing the denial of a company’s application to construct a coal mine, an
Australian court upheld the government’s denial of permit on climate change grounds).
543. See, e.g., Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, No. 09-1322 (D.C. Cir. Dec 23,
2009); Sierra Club v. EPA, No. 10-1215 (D.C. Cir. Aug 2, 2010) (both challenging EPA’s
Tailoring Rule).
544. Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295
(D. Vt. 2007).
545. Complaint ¶ 4, Green Mountain Chrysler, Dkt. 1, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295 (2:05-cv-302)
filed Nov. 18, 2005.
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basis for arguing that CO2 reductions in Vermont would not have
546
any practical impact on public health in Vermont.
Vermont,
joined by other defendants, solicited expert testimony from
scientists to contradict these claims, and the petitioners attacked
the credibility of these scientists. The reviewing court issued a
lengthy opinion evaluating the scientific claims and finding that
547
The
the scientific basis for the emission standards was sound.
court cited specific examples of climate-related harms, including
potentially severe effects on Vermont, as well as language from the
Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts highlighting the
legitimacy of small and incremental regulatory steps to address
548
climate change.
The decision also contained a lengthy
explanation of why expert testimony from climate scientists such as
549
James Hansen was admissible under the Daubert test.
5. Lawsuits to Hold Emitters Liable for Damages Caused by
Climate Change Impacts
In addition to suing governments for failure to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions, some plaintiffs have gone directly to the
source, suing major emitters, such as utilities, as well as fossil fuel
companies, in an attempt to obtain an injunction against future
emissions or monetary damages for adaptation costs. To date,
these lawsuits have been predominately domestic, and based on
tort or tort-like theories such as public nuisance, private nuisance,
550
and negligence. In one instance, an environmental organization
and Philippine citizens filed a petition with the Human Rights
Commission of the Philippines claiming that fossil fuel companies’
551
activities constitute a violation of their human rights.
In the
future, it is possible that climate change lawsuits may be brought by
foreign nations or citizens against private actors in either U.S.
552
courts or within their domestic jurisdictions. Attribution science
is central to any and all such cases, as it is necessary to establish a
causal connection between the defendant’s emissions or activities
546. Id. at 9–11.
547. Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. at 339–40.
548. See, e.g., id. at 309.
549. Id. at 310–33.
550. Burger & Wentz, supra note 8.
551. In re Greenpeace Southeast Asia and Others, Case No. CHR-NI-2016-0001 (2015).
552. See Michael Byers et al., The Internationalization of Climate Damages Litigation, 7 WASH.
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 264 (2017).
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and plaintiffs’ injuries, and that the injuries were a foreseeable
result of the emissions.
553
Much has been written on the prospect of climate change torts.
As others have noted, these analyses sit along a “spectrum,” ranging
from “those who are optimistic about the prospects for climate
damages litigation [and] argue that climate damages are not
fundamentally different from other types of common law damages
553. See Albert C. Lin & Michael Burger, State Public Nuisance Claims and Climate Change
Adaptation, 36 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 49 (2018); Byers et al., supra note 552; R. Henry Weaver &
Douglas A. Kysar, Courting Disaster: Climate Change and the Adjudication of Catastrophe, 93 N.D.
L. REV. 295 (2017); CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY: TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
(Richard Lord et al. eds., Cambridge University Press 2012); David Weisbach, Negligence, Strict
Liability, and Responsibility for Climate Change, 97 IOWA L. REV. 521 (2011–2012); CLIMATE
CHANGE LIABILITY (Michael Faure & Marjan Peeters, eds., Edward Elgar 2011); Amy Sinden,
Allocating the Costs of the Climate Crisis: Efficiency Versus Justice, 85 WASH. L. REV. 293, 323–39
(2010); Matthew F. Pawa, Global Warming: The Ultimate Public Nuisance, 39 ENVTL. L. REP.
10230 (2009); Christopher R. Reeves, Climate Change on Trial: Making the Case for Causation,
32 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 495 (2009); Kirk B. Maag, Note, Climate Change Litigation: Drawing
Lines to Avoid Strict, Joint, and Several Liability, 98 GEO. L.J. 185 (2009); Randall S. Abate,
Automobile Emissions and Climate Change Impacts: Employing Public Nuisance Doctrine as Part of a
“Global Warming Solution” in California, 40 CONN. L. REV. 591 (2008); Shi-Ling Hsu, A Realistic
Evaluation of Climate Change Litigation Through the Lens of a Hypothetical Lawsuit, 79 U. COLO. L.
REV. 701 (2008); Timothy D. Lytton, Using Tort Litigation to Enhance Regulatory Policy Making:
Evaluating Climate-Change Litigation in Light of Lessons from Gun-Industry and Clergy-Sexual-Abuse
Lawsuits, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1837 (2008); James R. May, Climate Change, Constitutional
Consignment, and the Political Question Doctrine, 85 DENV. L. REV. 919 (2008); Amelia Thorpe,
Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation and the Political Question Doctrine, 24 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
L. 79 (2008); Jonathan Zasloff, The Judicial Carbon Tax: Reconstructing Public Nuisance and
Climate Change, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1827 (2008); Erin Casper Borissov, Note, Global Warming: A
Questionable Use of the Political Question Doctrine, 41 IND. L. REV. 415 (2008); David A. Dana, The
Mismatch Between Public Nuisance Law and Global Warming, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 9 (2010);
David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in Climate Change
Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1741 (2007); Myles Allen et al., Scientific Challenges in the
Attribution of Harm to Human Influence on Climate, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1353 (2007); Daniel J.
Grimm, Note, Global Warming and Market Share Liability: A Proposed Model for Allocating Tort
Damages Among CO2 Producers, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 209 (2007); Sarah Olinger, Comment,
Filling the Void in an Otherwise Occupied Field: Using Federal Common Law to Regulate Carbon
Dioxide in the Absence of a Preemptive Statute, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 237 (2007); Benjamin P.
Harper, Note, Climate Change Litigation: The Federal Common Law of Interstate Nuisance and
Federalism Concerns, 40 GA. L. REV. 661 (2006); Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public
Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293 (2005); Matthew F. Pawa & Benjamin A. Krass, Global
Warming as a Public Nuisance: Connecticut v. American Electric Power, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL.
L. REV. 407 (2005); James R. Drabick, Note, “Private” Public Nuisance and Climate Change:
Working Within, and Around, the Special Injury Rule, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 503 (2005);
Myles R. Allen & Richard Lord, The Blame Game: Who Will Pay for the Damaging Consequences of
Climate Change?, 432 NATURE 551 (2004); David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical
Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2003); Eduardo M.
Peñalver, Acts of God or Toxic Torts? Applying Tort Principles to the Problem of Climate Change, 38
NAT. RESOURCES J. 563 (1998).
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that already give rise to liability,” to those who “accept that existing
legal concepts could form a basis to recover climate damages, [but]
they caution that such cases face a series of challenges often
centered around causation,” to those who “argue that climate
damages claims face threshold issues that will likely prevent them
554
from ever being argued on their merits.” Among these, Professor
Douglas Kysar has done the most to conceptualize and articulate
the problems confronting any such claim:
Tort law seems ill-equipped to address the causes and impacts of
climate change: diffuse and disparate in origin, lagged and latticed
in effect, anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions represent the
paradigmatic anti-tort, a collective action problem so pervasive and so
complicated as to render at once both all of us and none of us
responsible. Thus, courts will have ample reason—not to mention
doctrinal weaponry—to prevent climate change tort suits from
555
reaching a jury.

This leads Kysar to the conclusion that “tort law is unlikely to play
a substantial role in the ultimate effort to reduce greenhouse gas
556
emissions,” placing him on the relatively skeptical end of the
spectrum. At the same time, however, Kysar exposes the potential
for encounters with climate change tort claims to shift “the bar for
exoticism in tort”:
Various suits that have frustrated judges because of their scale,
scientific complexity, and widespread policy implications—such as
claims involving toxic and environmental harm, tobacco and
handgun marketing, or slavery and Holocaust reparations—may
come to seem less daunting and intractable when juxtaposed against
“the mother of all collective action problems.” Current debate over
whether courts are engaging in “regulation through litigation” may
come to appear miscast in the face of suits that raise at once both an
ordinary pollution nuisance and a challenge to the very foundations
of modern industrial life. At long last, courts and commentators may
come to view tort claims in degrees of polycentricity, rather than in
crude binary terms of conventional civil disputes, on the one hand,
557
and political or regulatory matters, on the other.

554.
555.
(2011).
556.
557.

Byers et al., supra note 552, at 270–71.
Douglas A. Kysar, What Can Climate Change Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 4
Id.
Id. at 4–5.
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If the bar shifts, it may well be that the bar shifts not only after
558
but during the course of climate tort litigation.
To date, Kysar’s
first prediction, at least, has proved correct. While there have been
quite a few successful cases brought against governments for failure
559
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, the same cannot be said for
lawsuits aimed at holding emitters liable for damages caused by
climate change impacts. The authors are not aware of any such
lawsuit that has been successful to date. Moreover, the influence of
these cases on the shape of tort law remains to be seen. But our
purposes here are more limited than Kysar’s deep
conceptualization of tort law: namely, to provide a summary of key
issues confronting common law climate change cases and to
identify the role attribution science has played, is playing, and
might yet play in resolving them.
Accordingly, in this section we describe the basic elements of
tort—duty, breach, causation, and harm—and how climate change
insinuates itself into an analysis of them. We then assess the role
attribution science might play in meeting evidentiary standards in a
court of law, and ultimate persuasive outcomes on the merits.
Finally, we describe the way attribution science played into a
number of high-profile climate tort cases in the past, to give an
inkling of what may lie ahead in the future.
a. Elements of Negligence & Nuisance
The legal elements required to prevail on different tort claims
differ from one another: to prevail on a negligence claim, the
plaintiff must establish that the defendant has breached a duty or
standard of care, that this breach caused a personal injury to the
plaintiff, and that the defendant’s conduct is the “proximate cause”
560
of the injury. To prevail on a private nuisance claim, the plaintiff
must establish that the defendant’s conduct has caused a
“substantial and unreasonable interference with plaintiff’s use and
561
enjoyment of property.”
To prevail on a public nuisance claim,

558. Weaver & Kysar, supra note 553; see also Douglas A. Kysar, The Public Life of Private
Law: Tort Law as a Risk Regulation Mechanism, 9 EUR. J. RISK. REG. 48 (2018).
559. See supra Part III(C)(3)(a)(i) (Massachusetts v. EPA); see supra Part III(C)(3)(c)(iii)
(Foreign Jurisdictions).
560. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
561. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
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the plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s conduct has caused
an “unreasonable interference with a right common to the
562
public.” Despite the differences, they do all share some common
elements. The concepts of duty and breach, explicit in negligence,
are imported into nuisance through the concept of “unreasonable
interference.” Proximate causation and a resulting harm or injury
are required in all three.
Below, we summarize the key elements of tort cases and briefly
touch on how attribution science may help with establishing these
elements. This summary is followed by a more in-depth overview of
the role of attribution science in climate change cases.
i. Duty
It is a well-worn story that tort law’s notion of a legal duty is a
confusing, muddled concept, generally bounded by the competing
opinions by Judge Cardozo and Judge Andrews set forth in Palsgraf
563
v. Long Island Railroad Company some ninety years ago. In Judge
Cardozo’s view, “antisocial conduct only triggers a duty of tort
responsibility when its potential harmful effects can be attached to
particular, identifiable victims” and the risk of harm is “apparent to
564
the eye of ordinary vigilance.”
In other words, “the risk
reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk
imports relation; it is a risk to another or to others within the range
565
of apprehension.”
Foreseeability, then, is part of Cardozo’s
definition of tort duty. In contrast, Judge Andrews’ dissent
presents a “communal notion of responsibility in which all actors
are under a duty to avoid unreasonable behavior, irrespective of
whether that behavior implies a particular relation of responsibility
566
to plaintiffs.”
Judge Andrew explained: “Due care is a duty
imposed on each one of us to protect society from unnecessary
567
danger, not to protect A, B, or C alone.” For Judge Andrews, the
issue of foreseeability of injury to a particular plaintiff may be
relevant to the proximate cause inquiry, but not the nature of the

562. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 369–70 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 564
U.S. 410 (2011).
563. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
564. Kysar, supra note 555, at 13; Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99.
565. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100.
566. Kysar, supra note 555, at 14.
567. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 102.
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568

defendant’s duty.
Federal and state courts wrestling with cases
sounding in negligence and nuisance fall somewhere within this
range, with some courts embracing foreseeability of harm to the
569
570
specific plaintiff as an element of duty and others rejecting it.
The identification of a legal duty under Cardozo’s concept is
deeply complicated by the facts of climate change. Climate change
is, after all, a “geophysical problem . . . centuries in the making
(and studying) with causes ranging from volcanoes, to wildfires, to
deforestation to stimulation of other greenhouse gases . . . . to the
571
combustion of fossil fuels.”
What’s more, “the range of
consequences is likewise universal—warmer weather in some places
that may benefit agriculture but worse weather in others, e.g.,
worse hurricanes, more drought, more crop failures and . . . the
melting of the ice caps, the rising of the oceans, and the inevitable
572
flooding of coastal lands.” Would the “eye of ordinary vigilance”
573
demanded by Judge Cardozo foresee a pathway leading from a
574
particular activity located somewhere in the “train of industry” to
a particular climate change-related injury experienced by a
particular person in a particular place and time? Is the duty more
easily recognizable if the entity suffering the injury is a state, a city,
a tribe, or a certified class? If the particularized harms that come
from producing, transporting, storing, marketing, selling,
combusting, and/or consuming fossil fuels so as to emit
greenhouse gases are foreseeable now, at what point did they
become so?
Where foreseeability is an element of tort duty, the history and
current and future states of attribution science will play a role in
establishing and defending against it. However, even in a case
568. Id. at 104.
569. See, e.g., Norris v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 521 F. Supp. 2d 586, 589 (W.D. Ky. 2007).
570. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Del Sol Shopping Ctr. Assocs., L.P., 326 P.3d 465, 467 (N.M.
2014); Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 835 (Iowa 2009). The decisions rejecting
foreseeability as an element of duty are consistent with the Third Restatement of Torts,
which notes: “Despite widespread use of foreseeability in no-duty determinations, this
Restatement disapproves that practice and limits no-duty rulings to articulated policy or
principle in order to facilitate more transparent explanations of the reasons for a no-duty
ruling and to protect the traditional function of the jury as factfinder.” RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7, cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
571. California v. BP P.L.C., No. C 17-06011 WHA, 2018 WL 1064293 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27,
2018).
572. Id.
573. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99.
574. California v. BP P.L.C., 2018 WL 1064293, at *4.

BURGER ET AL. FINAL MACRO 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

198

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

2/5/2020 2:44 PM

[Vol. 45:1

governed by Judge Andrews’ more expansive view—for instance, a
public nuisance case where the duty is more widely distributed—
plaintiffs cannot evade the issue of foreseeability. It will come up in
establishing proximate cause. As Kysar explains, “plaintiffs will face
the challenge of establishing foreseeability in a way that does not
strain liberal notions of limited obligation beyond the breaking
575
point.”
The end result could be a global duty owed by some
select group of actors to people everywhere. Or it could mean that
no legal duty exists to constrain these types of behaviors.
ii. Breach
Once a duty has been established, liability can only attach if there
has been a breach, in some form, of that duty. The key issue in
assessing a breach, under a conventional analysis, involves
balancing competing values, both in negligence and nuisance. In
the negligence context, a breach occurs where the plaintiff has
failed to exercise reasonable care to protect others from a
foreseeable risk of harm. What constitutes “reasonable care” is
typically defined by what a “reasonable person” would do under
576
similar circumstances.
In nuisance, the breach factors into an
assessment of whether defendant’s interference with plaintiff’s
person, property, or public goods was “unreasonable.”
To
determine what constitutes an “unreasonable interference,” courts
may weigh factors such as the utility of the conduct giving rise to
the alleged nuisance, the cost of abating the alleged nuisance, and
the severity of the harm caused by defendant’s conduct when
577
deciding whether the conduct is indeed a nuisance.
In both instances, the “reasonableness” inquiry involves
578
something of a “social welfare cost-benefit test,” with one critical
factor being whether the cost of taking precautions is greater or
579
Attribution science has a
less than the cost of potential harm.

575. Kysar, supra note 555, at 17.
576. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
577. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). While a balancing
of harm versus utility is typically required in nuisance cases seeking injunctive relief, some
courts have held that such balancing is not required where plaintiffs are seeking monetary
damages. See, e.g., Nat’l Energy Corp. v. O’Quinn, 233 VA. 83, 86 (1982).
578. Kysar, supra note 555, at 21.
579. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (liability in
negligence will be found if the probability of harm multiplied by the gravity of the potential
injury exceeds the cost of precaution).
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role to play in calculating the costs of climate change. As discussed
in Part II, attribution science is the connective tissue tying
particular impacts resulting in particular costs back to climate
change and anthropogenic influence on climate change, and it can
help improve calculations of the social cost of greenhouse gas
580
emissions.
In some instances, attribution science may have a role to play in
calculating the benefits of climate change. As has been long581
recognized, climate change does produce some “winners.”
Changes that lead to increased agricultural production in some
northern latitudes may be identified through attribution science.
However, many of the benefits of defendants’ activities will fall
outside the scope of attribution science. These include things like
the economic, social, health, and welfare benefits of fossil fuel
development, power production, transportation, materials
manufacturing, cement, shipping, aviation, and so forth and so on.
Courts will also consider foreseeability when assessing the
reasonableness of conduct (a concept that cuts across the elements
of duty, breach, and proximate cause). Again, attribution science
plays an obvious role in this inquiry, helping to establish that a
reasonable person would anticipate that activities which generate
greenhouse gas emissions or otherwise contribute to climate
582
change will eventually result in specific types of harmful impacts.
But there are limitations on the extent to which attribution science
can establish foreseeability with respect to specific impacts and
specific plaintiffs, which we discuss in further detail below.
There are other factors underpinning the “reasonableness”
analysis that do not implicate climate change attribution science—
these include custom, common practice, and regulatory treatment
(e.g., whether the conduct is proscribed by law). Thus, while
attribution studies can give weight to the idea that major
contributions to climate change are “unreasonable,” a court may

580. See also Kysar, supra note 555, at 22–23 (discussing application of SC-CO2 to American
Electric Power).
581. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, The Political Economy of Climate Change Winners, 97 MINN. L. REV.
206 (2012); Michael H. Glantz, Assessing the Impacts of Climate: The Issue of Winners and Losers
in a Global Climate Change Context, 65 STUD. IN ENVTL. SCI. 41 (1995).
582. Deforestation and the marketing of fossil fuels would be examples of conduct which
does not directly generate greenhouse gas emissions but nonetheless contributes to climate
change.
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nonetheless conclude that such conduct is reasonable because it is
a customary pattern of behavior.
iii. Causation
In addition, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct
was both the factual and the proximate, or legal, cause of the
583
Factual causation concerns the scientific relationship
injury.
between the defendant’s action or behavior and the alleged
584
injury.
To show factual causation, one must show both general,
585
or generic, causation, and specific, or individualized, causation.
One commentator offered this useful summary: “General causation
refers to whether the action in question could have caused the
alleged injury, while specific causation refers to whether the action
in question ‘more likely than not’ actually caused the alleged
586
injury.” These are separate inquiries, that raise distinct questions
for attribution science.
In regards to general causation, one critical question is whether
and under what circumstances courts will impose liability on an
actor who is not the sole cause of the injury. Underpinning this is
the question of how courts might apportion liability among
multiple emitters. In failure-to-regulate cases, some courts have
granted standing based on a showing that the unregulated
587
emissions made a “meaningful contribution” to climate change.
Courts have devised alternative tests for apportioning liability in
tort cases. Consider the example of “toxic tort” cases, which
involve claims of injury caused by exposure to harmful substances,
and where there are multiple potential defendants that caused the
exposure (e.g., by producing or releasing the harmful substance
588
into the environment).
These cases have much in common with
tort actions undertaken against greenhouse gas emitters, insofar as
there is a “basic problem of proving, even defining, causal
relationships in an environment where multiple causation

583. Byers et al., supra note 552, at 279.
584. Id.
585. Id.
586. Id.
587. See supra Part III(C)(1)(b) (Case Law on Standing to Sue for Climate ChangeRelated Harms).
588. See Glen O. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk¸ 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 779 (1985).

BURGER ET AL. FINAL MACRO 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

2/5/2020 2:44 PM

The Law and Science of Climate Change Attribution

201

confounds the possibility of isolating one ‘responsible’ cause as the
589
touchstone of legal liability.”
As in toxic tort cases, there are several ways that liability may be
apportioned among potentially responsible parties in this context,
including the use of statistical, probabilistic, and epidemiological
590
studies.
Due to the nature of the claims in toxic tort cases, it is
typically impossible to show that a particular plaintiff’s health
condition is directly and solely caused by exposure to a substance
591
generated by a specific defendant. To overcome this hurdle, the
plaintiffs in toxic tort cases have used statistical analyses and
computer modeling to present: (i) probabilistic estimates of health
risks associated with chemical exposures, and (ii) relative
592
contributions to that risk from different parties.
Where the
probability that a particular defendant’s substance caused a
substantial portion of the harm reaches a certain threshold, then
courts may be willing to impose liability for the harm. For
example, some courts require plaintiffs to show that their injuries
were “more likely than not” caused by the defendant’s conduct,
and this requirement has been met through showings that the
593
behavior increased the risk of the harm occurring by a factor of 2.
However, other courts have held that probabilistic proof is
insufficient for imposing liability and have demanded
594
“particularistic proof” of a causal connection.
In regards to specific causation, the critical question is “whether
defendant’s actions or behavior were ‘a necessary element’ in
595
bringing about the injury.” Assuming one can show that climate
change is responsible for a particular local climate-related
phenomenon or event that produced an injury, and before one
589. Id. at 780.
590. Byers et al., supra note 552, at 279.
591. Note, Causation in Environmental Law: Lessons from Toxic Torts, 128 HARV. L. REV.
2256, 2259 (2015) (“Because of the nature of the substances generally involved, the harms
due to exposure typically are not discovered until long after the exposure occurred. In
addition, over that period of time, the injured party may have been exposed to a variety of
potentially harmful substances, likely as a result of actions by a variety of different actors. As
a result, identifying any responsible party, much less identifying all responsible parties, can
be quite difficult.”).
592. Id. at 2268–69 (citing Daniel Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1220
n.7 (1987)).
593. Albert C. Lin, Beyond Tort: Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic Injury,78 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1439, 1450 (2005); Grossman, supra note 553, at 23.
594. Lin, supra note 593, at 1450.
595. Byers et al., supra note 552, at 280.
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gets to issues of contributory negligence, the problem for proving
climate harms here is clear: emissions of any one actor, or even any
small set of actors, will be difficult to pin down as a “but-for” cause
596
of impacts arising from anthropogenic climate change.
Again, though, toxic tort law has encountered similar
situations—even if at an entirely different scale—and developed
approaches through which to assign liability. The “substantial
factor” or “material contribution” test allows a court to find liability
where a defendant’s conduct was a “substantial factor” in bringing
597
about or a “material contribution” to a plaintiff’s injury.
The
“commingled approach” offers another possible approach. In
litigation over groundwater contamination from MTBE, a court
held that “[w]hen a plaintiff can prove that certain gaseous or
liquid products . . . of many suppliers were present in a completely
commingled or blended state at the time and place that the risk of
harm occurred, and the commingled product caused a single
indivisible injury, then each of the products should be deemed to
598
have caused the harm.” Under a market share theory of liability,
defendants may be held liable for injuries caused by a product
based on their respective “shares” in the manufacture and sale of
599
the product.
In contrast to the factual causation inquiry, which focuses on
scientific relationships, proximate cause is intended to address
whether the injury is sufficiently closely related to the allegedly
wrongful conduct, such that it makes sense to impose liability on
600
the defendant.
To answer this question, courts may consider
factors such as the geographic and temporal proximity between the
conduct and the injury (and more generally, the directness of the
relationship between conduct and injury), and whether the injury
601
was a foreseeable result of the conduct. As Justice Andrews
596. See, e.g. Kysar, supra note 555, at 31; Michael Duffy, Climate Change Causation:
Harmonizing Tort Law and Scientific Probability, 28 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 185 (2009).
597. Byers et. al., supra note 552, at 281–82.
598. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prod. Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 348,
377–78 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
599. Byers et al., supra note 552, at 283.
600. Another way of posing this question is to ask whether the defendant should be
shielded from liability even if he or she is the cause-in-fact of the injury. See Luke Meier,
Using Tort Law to Understand the Causation Prong of Standing, 80 FORDHAM Law L. REV. 1241,
1249 (2011).
601. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 124 (3d ed. 2007).
The Supreme Court has held that defendants must establish a direct link between conduct
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explained in his Palsgraf dissent, “open-ended concepts such as
fairness, justice, policy, practical politics, and common sense” may
602
also factor into the proximate cause analysis.
We have already touched on how attribution science can be used
to establish causation (in the context of standing) and
foreseeability (in the context of duty and breach). A more detailed
analysis of the role of attribution science with respect to these two
elements is provided in Section III.C.4.b.
iv. Harm or Injury
Regardless of the tort, actual harm must be shown. For a
negligence claim, breach must give rise to an injury that is similar
to, but not always identical to, the sort of “injury-in-fact” required
for standing purposes. Courts have yet to articulate a clear
distinction between standing and negligence injuries, but there are
some subtle differences in terms of how these concepts are typically
defined. For example, most courts have held that negligence
liability requires proof of actual harm, whereas standing can be
603
At the
based on a harm that has yet to occur but is imminent.
same time, the types of harms that can support a negligence claim
are defined more broadly to include emotional distress, and in
some jurisdictions, this has become a vehicle for imposing liability
on defendants whose negligent conduct increases the risk of harm
604
to a plaintiff, thereby causing emotional distress.

and injury to satisfy proximate cause requirements under various statutory frameworks that
mirror common law doctrines, and that courts should not go beyond the “first step” of the
causal chain to establish that link under these statutes. See Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of
Miami, 137 S.Ct. 1296 (2017). While directness is certainly relevant to the proximate cause
inquiry for tort liability, this narrow interpretation of what qualifies as a sufficient “direct”
cause has not been extended to common law cases.
602. David Owen, Figuring Foreseeability, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1277 (2009) (citing
Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 103–05 (Andrews, J., dissenting)).
603. Albert Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 3 WIS. L. REV. 897, 911
(2006); Cass Sunstein, Standing Injuries, SUP. Ct. REV. 37 (1993).
604. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 8, Scope Note (AM.
LAW INST. 2012). Courts may require that the emotional injury be linked to some sort of
physical harm or impact, such as exposure to a toxic substance, which gives rise to a
“reasonable fear” of a physical harm. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d
1188, 1205-06 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that mental distress from a reasonable fear of cancer
is an adequate injury for tort liability under Tennessee law). But some jurisdictions
recognize a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress absent any physical
impact or injury. See Lin, supra note 603, at 903–07.
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Like negligence, there is some precedent for treating risk as an
injury in the context of nuisance claims. Specifically, under the
doctrine of “anticipatory nuisance,” courts may enjoy an
anticipatory or prospective nuisance activity that has not yet caused
605
harm but threatens to do so.
In most cases, to prevail on an
anticipatory nuisance claim, the plaintiff must show that there is a
606
Here,
“high probability” or “reasonable certainty” of injury.
again, attribution science would be used in the ways described
above—both as a means of characterizing the injury (interference)
to the plaintiff, and as a means of explaining why the interference
is unreasonable and a threat.
b. Role of Attribution Science
As noted above, attribution science can be used to establish three
key elements in tort litigation: foreseeability, causation, and injury.
The foregoing discussion of standing illustrates how attribution
science is used to establish injury, and while there are subtle
differences in how “injury” is defined in standing and on the merits
of tort cases, the role of attribution science in these two contexts is
roughly the same. We therefore focus here on how attribution
science can support findings of foreseeability and causation.
Foreseeability and causation are closely linked—the same
research that can be used to establish a causal connection between
climate change and impacts can also be used to establish the
foreseeability of impacts—but they are not one in the same. To the
contrary, there may be circumstances where an impact may have
been caused by climate change but was not foreseeable, and
circumstances where an impact is a foreseeable consequence of
climate change but cannot be causally linked to climate change. It
is therefore important to discuss these as distinct applications of
attribution science.
With regards to foreseeability: the existing detection and
attribution literature highlights a wide array of impacts that are
already occurring as a result of climate change and lends credibility
to predictions of future impacts. A court’s determination as to
605. PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 640-41 (5th ed. 1984); George P. Smith,
II, Re-Validating the Doctrine of Anticipatory Nuisance, 29 VT. L. REV. 687, 689 (2005).
606. Smith supra note 605, at 689; Charles J. Doane, Beyond Fear: Articulating a Modern
Doctrine in Anticipatory Nuisance for Enjoining Improbable Threats of Catastrophic Harm, 17 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 441 (1990).
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whether an impact is a foreseeable consequence of activities that
increase greenhouse gas emissions would likely depend on: (i) the
degree of confidence with which the impact has been attributed to
climate change or projected to occur as a result of climate change;
(ii) the amount of scientific research linking the impact to climate
change (and level of consensus among scientists); and (iii) the
timeframe in which that research was performed. If there are only
a handful of studies on a particular impact or if the studies were all
published after the allegedly tortious conduct, then courts might
607
conclude that the impacts are not foreseeable.
Establishing that certain physical impacts such as sea level rise
and increasing temperatures are foreseeable outcomes of activities
that contribute to climate change is a relatively straightforward
task. However, as discussed in Part II, the actual injuries associated
with climate change are often secondary or tertiary impacts that are
influenced by a multitude of confounding factors in addition to
anthropogenic influence on climate. The greater the number of
confounding factors, the more difficult it may be to establish that a
particular injury was foreseeable. It may also be challenging to
establish the foreseeability of specific low-probability, high-impact
events even where those events are part of a broader trend that has
been attributed to or predicted to come about as a result of climate
change. For instance, a catastrophic flood that is far more severe
than what any climate model predicted may not be foreseeable,
even where increased intensity of extreme precipitation events is
generally accepted.
In most tort cases invoking climate change, it may be significantly
more challenging for plaintiffs to establish causation—and in
particular, specific causation—than it is to establish foreseeability.
Indeed, this appears to be the most difficult element to prove
across all cases. As discussed above, standing law requires a
showing of factual or but-for causation. This is also required for

607. Another factor that might be considered in the foreseeability analysis is the scale of
the emissions impact—the idea being that a small emissions impact will not result in
foreseeable harms. However, technically speaking, even a very small emissions contribution
would foreseeability contribute to all impacts associated with climate change due to the
dispersion of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. It is the authors’ view that the magnitude
of the emissions impact is more relevant to the analysis of harm and causation in the tort
context.
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608

negligence and nuisance cases.
As with standing, the challenge
here is proving a counter-factual: what would have happened in
the absence of defendant’s conduct? Sometimes this is a relatively
easy exercise, but for harms related to climate change, this is a factintensive inquiry that can involve a fair amount of assumption and
speculation, testimonies from competing experts, and weighing of
609
evidence. Whereas this inquiry is treated as a question of law in
the standing context in most cases, it is treated as a question of fact
in the tort context, and would therefore be decided “only at the
end of trial, after all of the evidence has been received and all of
610
the experts have testified.”
The causal questions implicated by tort lawsuits against the range
of likely defendants in climate cases are complex. To succeed in
such a case, a plaintiff would need to establish several lines of
causation:






The plaintiff must link a specific change or event to
anthropogenic climate change (e.g., sea level rise or a
flooding event)—i.e., climate change and extreme
event attribution.
The plaintiff must link a specific loss to that change or
event (e.g., the cost of adaptation measures or residual
losses that were not or could not be avoided through
adaptation)—i.e., impact attribution.
The plaintiff must link the defendant’s conduct (i.e.,
release of greenhouse gas emissions) to anthropogenic
climate change and identify the defendant’s relative
contribution to the harm incurred by the plaintiff—i.e.,
source attribution.

Regarding the first line of causation: proving that a specific
change or event is caused by climate change will be easier for longterm changes such as mean temperature increases and sea level
rise—but as discussed in Part II, there are challenges to establishing
608. This is known as “factual causation,” “but for causation,” or the sine qua non test.
These are basically the same concepts because “an act is a factual cause of an outcome if, in
the absence of the act, the outcome would have occurred even if the defendant had acted
non-negligently.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 26
Factual Cause (AM. LAW INST. 2012).
609. Luke Meier, Using Tort Law to Understand the Causation Prong of Standing, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 1241, 1248–49 (2011).
610. Id. at 1249 (citing KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW
105–07 (3d ed. 2007).
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causation even in that context. For example, plaintiffs will need to
establish that flooding or saltwater inundation is caused by sea level
rise even where coastal erosion and subsidence are also occurring
as a result of coastal development.
Linking a specific extreme weather event to climate change poses
another test. The probabilistic approach to event attribution,
whereby scientists quantify the extent to which anthropogenic
climate change affected the probability of the event occurring
(expressed as FAR—fraction of attributable risk), would likely be
the best vehicle for establishing causation for the purposes of tort
611
litigation.
As discussed above, some probabilistic attribution
assessments have identified a relatively strong climate signal on
certain events with a relatively high level of certainty. For example,
the study of the 2003 European Heat Wave found that climate
change had increased the probability of this event at least a factor
612
In other studies, the climate
of two, more likely a factor of six.
signal is evident but less strong. For example, a study of the 2000
United Kingdom floods found that climate change increased the
probability of the flood occurring by a factor of two in most
simulations, but in 10% of cases, the risk increase was less than
613
20%.
There is precedent for courts accepting this type of statistical
data as evidence of causation. For example, in U.S. tort law,
plaintiffs typically must show that their individual injuries were
“more likely than not” caused by the behavior question, and this
requirement has been met through showings that the behavior
614
increased the risk of the harm occurring by a factor of two.
Applying that same standard to the 2003 European Heat Wave, a
court could conclude that climate change was “more likely than
not” the proximate cause of the heat wave. As discussed in the
standing section, courts also consider probabilistic assessments
when determining whether a future injury is sufficiently
“imminent” such that plaintiffs have satisfied the injury-in-fact
requirement.
611. Allen et al., supra note 553, at 1385 (citing Myles Allen, Liability for Climate Change,
421 NATURE 891, 891–92 (2003); Dáithí A. Stone & Myles R. Allen, The End-to-End Attribution
Problem: From Emissions to Impacts, 71 CLIMATIC CHANGE 303, 303–04 (2005).
612. Allen et al., supra note 553, at 1393.
613. A. Kay et al., Attribution of Autumn / Winter 2000 Flood Risk in England to Anthropogenic
Climate Change; A Catchment-Based Study, 406 J. OF HYDROLOGY 91 (2011).
614. Grossman, supra note 553, at 23.
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Probabilistic event attribution can also be supplemented with
observational evidence showing trends in the frequency of an event
615
growing over time.
Observational evidence of trends probably
would not, by itself, suffice for the purposes of establishing liability
for a particular event for the reasons noted above. However, it is
possible that such evidence could be used to establish liability for
the aggregated impacts of additional extreme weather events over
time—for example, a state that has experienced a 10% increase in
extreme heat days may be able to establish that climate change
more likely than not was responsible for that increase. This type of
argument has been accepted in the context of the lawsuits noted in
the previous sections (defense of government regulation and
616
lawsuits seeking to compel regulation) but has not been tested in
the context of private liability lawsuits.
The storyline or mechanistic approach could also be used to link
an extreme event or even a long-term change to anthropogenic
influence on climate. That approach would yield different types of
quantitative findings—for example, that anthropogenic climate
change increased the magnitude of a storm or flood by 10%.
Even if the plaintiff is able to establish that a physical change or
extreme event was caused by climate change, he or she must also
establish the second and third lines of causation. The second
causation challenge—establishing and quantifying the specific loss
caused by the change or event—involves determining the extent to
which the loss was caused by anthropogenic climate change as
compared with other confounding factors. As discussed in Part II,
a probabilistic approach can also be used in impact attribution to
generate this sort of information. However, to date, most impact
attribution studies do not produce findings that are as
quantitatively robust as studies conducted on extreme events due to
the number of confounding factors that influence impacts such as
public health outcomes.
The third causation challenge—defining the defendant’s relative
contribution to the damage—is a matter of source attribution. As
discussed above, courts have grappled with a related question in
the context of lawsuits challenging government failure to
regulate—specifically, whether the total greenhouse gas
615. See, e.g, S.K. Min et al., Human Contribution to More-Intense Precipitation Extremes, 470
NATURE 378 (2011).
616. See Sections III(C)(3) and III(C)(4).
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contribution from the unregulated source category is sufficiently
large such that: (i) the plaintiffs have standing by virtue of some
actual or imminent harm caused by those emissions, and (ii) the
government has violated some sort of obligation by failing to
617
regulate those emissions.
Importantly, even if a source’s emissions are considered to be a
“material”, “substantial”, or “significant” contribution to climate
change, this does not mean that the source caused a specific impact
and can therefore be held liable for all harms associated with that
impact. Imposing liability in this context would be akin to
imposing joint and several liability on all emitters that surpass a
materiality threshold—something courts may be reluctant or even
unwilling to do, given the possible ramifications of such a judicial
policy. Recognizing this, some petitioners are now seeking to
obtain monetary damages from emissions sources that are
618
proportional to the emissions contribution from that source.
One possible way to avoid some of the challenges associated with
quantifying the defendants’ contribution to plaintiffs’ injuries is to
seek injunctive relief rather than monetary damages in a tort
lawsuit. Plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief have thus far faced the
same challenges as those seeking monetary relief when attempting
to establish causation for standing purposes, but there has not yet
been a trial in which courts have fully evaluated the merits of
causation claims in either context. Another option for plaintiffs
seeking monetary damages would be to rely on lower bound
damage estimates that can be attributed to defendants’ conduct
with high confidence—but this approach might require some reframing of attribution studies—an issue which we explore in Part
IV.
It may also prove easier to establish a causal nexus between
defendants’ conduct and plaintiffs’ injuries where plaintiffs
aggregate harms from multiple types of climate change-related
impacts and across multiple persons. It is easier to establish, for
example, that climate change (and defendants’ conduct
contributing to climate change) has caused injury to an entire
state, city, or trade organization as opposed to an individual private
plaintiff.

617. See Part III(C)(3)(b).
618. Lliuya v. RWE AG, VG Essen 15.12.2016 (2 O 285/15) (Germany).
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c. Cases
i. Connecticut v. American Electric Power (Second Circuit)
The Second Circuit’s review of American Electric Power, discussed
above, provides some insights into how courts might handle tort
claims pertaining to climate change. First, the court determined
that whether a given quantity of emissions is a “meaningful” or
“significant” contribution to global climate change is an evidentiary
issue that should be addressed at a future stage of the
proceedings—at least where those emissions appear on their face
619
to potentially meet that standard.
Second, the court found that
contributing sources of GHG emissions can be called to account,
explaining that “[t]he Court has not imposed a requirement upon
all federal common law of nuisance cases that the challenged
pollution must be ‘directly traced’ or that plaintiffs must sue all
sources of the pollution complained of in order to state an
actionable claim. On the contrary, ‘the fact that other persons
contribute to a nuisance is not a bar to the defendant’s liability for
620
his own contribution.’” Third, the court held that, to prevail on a
public nuisance theory, plaintiffs need not demonstrate that they
have suffered an actual harm or even an immediate harm—rather,
a threatened harm would suffice. The court cited numerous
precedents showing that federal courts have the authority to enjoin
621
a threatened nuisance before irreparable harm results.
These
619. Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d at 345.
620. Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d at 356–57 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
840E). (Am. Law Inst. 2008). See also, e.g., Illinois ex. rel Scott v. Milwaukee, No. 72 C 1253,
1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15607, (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 1973) (“[I]t is sufficient for plaintiffs to show
that defendants’ nutrient discharges [leading to eutrophication of Lake Michigan]
constitute a significant portion of the total nutrient input to the lake. The correct rule
would seem to be that any discharger who contributes an aliquot of a total combined
discharge which causes a nuisance may be enjoined from continuing his discharge. Either
that is true or it is impossible to enjoin point dischargers.”), aff’d in relevant part and rev’d in
part, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds, Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304
(1981). Cf. Student Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. Tenneco Polymers, Inc., 602
F. Supp. 1394, 1397 (D.N.J.1985) (holding, in the context of finding causation for standing
purposes, that pollution may derive from multiple sources and that it is not necessary to
pinpoint which polluter caused a specific harm).
621. Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d at 357 (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)
(observing that courts of equity, in adjudicating public nuisance cases, can both prevent
threatened nuisances, “before irreparable mischief ensues,” as well as abate those in
progress); United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, 346 F. Supp. 145, 150 (D. Vt. 1972) (“[o]ne
distinguishing feature of equitable relief is that it may be granted upon the threat of harm
which has not yet occurred.”) (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
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conclusions would tend to support the notion that a nuisance claim
can be predicated on a contribution to threatened harm, and that
emitters might be held liable based on their proportional
contribution to climate change.
ii. Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil (Northern District of California)
The district court’s analysis of standing in Kivalina also provides
some insight into how a court might address a climate nuisance
claim. In particular, that the district court found an inadequate
causal connection between the defendants’ emissions (which were
significantly more than those at issue in AEP—more than 1.2 billion
tons per year of direct emissions) suggests that the district court
would not have found adequate causation to support a nuisance
622
claim.
While not explicitly stated in the decision, the court’s decision to
dismiss the case may have been influenced by the fact that Kivalina
was seeking damages to cover the full costs of its injuries, while
defendants were only partially responsible for those injuries. In a
sense, Kivalina was asking the court to impose joint and several
623
liability on the companies. Consider the following excerpt from
the court’s discussion of why the political question doctrine (as well
as a lack of standing) barred its consideration of the case:
Plaintiffs also fail to confront the fact that resolution of their
nuisance claim requires the judiciary to make a policy decision about
who should bear the cost of global warming. Though alleging that
Defendants are responsible for a “substantial portion” of greenhouse
gas emissions . . . Plaintiffs also acknowledge that virtually everyone
on Earth is responsible on some level for contributing to such
emissions. Yet, by pressing this lawsuit, Plaintiffs are in effect asking

TORTS 624 (3d ed. 1964)); Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 242 (10th Cir. 1971) (reversing
district court refusing to issue injunction against pesticide spraying that was both threatened
at the time the suit was instituted and had since been done); 7 STUART M. SPEISER, CHARLES
F. KRAUSE & ALFRED W. GANS, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 20.19 (Thomson West 2003)
(“We deem it necessary to explain that a prospective nuisance is a fit candidate for injunctive
relief. . . . One distinguishing feature of equitable relief is that it may be granted upon the
threat of harm which has not yet occurred.”); Andrew H. Sharp, Comment, An Ounce of
Prevention: Rehabilitating the Anticipatory Nuisance Doctrine, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 627,
633–36 (1988).
622. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 881 (N.D. Cal.
2009), aff’d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
623. However, courts might not be receptive to such claims. See Maag, supra note 553, at
187.
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this Court to make a political judgment that the two dozen Defendants
named in this action should be the only ones to bear the cost of contributing to
global warming. Plaintiffs respond that Defendants should be the ones
held responsible for damaging Kivalina allegedly because “they are
responsible for more of the problem than anyone else in the
nation . . .” [] But even if that were true, Plaintiffs ignore that the
allocation of fault—and cost—of global warming is a matter
appropriately left for determination by the executive or legislative
624
branch
in
the
first
instance.

iii. Lliuya v. RWE AG
For plaintiffs seeking damages, an alternative approach to
Kivalina is to request compensation for a proportion of damages
that corresponds with the proportion of global greenhouse gas
emissions emitted by the defendant. This is the strategy deployed
in Lliuya v. RWE AG, in which a Peruvian farmer filed suit in
German court against a German utility company, seeking damages
625
to offset the costs of protecting his town from melting glaciers.
The farmer only sought damages proportional to the utility’s
626
relative contribution to global GHG emissions. A district court in
Germany dismissed the case, finding that there was no “linear
causal chain” between RWE’s emissions and the alleged injury
because so many emitters had contributed to the risk of flooding in
627
the farmer’s town, but the appellate court reversed and directed
that the case move forward to an evidentiary phase to determine
whether the plaintiff’s home is threatened by flooding or mudslide
as a result of the melting glacier, and the extent to which RWE’s
628
greenhouse gas emissions contribute to that risk. The court will
be reviewing expert opinions on the RWE’s CO2 emissions, the
contribution of those emissions to climate change, the resulting
impact on the glacier, and RWE’s contributory share of
responsibility for causing that impact.

624. Native Vill. of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 876–77.
625. Lliuya v. RWE, supra note 618.
626. Id.
627. FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG [David Loses the Fight Against Goliath], Dec. 15,
2016, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/energiepolitik/peruanischer-bauer-scheitertmit-klage-gegen-rwe-14575835.html [https://perma.cc/3JNZ-9ADV] (“Eine Flutgefahr wäre
jedoch der RWE AG nicht individuell zuzuordnen.” [“A flood risk would however not be
attributed singly to RWE AG.”]).
628. Lliuya v. RWE AG, Landgericht Essen 30.11.2017 (I-5 U 15/17) (Germany).
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Providing an accurate and precise estimate of a particular
emitter’s contribution to climate change remains challenging—in
part due to limited information about historical and current
emissions from individual sources, and in part due to uncertainty
about the total amount of emissions being generated and
sequestered as well as the relative contribution of different
greenhouse gases to the greenhouse effect. There is also the
question of how to apportion responsibility for emissions, with one
critical question being whether fossil fuel production companies,
electric generating units, or both should be viewed as “responsible”
for emissions in the context of a private liability lawsuit. While this
is an “attribution” question, it does not fall within the scope of
detection and attribution science; rather, it involves social, political,
and legal determinations about how to apportion responsibility.
iv. Pending U.S. Cases Against Fossil Fuel Companies
In 2017 and 2018, local governments across the United States
initiated a new wave of litigation seeking to hold fossil fuel
companies liable for their contribution to climate change and to
629
recover damages for the cost of adapting to climate change.
Similar lawsuits have been filed by Rhode Island and the Pacific
630
The plaintiffs in
Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations.
these cases allege that companies like ExxonMobil, BP, and Shell
knowingly contributed to climate change by extracting and selling
fossil fuels, obscuring the science of climate change, and fighting
policies aimed at mitigating climate change, and should therefore
629. Complaint, City of Imperial Beach v. Chevron Corp., No. C17-01227 (Cal. App.
Dep’t Super. Ct. Jul. 17, 2017); Complaint for Public Nuisance, City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C.,
No. RG17875889 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Sep. 19, 2017); Complaint, City of Santa Cruz v.
Chevron Corp., No. 17CV03243 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2017); Complaint, Cty.
of Marin v. Chevron Corp., No. CIV1702586 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Jul. 17, 2017);
Complaint, Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., No. 17CIV03222 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct.
Jul. 17, 2017); Complaint, Cty. of Santa Cruz v. Chevron Corp., No. 17CV03242 (Cal. App.
Dep’t Super. Ct. Jul. 17, 2017); Complaint for Public Nuisance, City of San Francisco v. BP
P.L.C., No. CGC-17-561370 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Sep. 19, 2017); Complaint, City of
Richmond v. Chevron Corp., No. C18-00055 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 2018);
Complaint and Jury Demand, Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Boulder Cty. v. Suncor Energy
(U.S.A.), No. 2018CV030349 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 17, 2018); Complaint, City of New York v.
BP P.L.C., No. 1:18-cv-00182 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2018); Plaintiff’s Complaint, Mayor & City of
Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., No. 24-C-18-004219 (Md. Cir. Ct. Jul. 20, 2018).
630. Complaint, Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., No. PC-2018-4716 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jul.
2, 2018); Complaint, Pac. Coast Fed’n. of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, Inc. v. Chevron Corp., No.
CGC-18-571285 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2018).
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be held liable for some of the adaptation costs incurred by
governments. They are pursuing multiple state law legal theories:
public nuisance, private nuisance, negligence, trespass, failure to
warn, and design defect, among others. These are not the first tort
cases against emitters involving state rather than federal law
631
claims—as noted in the above discussion of standing, both
American Electric Power and Comer also involved state law claims, but
those decisions did not address the merits of those claims.
The complaints submitted by petitioners in these cases touch on
all aspects of attribution. They discuss the basic science of climate
change and attribution of climate change to increasing
concentrations of greenhouse gas emissions; they identify specific
extreme events and impacts of climate change that are injuring
petitioners; and they examine “known causes” of those impacts,
looking at the effect of anthropogenic climate change as well as
632
other factors.
With regards to source attribution, petitioners
quantify the cumulative emissions from the fossil fuels produced,
sold, and marketed by defendant companies (e.g., “15% of global
fossil fuel product-related CO2 between 1965 and 2015, with
633
contributions currently continuing unabated” ) and assert that
634
this is a “substantial” contribution to the impacts on petitioners.
The complaints are thus drafted in a manner which clearly
anticipates that questions of climate change attribution will be at
the heart of the inquiry into whether defendants have caused a
nuisance or other actionable harm under common law. The
attribution statements contained therein are relatively robust
because: (i) petitioners represent the aggregated interests of all
individuals within their jurisdiction (or trade association) and can
therefore allege a broader array and greater magnitude of harms,
and (ii) emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels produced by
defendants constitute a relatively large (and quantifiable) share of
global cumulative emissions. From the standpoint of attribution

631. See supra Section III (C)(1).
632. See, e.g., Complaint for Public Nuisance, City of San Francisco v. BP P.L.C., supra
note 629; Plaintiff’s Complaint, Mayor & City of Baltimore v. BP P.LC., supra note 629;
Complaint, Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., supra note 630.
633. Complaint for Public Nuisance, City of San Francisco v. BP P.L.C., supra note 629,
at 35.
634. See, e.g., Complaint, Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., supra note 630, at 48;
Complaint for Public Nuisance, City of San Francisco v. BP P.L.C., supra note 629, at 35;
Complaint, Maryland & Mayor of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., supra note 629, at 49.
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science, petitioners have made compelling arguments as to why a
substantial proportion of their injuries can be traced to those
emissions.
It remains unclear whether these cases will actually go to trial and
whether the reviewing courts will fully evaluate the attribution
questions presented therein. While plaintiffs are pursing state law
theories, defendants have argued (and some judges have agreed)
that all of the claims are “necessarily governed by federal law”
because a “uniform standard of decision is necessary to deal with
635
the issues raised” by plaintiffs.
Cases decided under federal law
are more likely to be dismissed due to federal precedent in cases
such as American Electric Power. To date, two cases have been
dismissed by district court judges who held that claims were nonjusticiable because they raised questions that should be resolved by
636
the legislative and executive branches of the federal government.
One of these federal judges held a “climate science tutorial” in
which both sides were asked to brief him on climate science.
However, the opinion granting defendants’ motion to dismiss
explicitly recognized that “[t]he issue is not over science” but
637
rather precedent and the separation of powers.
v. Philippines Carbon Majors Inquiry
Plaintiffs in foreign jurisdictions have also begun to use human
rights law and other legal sources as the basis for holding
companies responsible for their contribution to climate change. In
2016, environmental and human rights advocates submitted a
petition to the Philippines Commission on Human Rights
requesting an investigation into the responsibility of forty-seven
“Carbon Majors” (carbon producing companies) for human rights
violations or threats of violations resulting from the impacts of
638
The claims raised by petitioners are similar to
climate change.
those raised in tort—that the companies produced and promoted
the use of massive quantities of fossil fuels with full knowledge that
the consumption of these fuels would contribute significantly to

635. City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., No. C 17-06011 WHA, 2018 WL 1064293, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 27, 2018).
636. City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2018); City of New
York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
637. City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. at 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
638. In re Greenpeace Southeast Asia v. Chevron, Case No. CHR-NI-2016-0001 (2016).
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global climate change (and the corresponding harmful impacts on
lives and livelihoods), and that this knowing contribution
639
constituted a violation of fundamental human rights.
The
petition emphasizes the scientific basis for the claim, referring to
scientific studies on climate change attribution as well studies on
the emissions that can be attributed to the carbon majors. A joint
summary brief submitted by a group of amici curiae in support of
the petitioners contains an even more detailed overview of climate
and attribution science, including the latest research on how
climate change is affecting and will continue to affect the
640
Philippines.
The joint summary brief was a collaboration
between legal experts and climate scientists—the goal being to
present a credible overview of the best available science in relatively
straightforward terms.
In December 2019, the Commission
announced its finding that major fossil fuel companies can be held
liable for climate change impacts and that existing civil law in the
Philippines provided grounds for holding such companies
criminally liable where there is clear proof that they have engaged
641
in acts of obstruction, deception, or fraud.
d. Concluding Notes on Tort Liability
The role of attribution science in climate torts is, at the moment,
front and center in the public’s eye. But our analysis is consistent
with Professor Kysar’s:
Make no mistake: a conceivable set of arguments on behalf of climate
change tort plaintiffs does exist. The problem, however, is that the
winning scenario for most climate-related harms requires a court to
stretch in plaintiffs’ direction at nearly every stage of the traditional
tort analysis: duty would have to encompass “negligence in the air,”
rather than more particularized relations of responsibility; nuisance
would have to be interpreted as an absolute protection against
significant invasions, irrespective of social welfare balancing; actual
cause would have to embrace—at long last—a probabilistic, risk-

639. Id.
640. CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ET AL., JOINT SUMMARY OF THE
AMICUS Brief CURIAE: IN RE: NATIONAL INQUIRY ON THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE
HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.ciel.org/philippinesjoint-amicus [https://perma.cc/66P4-KBU7].
641. Press Release, CIEL, Groundbreaking Inquiry in Philippines Links Carbon Majors
to Human Rights Impacts of Climate Change, Calls for Greater Accountability (Dec. 9,
2019).
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enhancement conception of causation; exceptional measures of
apportionment would have to be invoked to address a multiple
defendant problem of unprecedented magnitude; proximate cause
would have to be interpreted such that the scope of foreseeable harm
from greenhouse gas emissions both tracks projections from climate
models that stand at the very forefront of scientific inquiry and, in
many cases, applies retroactively as a form of imputed knowledge
tantamount to strict liability; and harm would have to be expanded to
include much more by way of anticipatory injury than courts
642
currently recognize.

Science can be used to support arguments but it does not
necessarily answer fundamental questions over the appropriate
logic of blame.
6. Lawsuits Involving Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation, and
Risk Disclosures
Attribution science also plays a more limited role in lawsuits
involving climate change impacts, adaptation, and disclosures
about climate change-related risks. These include: (i) failure-toadapt lawsuits, which involve allegations that an actor has failed to
account for the effects of climate change and this resulted in an
adverse outcome that would not have occurred if the actor had
accounted for those effects, or else failed to develop adequate plans
643
to prevent foreseeable adverse outcomes in the future; (ii)
644
lawsuits involving legal defense of adaptation measures; (iii)
lawsuits in which defendants seek to shield themselves from liability
for climate-related harms by alleging that climate change, and not
645
their own conduct, was responsible for those harms; and (iv)

642. Kysar, supra note 555, at 44.
643. See, e.g., ExxonMobil Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Civil
Penalties at para 170; Conservation Law Found. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 1:16-cv-11950 (D.
Mass. Sep. 9, 2016); Complaint and Jury Demand, Conservation Law Foundation, Inc. v.
Shell Oil Products US, No. 1:17-cv-00396 (D.R.I. Aug. 28, 2017). See also Jennifer Klein,
Potential Liability of Governments for Failure to Prepare for Climate Change, SABIN CENTER FOR
CLIMATE CHANGE LAW (2015); Jacqueline Peel & Hari M. Osofsky, Sue to Adapt?, 99 MINN. L.
REV. 2177, 2193–95 (2015).
644. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 643.
645. For example, utilities may cite climate change as a defense in wildfire litigation. See
Mark Chediak, Facing $17 Billion in Fire Damages, a CEO Blames Climate Change, BLOOMBERG
(August 13, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-13/facing-17-billionin-fire-damages-a-ceo-blames-climate-change [https://perma.cc/9A38-YQUD].
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lawsuits involving climate change-related risk disclosures in
646
contexts, such as environmental reviews and financial statements.
One critical question in such cases is whether the present or
future effects of climate change are foreseeable. This bears on
questions such as whether it was reasonable for a defendant to omit
climate change-related risks from a security disclosure or an
environmental report; whether it was reasonable for a defendant to
ignore climate change-related risks in the approval, construction,
or operation of a facility or development project; and whether it
was reasonable for a government officer to impose new restrictions
on private development due to climate change-related risks. For
example, attribution science has been used in cases involving listing
decisions under the U.S. Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) to both
justify listing decisions predicated on consideration of climate
647
change-related risks to the species and to compel consideration
of climate change impacts where the government failed to do so in
648
listing decisions. Attribution science may also be used to establish

646. See, e.g., AquAlliance v. Bureau of Reclamation, F. Supp. 3d 969 (E.D. Cal. 2018)
(agency violated NEPA by failing to adequately assess climate change impacts on water
supply); Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (agency violated NEPA by
failing to adequately disclose GHG emissions from pipeline project); People of the State of
New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp., N.Y. No. 452044 (Dec. 10, 2019) (Exxon did not violate
Martin Act through public disclosures concerning how it accounted for past, present, and
future climate change risks). See also Michael Burger & Jessica Wentz, Downstream and
Upstream Emissions: The Proper Scope of NEPA Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 109 (2017);
Jessica Wentz, Planning for the Effects of Climate Change on Natural Resources, 47 ENVTL. L. REP.
10220 (March 2017); Jessica Wentz, Assessing the Impacts of Climate Change on the Built
Environment: A Framework for Environmental Reviews, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 11015 (2015).
647. See, e.g., Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Pritzker, 840 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2016) (upholding
NMFS’s use of climate science in deciding to add Pacific bearded seal subspecies to
endangered species list); Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Jewell, 815 F.3d 544, 558, 46 ELR 20042
(9th Cir. 2016) (upholding FWS’s decision to account for climate change impacts in
designating critical habitat for species); In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing &
§4(d) Rule Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 65, 41 ELR 20318 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 709 F.3d 1, 43 ELR
20132 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (upholding the polar bear listing); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v.
Lubchenco, 758 F. Supp. 2d 945 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (upholding NMFS decision not to list
ribbon seal as threatened or endangered despite climate-related threats).
648. See, e.g., Defs. of Wildlife v. Jewell, No. 14-247-M-DLC, 2016 WL 1363865, at *20, 46
ELR 20070 (D. Mont. Apr. 4, 2016) (FWS failed to use best available science, including
science on climate change, when deciding not to list wolverine as threatened); In re Polar
Bear Endangered Species Act Listing §4(d) Rule Litig., 748 F. Supp. 2d 19, 30 (D.D.C. 2010)
(holding that a species may be listed as “endangered” even if it is not in danger of imminent
extinction, and remanding FWS’s decision to list the polar bear as “threatened” rather than
“endangered” for additional consideration of foreseeable future threats, particularly changes
in future sea ice conditions); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, No. 3:18-cv-00064-SLG,
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the extent to which anthropogenic climate change is the cause of
harmful effects, which bears on the question of whether the
defendant’s failure to adapt actually caused or contributed to the
plaintiff’s alleged injury.
IV. FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF CLIMATE
ATTRIBUTION
As courts and policy-makers continue to grapple with appropriate
responses to the increasingly urgent climate crisis, attribution
science will continue to play a critical role in shaping discussions
around responsibility and liability for climate change and its
impacts. Here, we discuss future directions in the law and science
of climate change attribution, addressing questions such as how
attribution science might better support policy-making, planning
and litigation; how plaintiffs might utilize attribution science in
lawsuits against government and private defendants; and how
defendants and courts might respond to the realities and
limitations of climate attribution science. Some of these functions
may be best performed by a third party organization that focuses
on the synthesis and communication of scientific research, such as
649
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
A. How Can Attribution Science Better Support Climate Law, Policy
and Planning?
There are a variety of ways in which the scientific community
could work towards supporting applications of attribution research,
such as the use of this research to inform loss and damage
negotiations and judicial determinations of liability for climate
change impacts. These include: (i) continuing to lead the
development of scientific knowledge and understanding by

2018 WL 8805325, at *1 (D. Alaska 2018) (challenging the determination that the listing of
the Pacific walrus as endangered or threatened was not warranted).
649. The IPCC chapters on detection and attribution of climate change are a good
example of how attribution research can be summarized, synthesized, and communicated in
an accessible format. Krishna Mirle Achuta Rao et al., Detection and Attribution of Climate
Change: from Global to Regional, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 867–
952 (2013). Other entities that are engaged in the synthesis and communication of
attribution research include the World Weather Attribution (WWA) project and the Bulletin
of Atmospheric Scientists (particularly in the publication of the annual reports on extreme
event attribution).
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advancing detection and attribution research across the board; (ii)
generating attribution findings at different confidence levels to
better communicate uncertainty about the “upper bound” and
“lower bound” of plausible anthropogenic influence on an
observed change; (iii) communicating findings clearly and in an
accessible format; (iv) engaging stakeholders; and (v) linking
individual studies to other advancing research areas that helps to
flesh out the causal chain from emissions to impact.
1. Continue to Conduct Attribution Research on the Full Range
of Climate Change Impacts With An Eye Towards Improving
Confidence Levels and Certainty In Findings.
The body of attribution research has grown considerably in
recent years, increasing levels of confidence and certainty
regarding a wide range of climate impacts at multiple political and
geographical scales. Climate scientists pursuing their collective and
independent research agendas have already established an
undeniable connection between anthropogenic GHG emissions
and climate change, and between climate change and slow onset
impacts and the increasing frequency and intensity of certain types
of extreme events, assuring that there is a sound scientific basis for
collective action to address the climate crisis through mitigation
and adaptation measures. More recent emphasis in relatively novel
areas such as source attribution and single-event attribution has
already helped inform progressive advocacy strategies. So, in an
important sense, the single most important thing the scientific
community can do to support applications of attribution research is
more of the same.
Indeed, international and national policy initiatives, as well as
lawsuits in the United States and elsewhere, have relied on existing
attribution research to claim that climate change is responsible for
a broad range of impacts, including coastal impacts from sea level
rise, loss of snowmelt, declines in agricultural productivity, and
declines in fishery productivity, among other things. To our
knowledge, international coordination, domestic efforts, and
climate change litigation have never failed due to a shortfall in the
attribution science—even despite a concerted disinformation
campaign that has reduced political support for ambitious climate
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action for the last quarter century.
In short, the scientific
findings compiled to date are already well-suited to support climate
law and policy.
Yet, there are gaps in coverage, particularly with respect to
extreme events and impacts in developing countries and in areas
where the observational record is not as robust and where funding
for research may be more limited.
Moreover, even where
attribution research has been performed for a particular variable,
the scope and scale of the study may be incompatible with realworld applications. Geographic and temporal scope are both
relevant in this context.
For example, loss and damage
negotiations would benefit from research attributing impacts over a
long timeframe within specific countries, whereas the plaintiffs in a
651
case like Juliana would benefit most from research attributing
impacts on them as individuals, which requires more downscaling
than a country-wide analysis and a more complete reckoning with
confounding factors.
Going forward, litigants, policy-makers, and planners will benefit
from attribution research on all impacts and at all scales from the
global to the highly individualized, the goal being to improve
confidence levels and certainty in findings. It will be helpful for
scientists to generate additional findings for slow-onset impacts
such as sea level rise, temperature changes, ocean acidification, and
desertification, as well as extreme events such as precipitation, heat,
and wildfire. It would additionally be beneficial to work towards
quantifying actual impacts or harms on communities and
individuals.
The scientific community could work with affected stakeholders
to address the incomplete coverage of attribution science and
identify priority areas for research. Granted, working with affected
people to determine what variables to focus on in attribution
studies could contribute to concerns about selection bias (i.e., the
bias introduced when data is selected for research without proper
randomization). This practice could result in a larger proportion
650. See Fossil Free MIT, The Fossil Fuel Industry’s Role in Hindering Climate Change Action:
Lobbying and Disinformation Against Science and Scientists (April 2014) https://
www.fossilfreemit.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/FossilFreeMIT-Lobbying-Disinformat
ion.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8DD-S6ED]; Union of Concerned Scientists, Climate
Disinformation, https://www.ucsusa.org/climate/disinformation [https://perma.cc/4976NSKS].
651. 339 F.Supp.3d 1062.
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of attribution studies that focus on events or impacts with a clear
connection to climate change than a purely random sampling of
events and impacts. As such, scientists may need to be cautious
about any overarching statements made with respect to the body of
attribution research. But scientists are already cautious about
652
making such statements, and such concerns about selection bias
would not undermine the credibility of the individual studies being
performed.
2. Generate Findings at Different Confidence Levels
As discussed in Part II, attribution findings are often expressed in
terms of probabilities and confidence levels. For example, an IPCC
report might conclude with “high confidence” (80%) that a
particular impact was “very likely” caused by anthropogenic climate
change, or a probabilistic event attribution study might find with >
90% confidence that anthropogenic climate change quadrupled
the risk of a particular storm occurring. These are compelling
statistics, but depending on the application, it may also be helpful
for researchers to also discuss lower-bound, higher confidence
estimates (e.g., > 95% confidence that anthropogenic climate
change at least doubled the risk of that same storm occurring) or
higher-bound, lower confidence estimates (e.g., > 80% confidence
that anthropogenic climate change made the storm at least six
times more likely). Lower-bound estimates with higher confidence
levels would be more useful for applications where certainty in
findings is needed, such as litigation seeking to hold fossil fuel
companies liable for their contribution to climate change. Upperbound estimates with lower confidence levels would be more useful
in policy and planning applications where decision-makers would
benefit from understanding the potential extent of anthropogenic
influence on an observed change but certainty about that data is
less important.
There is an inevitable tradeoff between the level of confidence in
findings and the magnitude of the “human fingerprint” identified
in an attribution study. Scientists can issue higher confidence
findings that anthropogenic climate change contributed “at least” a
certain amount to the probability or magnitude of an event without

652. See, e.g., BAMS 2016, supra note 76 (studies contained within these reports contain
clear explanations of research parameters and uncertainty).
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ruling out the possibility that the effect of anthropogenic climate
change was actually much larger. Again, discussing both lower and
upper bound estimates in this context is helpful for navigating
uncertainty and clarifying findings. Consider the study of the 2003
European heat wave: Stott et al. (2004) found that it was very likely
(confidence level > 90%) that anthropogenic climate change had
at least doubled the risk of a heat wave of the sort experienced that
summer (FAR = 0.5), but they also noted that the anthropogenic
FAR could be substantially greater and that their “best estimate”
was that climate change had increased the risk by a factor of four
(FAR = 0.75) (no confidence interval was specified for this
653
estimate, but it was clearly lower than 90%).
Without that
additional information, a reader might assume that the FAR = 0.50
is the “best estimate” of the human fingerprint in this study, and
without the more conservative FAR estimate, the findings might not
hold up to scientific (or judicial) scrutiny.
This same approach could also be implemented in the context of
a storyline or mechanistic study.
For example, a storyline
evaluation of a tropical storm might generate several findings at
different confidence intervals (e.g., >95% chance that climate
change increased the magnitude of a storm by at least 30%, >90%
chance that climate change increased the magnitude of the storm
by at least 40%, and >80% chance that climate change increased
the magnitude of the storm by at least 50%).
3. Clearly Communicate Findings
Most attribution studies are written for a scientific audience, and
the findings contained therein can be difficult to understand for
people who lack expertise with terminology and concepts such as
confidence intervals and p-values. These studies are sometimes
“translated” for a broader audience, often by journalists, but when
non-scientists summarize scientific findings there is a greater risk
that complex topics will be over-simplified or inaccurate
conclusions will be drawn from the research. For this reason, it is
helpful for the scientists conducting the research to present their
findings in a clear and accessible fashion, to the extent practicable.
Marjanac et al. (2017) highlight several best practices for
communicating attribution science to courts, but their
653. Stott et al., supra note 153.
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recommendations apply in equal force to communication with
policy-makers, planners, companies, and the public at large:
(i) areas of agreement should be clearly stated before discussion of
areas of disagreement; (ii) methodology and results should be
quantitatively and qualitatively transparent to enable interpretation
and assessment of credibility by the courts; (iii) assumptions and
uncertainties should be stated in a simple, concise and transparent
manner; and (iv), results should discuss implications for
foreseeability; that is, whether and to what extent a study can opine
on the impact of anthropogenic emissions on the future likelihood of
654
occurrence or severity of the event.

An oft-lamented reality is that in communicating uncertainty,
bias, and other limitations in their research, scientists risk giving
the impression that the research is not credible or accurate.
Careful communication of these concepts is also important to
protect the credibility of the research against external attacks by
parties antagonistic to climate action, or else defending themselves
in lawsuits. Generally speaking, careful communication involves
providing context for statements about uncertainty, bias, and
limitations to help a non-scientific audience understand: (i)
whether the level of uncertainty, bias, etc. is standard or unusual as
compared with similar studies; and (ii) the effect of uncertainty
and bias on the reliability and accuracy of the results. Scientists
should also be careful not to overstate the novelty of this field—
while attribution science is undergoing constant evolution, the vast
majority of studies published in this field are based on wellestablished scientific techniques, carefully tested models, and
detailed observational sets.
4. Engage with Stakeholders
Clear communication of findings is an important first step
towards promoting the real-world application of attribution
science; engagement is critical to successful communication, and to
growing the impact of attribution research. Various researchers
have already highlighted the need for dialogue between scientists
and stakeholders on climate change science and attribution

654. Sophie Marjanac et al., Acts of God, Human Influence and Litigation, 10 NATURE
GEOSCIENCE 616 (2017).
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research to ensure practical relevance of this research. Weaver et
al. (2013) describe the importance of active-learning feedback
loops––that is, processes which allow for policy-makers and other
stakeholders “to communicate back to scientists any concerns,
656
misunderstandings, relevance, or timeliness of the issues.”
This
type of co-generation of knowledge has played a central role in
climate risk assessments, such as those conducted by the New York
657
City Panel on Climate Change. Some of the lessons learned from
these co-generation efforts (e.g., risk management frameworks,
focusing on the decision-needs of stakeholders, inclusion of social
scientists and boundary spanners in the process, and working
through existing, trusted networks) will help ensure attribution
research is as impactful as possible. Given the expertise about
impacts that resides with stakeholders, deeper stakeholder
engagement can also be expected to lead to scientific advances not
only in attribution science for decision-making, but also for
attribution science itself, especially with respect to attribution of
impacts. For example, a stakeholder engagement process with
water managers encouraged attribution scientists to focus on a
broader set of event metric definitions, including the duration of
rain events, in order to make their research more relevant for
658
decision-makers and sector experts.
5. Link Individual Studies to Related Research To Help Flesh Out
the Causal Chain from Emissions to Impact
Most attribution studies only focus on one part of the causal
chain linking emissions and land use changes to impacts. To the
extent that the scientists working on these studies are aware of
related research, it would be helpful for them to explicitly discuss
this research and explain how it ties into their own findings. For
example, a study attributing specific impacts to increases in
655. See, e.g., Sippel et al., supra note 111; Christopher P. Weaver et al., Improving the
Contribution of Climate Model Information to Decision-Making: The value and Demands of Robust
Decision Frameworks, 4 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE 39 (2013); Hannah Parker et al., Using a Game
to Engage Stakeholders in Extreme Event Attribution Science, 7 INT’L J. DISASTER RISK SCI. 353
(2016).
656. Sippel et al., supra note 111, at 225 (citing to Weaver et al., supra note 655).
657. See, e.g., Cynthia Rosenzweig & William Solecki, New York City Panel on Climate
Change, Special Issue: Advancing Tools and Methods for Flexible Adaptation Pathways and Science
Integration Policy (The New York Academy of Sciences 2019).
658. Julie A. Vano et al., Hydroclimatic extremes as challenges for the water management
community: Lessons from Oroville Dam and Hurricane Harvey, in BAMS 2016, supra note 76.
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extreme heat could cite external studies demonstrating the link
between increases in extreme heat and anthropogenic forcing on
climate.
Researchers and scientific organizations could also
publish more synthesis reports linking individual studies and
explaining the extent to which these studies, in aggregate, can
support claims of end-to-end attribution. Where possible, it would
be helpful to harmonize the scope and scale of connected studies
such that the quantitative analyses conducted in one study can flow
through and inform the quantitative analysis in the subsequent
study, with the goal being to develop robust, quantitative findings
across a larger section of the causal chain. More fundamentally,
further standardization of attribution research—ranging from the
selection of topics to study, to the metrics used, and the data and
models brought to bear—will support cross-comparison,
evaluation, and scaling up of findings across studies.
B. How Might Judges and Litigants Utilize Attribution Science in
the Courtroom?
The IPCC’s Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C
highlights the necessity of achieving rapid GHG emission
659
reductions in the immediate future.
With temperatures having
already increased by approximately 1°C and many national
governments failing to make the necessary cuts in GHG emissions,
legal intervention and innovation may be necessary in order to
avert catastrophic climate change. This raises the question of how
judges and litigants can best utilize attribution science to help
argue and decide cases, particularly those involving claims that a
government or private actor should be held accountable for their
contribution to or failure to regulate GHG emissions. Below, we
discuss some approaches and legal innovations that could provide
for a more robust assessment and application of attribution science
in the courtroom.
1. Standing and Justiciability
The single greatest obstacle to the effective utilization of
attribution science in the courtroom is the fact that climate cases
raising complex attribution issues may be dismissed or decided
659. IPCC, SPECIAL REPORT: GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C (Valerie Masson-Delmotte et al.
eds., 2018).
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without a trial, meaning that their scientific bases may never fully
assessed and adjudicated. As discussed in Part III, the main reasons
for dismissal are lack of standing, the political question doctrine,
the doctrine of legislative displacement, and the doctrine of
foreign affairs preemption.
With regards to standing, some courts have recognized that the
questions implicated in the standing analysis are heavily fact
660
dependent and tend to overlap with the merits of the case. But
other courts have denied standing based on a cursory assessment of
these scientific questions, finding without trial that the causal
661
connection between emissions and injury is too attenuated.
Plaintiffs should not be denied their day in court based on judicial
hunches about the state of the science. Standing claims involving
disputed facts should be addressed after discovery, when all issues
662
are fully briefed and all evidence is submitted. For example, the
questions of what constitutes a “meaningful contribution” to GHG
emissions and whether a court can provide meaningful relief
should be considered factual issues to be evaluated at the merits
663
stage.
The Second Circuit in American Electric Power, the Fifth
Circuit Court in Comer, and the district court in Juliana all endorsed
664
this approach.
Some scholars have also recommended specific analytical
techniques that are uniquely well-suited for assessing standing
claims in cases involving climate change-related claims. For
example, scholars have recommended that courts recognize that
the risk of harm is itself an injury that can provide the basis for
665
standing.
This would bear on how the courts interpret the
660. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1242–1248 (D. Or. 2016). See also
Meier, supra note 600, at 1248–49 (noting that the standing analysis involves many
assumptions and speculation, fact-intensive inquiry, competing experts, and weighing of
evidence).
661. See, e.g., Native Vill. of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 880
(N.D. Cal. 2009).
662. Causation in Environmental Law, supra note 591, at 2270–71; Meier, supra note 600,
at 1265 (“the fact-specific nature of the cause in fact inquiry makes it difficult to conduct this
inquiry at the threshold of litigation, and thus it is irreconcilable with the gatekeeper
function of standing”).
663. See supra Part III(C)(5).
664. See supra Part III(C)(1)(b).
665. Hessick, supra note 353, at 67–68 (arguing that all claims based on a risk of injury
present an actual case or controversy that should be justiciable, no matter how small the risk,
and that the “substantial risk” requirement is directly at odds with holdings that the size of
the harm is irrelevant to whether a plaintiff has standing, since the risk itself is an injury);
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“injury-in-fact” requirement for future harms (e.g., in cases where
attribution science is primarily used to support model projections
of those future harms). It may also bear on how courts interpret
the causation and redressability requirements. For example, in
cases involving procedural harms, the “harm” is really an increased
chance of substantive harm in the future, and courts adjust their
standing analysis to accommodate such harms by relaxing
666
requirements for imminence and redressability.
There is some
667
judicial precedent to support such an approach.
Another approach could be to allow “fractional standing” for
668
probabilistic injuries.
According to one commentator, a
“fractional injury” is “one that, if manifest in one individual, would
be insufficient to grant standing” but if “multiple individuals
experience this injury and band together to demand relief . . . then
669
their collective grievance would be sufficient to merit standing.”
Fractional standing involves looking at the probability of the harm,
the severity of the harm, and the number of people at risk and
determining whether the aggregate harm is sufficient to grant

Lin, supra note 603 (involuntary risk is a harm); Sunstein, supra note 603 (arguing that an
increased probability of harm is itself an injury-in-fact that should suffice for standing
purposes in cases that involve public law claims); Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm? 151 U.
PENN. L. REV. 963 (2003) (arguing that risk of harm is itself a harm); Meier, supra note 600,
at 1288–91 (noting there is some precedent for this approach); Robinson, supra note 588, at
783 (explaining why the “basic objectives of tort law are better served if liability is based on
risk of injury than if it is based on the actual occurrence of harm”).
666. Burt, supra note 353, at 280 (citing Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir.
1989) (Judge Breyer clarified that the underlying harm in procedural injury cases is not the
“harm to procedure,” but the increased risk of substantive harm (to the environment, for
example) that occurs when procedures are not followed.). See also Hessick, supra note 353, at
69 (In procedural cases, “it is clear that the injury is not the effect of the agency action on the
plaintiff” because the redress that a court could provide (making the agency follow proper
procedures) will not necessarily remedy that injury. Rather “the relevant injury that is
redressed in a procedural claim is the increased probability of harm.”).
667. See Duke Power Co. 438 U.S. 59 at 73–74 (holding apprehension caused by risk of
harm caused by radiation exposure was sufficient for standing); Covington v. Jefferson Cty.,
358 F.3d 626, 641 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding fear that leaking hazardous material would
contaminate property was sufficient for standing); Suttin v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc. 419 F.3d
568, 575 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding increased risk of future physical injury from the
implantation of an allegedly defective device constituted injury-in-fact); Baur v. Veneman,
352 F.3d 625, 633 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding enhanced risk of disease transmission may
constitute injury-in-fact); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204
F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Threats or increased risk . . . constitute[] cognizable harm.”).
668. Daniel E. Rauch, Fractional Standing, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 281 (2016).
669. Id. at 282.
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standing.
The D.C. Circuit implicitly endorsed this approach in
671
Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, discussed above.
With regard to the other justiciability issues raised by courts,
judges may be relying on overly broad applications of general
principles, such as the separation of powers, and legal doctrines,
such as political question or foreign affairs preemption, to dismiss
cases involving climate claims. There are, of course, many
potential reasons for judicial caution in this context. Regulation
has been viewed as a more appropriate response to climate change
than court intervention. It is argued that democratically elected
officials and technically sophisticated bureaucrats should be
making policy decisions that involve complex scientific
determinations, economic tradeoffs, and difficult ethical questions.
There are also concerns about opening the “floodgates” to
litigation. Even with robust evidence of attribution, courts may be
hesitant to adjudicate claims against governments or private actors
given that the numbers of potential claimants and defendants in
public trust and tort actions as well as the scope of potential court
decisions and the scale of potential compensation awards are huge.
But there are important counterpoints to these arguments. First,
672
as plaintiffs in the atmospheric trust litigation, the cities’ tort
673
674
cases, and numerous statutory cases argue, these climate cases
arguably fall neatly within courts’ core areas of competence and
well-settled legal causes of action. The scale of the problem is not a
reason, in and of itself, for courts to refuse to engage in its solution.
Second, there is a large gap between the level of action taken by
political branches of government and the level of action needed to
avert the worst impacts of climate change. Courts do have a role in
policing government failures to protect people’s rights, whether
those be fundamental rights secured under the Constitution or a
public trust inherent in our nation’s and states’ democracies, or
substantive and procedural rights provided under statute. Finally,
there is an expressive function the law can and arguably should
serve. Put simply, the world will experience catastrophic climate
change if we continue a business-as-usual trajectory. Judicial

670.
671.
672.
673.
674.

Id. at 290–91.
See supra Part III(C)(1)(a)(iv).
See supra Part III(C)(3)(b).
See supra Part III(C)(5).
See supra Part III(C)(3)(a).
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intervention at this time could help change our course by sending
important messages to governments and private actors about
responsibility for climate change, unearthing facts which will
advance public discourse on this topic, and in some cases
compelling action that is needed to mitigate and adapt to climate
change.
2. Factual and Proximate Causation
As illustrated in Part III, some judges have expressed skepticism
about whether plaintiffs pursuing climate change-related claims
can establish an adequate causal nexus between the defendant’s
conduct and their injuries as necessary to support standing and
their arguments on the merits. However, recent cases provide
valuable insight into how attribution science can be used to
establish both factual and proximate causation in these cases.
a. Defining Parties’ Contributions to GHGs
The first step in determining whether a party is a legally relevant
cause of damages associated with climate change is to define that
party’s contribution to increases in atmospheric GHG
concentrations. Some form of quantification is necessary to
establish both factual cause and proximate cause. Above, we note
that there are several legal tests for determining whether a party’s
contribution to a larger problem is a factual cause of that problem,
most of which focus on the relative size of that contribution as
compared with others (e.g., whether the party made a “material
675
contribution” to the problem). Quantifying the party’s GHG
contribution is essential to applying these tests. As for proximate
cause: the question here is whether the injury is sufficiently closely
related to the allegedly wrongful conduct such that it would be
reasonable to impose liability. Again, the size of the emissions
contribution is relevant to this inquiry.

675. We do not mean to imply that these relative share tests are the only appropriate
means of ascertaining factual causation. A court could conclude that even a small
contribution to GHG emissions is a factual cause of at least some of the harmful effects of
climate change. The concern, of course, is that imposing liability on small contributors
would open the floodgates to litigation. But a court pursuing this approach could also rely
on the proximate cause requirement to conclude that it would be unreasonable to impose
liability for such a small contribution.
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Defining a party’s GHG contribution is not as straightforward as
one might like. There may be data gaps that preclude accurate
quantification.
Even where adequate data exists, there are
inevitably analytical questions that must be answered, such as which
emissions accounting approach to use—territorial, consumptionbased, or extraction-based—and how to account for historical as
compared with present (and possibly even future) emissions.
Lawyers and judges can turn to source attribution science to
understand the relative contribution of sources under different
accounting methods at different temporal scales.
Several of the cases brought to date illustrate how litigants and
courts might use source attribution data to define GHG
contributions:
In Urgenda, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands used the
Dutch national emissions inventory to define that country’s
GHG contribution and relied on scientific research on the
global carbon budget to define its corresponding emissions
reduction obligation.
Specifically, the court referred to
UNFCCC decisions finding that industrialized countries must
reduce emissions 25–40% below 1990 levels by 2020 to limit
global warming to 2°C, which was in turn based on IPCC
reports outlining possible676global emission reduction pathways
The court also discussed reports
for achieving this target.
which corroborated Urgenda’s assertion that the Dutch
government must reduce emissions by at least 25% in this
timeframe, including UNEP Emissions Gap reports which
found that industrialized country commitments were
insufficient to limit warming to 2°C or 1.5°C, a report prepared
by the PBL Netherlands Environment Assessment Agency
finding that Dutch policy must be more ambitious to align it
with the Paris Agreement, and data showing that Dutch per
capita emissions were677 “relatively high” compared to other
industrialized nations.
The expert reports compiled in Juliana illustrate, among other
things, how parties can disaggregate government responsibility for
GHG emissions based on authorities and decisions. For example,
plaintiffs provided a counterfactual scenario in which they
estimated emission reductions that would have occurred if the
government had pursued a certain course of action to address
676. Urgenda Decision (2019) at ¶¶ 7.1-7.3.6.
677. Id. at ¶¶ 2.2.2, 4.6, 7.3.4, 7.4.4, 7.2.9.
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climate change in the past, in order to delimit the fact of
government responsibility, while also presenting estimates of total
emissions from energy emissions within the U.S. and data on
678
potential emissions from U.S. energy exports and consumption.
Defendants, naturally, contested that scenario with their own
experts, who argued that the U.S. government cannot be held
responsible for all emissions generated within the U.S. (or by
products consumed within the U.S. or fossil fuels extracted within
the U.S.), and who estimated that U.S. government conduct is
679
responsible for no more than 4–5% of total global emissions. In
denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgement, the
district court found that the pleadings submitted by both parties
“make clear that plaintiffs and defendants agree that federal
defendants’ policies greenhouse gas emissions play a role in global
climate change” even if there was a dispute as to extent of that
680
role. With regards to the quantity of emissions attributable to the
U.S. government, the district court focused on the defendants’
admissions regarding total U.S. emissions (e.g., defendants
admitted in their answer that the U.S. is responsible for more than
25% of cumulative global CO2 emissions from 1850 to 2012) and
noted that this was much greater than the 6% of global emissions at
681
The judge did not explicitly rule on
issue in Massachusetts.
whether all cumulative U.S. emissions could be attributed to U.S.
government conduct, but she did discuss the many lines of
evidence demonstrating a causal connection between U.S. policies
and third party emissions and found this sufficient to support
682
causation for standing purposes at the summary judgement stage.
The plaintiffs in Juliana also argued that territorial, consumptionbased, and extraction-based accounting methodologies should be
considered in determining the government’s GHG contribution
and corresponding responsibility for climate change. In their
complaint, they relied primarily on estimates of cumulative

678. See supra Part III(C)(3)(b)(i).
679. Id.
680. Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1072 (D. Or. 2018).
681. Id. at 1092.
682. Id. at 1093. See also Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1246 (D. Or.
2016) (“DOT and EPA have jurisdiction over sectors producing sixty-four percent of United
States emissions, which in turn constitute roughly fourteen percent of emissions worldwide;
they allow high emissions levels by failing to set demanding standards; high emissions levels
cause climate change; and climate change causes plaintiffs’ injuries.”).
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territorial emissions to support their allegations, and then
supplemented this with additional emissions attributable to U.S.
consumption of fossil fuels and U.S. fossil fuel exports. As
discussed in Part III, they also enlisted an expert to provide a
detailed comparison of U.S. emissions under the three accounting
approaches and to explain why the U.S. government should
maintain consumption-based and extraction-based inventories in
683
addition to a territorial inventory.
This “all-of-the-above”
approach makes sense for the purposes of establishing national
responsibility for climate change as a general matter or in
qualitative terms. But in calculating a national and global
emissions inventory and budget for the purpose of setting policy,
one methodology must dominate, to avoid double and triple
counting of emissions. Recognizing this, the plaintiffs in Juliana
focused on consumption-based emissions in their requested
remedy:
they sought a court order compelling the U.S.
government to “prepare a consumption-based inventory of U.S.
CO2 emissions” accompanied by an enforceable plan to phase out
684
fossil fuel emissions and draw down excess atmospheric CO2. The
defendants did not strongly object to a consumption-based
accounting approach in their reply briefs (as their primary
argument was that the U.S. government should not be held
accountable for all U.S. emissions no matter what accounting
approach is used), but one of their experts did express the view
that transitioning to a consumption-based accounting system might
685
be infeasible or difficult to implement.
Other lawsuits rely on different emissions accounting
methodologies. There is no strict requirement that different courts
addressing different types of legal claims, in different jurisdictions,
use the same accounting methods to impose responsibility on
entities; it may well be that climate litigation results in two different
parties being held responsible for the same emissions. However,
while this may not strangle the litigation, it can raise concerns
683. See supra Part III(C)(3)(b)(i).
684. Amended Complaint, Prayer for Relief, at 94, Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp.
3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC).
685. Expert Report of David G. Victor at 4, Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224
(D. Or. 2016) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC) (“with respect to claims regarding the use of
consumption-based accounting methods for 95 GHGs, it is my expert opinion that such
methods are neither administratively, nor politically 96 straightforward to implement
quickly.”).
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about fairness, justice, and the efficiency of the judicial system. For
instance, in the lawsuits against fossil fuel companies, plaintiffs
focus on extraction-based emissions, primarily relying on estimates
of cumulative fossil fuel production to establish that the companies
they are suing have made a “substantial contribution” to climate
686
change.
In response, the defendants have argued that plaintiffs
are seeking to evade precedent holding that the federal
government’s Clean Air Act authority displaces nuisance claims
based on GHG emissions by focusing on the extraction of fossil
fuels rather than consumption. The federal district court in
California, in denying motions from San Francisco and Oakland to
remand their cases back to state court, expressed agreement with
defendants, stating that plaintiffs seek to avoid federal common law
by “fixat[ing] on an earlier moment in the train of history, the
earlier moment of production and sale of fossil fuels, not their
687
combustion.”
Relatedly, the district courts in both the Oakland
case and in the New York City case dismissed the cases, in part, due
to the extraterritorial implications of imposing liability for the
extraction of fossil fuels and their belief that this would infringe on
the foreign affairs power of the executive and legislative branches
688
of government.
It remains to be seen whether other judges
overseeing these lawsuits will adopt a similar perspective on the
extraterritorial effects of holding fossil fuel companies liable for
their contribution to climate change.
These cases also illustrate how other types of information are
relevant to the analysis of proximate cause and supplement
attribution data. Some of the normative considerations relevant to
the proximate cause inquiry include the extent to which the
company profited from the production and eventual use of fossil
fuels, whether the company knew that it was producing and selling
a harmful product, and whether the company engaged in unethical
689
activities such as the obstruction of climate change science.
686. See supra Part III(C)(5).
687. Order Denying Motion to Remand at 6, California v. BP P.L.C., (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27,
2018) (No. C 17-06011 WHA).
688. City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2018); City of New
York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
689. The UCS publishes reports on “climate accountability” at fossil fuel companies in
which it assesses companies based on these sorts of criteria. See, e.g., The Climate Accountability
Scorecard, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.ucsusa.org/global-
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Recognizing this, plaintiffs in lawsuits against fossil fuel companies
have framed the allegedly tortious conduct in their complaints
broadly, focusing not only on the companies’ production and sale
of fossil fuels, but also the fact that they knew about the potential
harms of their products many years, actively concealed that
information, pursued climate change disinformation campaigns,
690
and lobbied against climate change regulations.
Plaintiffs in
Juliana also touched on some similar arguments in their complaint,
noting, for example, that the U.S. government “acted with
deliberate indifference” when it ignored expert reports urging it to
691
take immediate action on climate change in the early 1990s.
Countries and companies may claim that they cannot be held
responsible for emissions before the early 1990s because that was
when the IPCC first warned the world about climate change and
the UNFCCC first committed to take action to address the
problem. Recognizing this, some plaintiffs, like those in Juliana,
have focused on emissions since 1990 as the primary basis for their
692
claims.
However, scholars have compiled a wealth of evidence
from the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s that put countries and companies
on notice about the harmful effects of GHG emissions and the
693
perils of climate change. Plaintiffs in tort cases against fossil fuel
companies rely on evidence showing that fossil fuel companies have
known about the risks of their products since the 1950s to establish
that they can be held responsible for historical emissions, but the
plaintiffs also emphasize the point that most fossil fuel emissions
have accumulated since 1980, at which time the industry already
knew that their products posed a “catastrophic” threat to the global
694
climate.
Given the level of industry knowledge regarding the
harms of their products and the intentional concealment of these
risks, some plaintiffs in these cases have also argued that companies
warming/fight-misinformation/climate-accountability-scorecard-ranking-major-fossil-fuelcompanies#.W_L31ZNKhaR [https://perma.cc/5K7X-VK9K].
690. See supra Part III(C)(5).
691. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶ 8, Juliana v. United States, 217 F.
Supp. 3d 1224 (2015) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC), 2015 WL 4747094.
692. First Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 141, 151, Juliana v United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d
1224 (2015) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC) (plaintiffs in Juliana also present data on historical
emissions since the 1700s and cite evidence of the U.S. government knowing about the
dangers of climate change as far back as 1965 to further bolster their claims).
693. Heede, supra note 31.
694. See, e.g., Complaint for Public Nuisance ¶ 61, State of California v. BP P.L.C., No.
CGC-17-561370 (filed Cal. Super. Ct., Sep. 19, 2017).
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should be held strictly liable for failure to warn and for design
695
defect.
b. Establishing Causal Connections to Impacts
The cases litigated to date demonstrate that attribution science is
sufficiently robust to establish causal connections between increases
in GHG concentrations, global warming, and a broad range of onthe-ground impacts and harms. This is not to say all impacts of
climate change can be definitively linked to anthropogenic
influence on climate—but there is a sufficiently large subset of
impacts that can be attributed with enough confidence to support
litigation in one form or another. These include, for example, sea
level rise, melting snowpack, increases in average temperatures and
extreme heat, and ocean acidification.
The analysis in cases like Massachusetts and American Electric Power
suggests that it should be relatively easy for entities like states,
tribes, and cities to establish a causal connection between climate
change and at least some injuries associated with it. This is not
merely because of their sovereign status—it is also because these
entities represent many people and assets and will experience
greater harms from climate change as a result of the breadth of
their interests. The same can be said for trade organizations,
environmental groups with large memberships, and other nongovernmental entities that represent many individuals.
Juliana illustrates some of the challenges plaintiffs may face in
establishing a causal connection to individual injuries. As discussed
in Part III, the plaintiffs dedicated a large portion of their briefs
and expert testimony to defining that causal nexus between climate
change and specific injuries, and if the case had gone to trial, this
would have been one of the key factual disputes. One critical
question for courts as they begin to grapple with such factual
disputes is to what extent observational evidence of local impacts
(e.g., loss of snowpack at ski resorts) can be used to support claims
of injury in the absence of an attribution study of a matching
geographic and temporal scope showing that the observed impact
was caused by anthropogenic influence on climate change. The
answer to this question of course depends on context, but generally

695. See, e.g., Complaint, Richmond v. Chevon et al., No. C18-00055 (filed Cal. Super. Ct.,
Jan 22, 2018).
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speaking, such observational evidence should be interpreted in
light of the larger body of attribution research and assigned weight
accordingly. For example, if plaintiffs submit evidence that
anthropogenic influence on climate is driving snowpack declines
throughout the Northern Hemisphere, then it would be reasonable
to infer that the observed declines in snowpack at particular resorts
in North America have also been caused by anthropogenic
influence on climate even without a radically downscaled
attribution study for those resorts.
We recognize that in cases like Kivalina and Bellon, courts have
expressed doubt about whether it is possible to trace emissions
from a particular source to specific impacts due to the nature of
climate change. But if this argument was taken to its extreme, then
no one could be held responsible for climate change. From a
technical standpoint, given that GHG emissions disperse
throughout the atmosphere and have a relatively uniform effect, it
would be more accurate to say that all emissions can be traced to
impacts. And as discussed below, the emissions contribution of a
party can be used as a proxy for its contribution to an impact.
Litigants and courts should be aware of both the strengths and
limitations of attribution science when framing and analyzing
arguments. Plaintiffs may prove most successful where they base
their claims on impacts which can be attributed to anthropogenic
climate change with high confidence, such as sea level rise, melting
snowpack, increases in average temperatures and extreme heat,
and ocean acidification. Plaintiffs may also prove most successful
where they rely on expert reports and peer-reviewed attribution
studies and avoid making causal inferences even for those impacts
for which there is a very robust connection to anthropogenic
climate change. Judges, meanwhile, should be mindful of the fact
that there are different levels of confidence for different impacts,
pay close attention to the evidence submitted, and should not
dismiss claims based on generalized conclusions about the
uncertainty of the science. Judges should also be aware that, when
translating global or regional impacts to specific injuries, it may be
necessary to accept causal inferences, as with the snowpack
example presented above.
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3. Proving and Defending against Obligations and Redressability
Few jurisdictions have addressed in even a preliminary way
critical questions regarding the scope and extent of private and
governmental obligations to address climate change. As discussed
above, there is some precedent affirming national obligations in
other jurisdictions (e.g., Urgenda), but no U.S. court has yet found
that the federal government is bound to any particular level of
climate ambition. Recall that Massachusetts held that EPA had
failed to justify its decision not to issue GHG regulations for motor
vehicles; it did not mandate that EPA actually issue the regulations,
far less that it issue regulations achieving one or another
696
standard.
Urgenda illustrates how attribution science can be used to help
establish national emission budgets. Source attribution data is
constantly improving and estimates of carbon budgets are
constantly being revised in light of new emissions data, so it will be
important for litigants and courts to rely on the most recent data in
697
framing carbon budgets. The understanding that carbon budgets
are a moving target could also factor into the remedy prescribed by
courts in cases like Urgenda. For example, rather than mandating a
government achieve a specific target on a specific date, a court
could require the government to establish and periodically update
its target based on the best available science. Attribution science
could also be used to define more specific obligations for national
governments, such as obligations pertaining to fossil fuel
development and subsidies (source attribution data on extraction
emissions would be particularly relevant here). For example, in the
Colombian case holding that the government violated fundamental
rights by failing to address the risks posed by climate change, the
court relied on research showing the contribution of deforestation
to climate change in determining that the Colombian government
had an obligation to protect, conserve, maintain, and restore the
698
portion of the Amazon forest located within Colombia.
In
particular, the court cited: (i) estimates from Colombia’s Institute
of Hydrology, Meteorology, and Environmental Studies (IDEAM)
696. See supra Part III(C)(3)(a)(i).
697. See discussion supra Part II(B)(4).
698. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], April 5, 2018, STC4360, No.
11001-22-03-000-2018-00319-01 (Colom.), http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/futuregeneration-v-ministry-environment-others/ [https://perma.cc/53WU-NLJK].
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finding that the increase in GHG emissions resulting from
deforestation in the Amazon forest would generate an increase in
Colombia’s temperature by 0.7–1.1°C between 2011 and 2040, by
1.4–1.7°C between 2041 and 2080, and by as much as 2.7°C
between 2017 and 2100; (ii) qualitative findings from IDEAM that
the GHG increase from deforestation would also result in more
precipitation in some areas and less precipitation in other areas,
potentially exacerbating problems such and pollutant loadings
(during wet periods) and drought; and (iii) a government report
finding that reducing deforestation to zero by 2020 would ensure
that “44 megatons of greenhouse gases would not enter the
699
atmosphere.”
In establishing obligations for private actors, one critical question
will be how to allocate liability and damages among multiple
companies. The plaintiffs in RWE have already provided the courts
with one possible approach: they are seeking damages that are
proportionate to the company’s individual GHG contribution (thus
pursuing several liability). The municipal plaintiffs suing fossil fuel
companies have pursued a slightly different approach, seeking to
hold these companies jointly and severally liable for their aggregate
contribution climate change. Judges may view joint and several
liability as a slippery slope in this context, given that there are so
many potential defendants who could be joined in these cases.
Another alternative would be to hold upstream manufacturers
liable for the production and sale of harmful products under a
market share theory of liability (e.g., apportioning liability among
700
fossil fuel companies based on their share of fossil fuel sales).
Arguably, imposing several liability based on the party’s
proportionate contribution to GHG increases is the approach
which best reflects the party’s “true” contribution to climate change
impacts. A market-share approach would also accomplish this if
699. Id. ¶¶ 11.1, 11.3.
700. For more on this topic, see Grimm, supra note 553, at 216 (“Market share liability has
often been found appropriate only where products are sufficiently interchangeable such that
it is either impossible or overwhelmingly burdensome to isolate individual causation among
defendants.”); Andrew B. Nace, Note, Market Share Liability: A Current Assessment of a DecadeOld Doctrine, 44 VAND. L. REV. 395, 396–97 (1991); Samantha Lawson, The Conundrum of
Climate Change Causation: Using Market Share Liability to Satisfy the Identification Requirement in
Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Co., 22 FORDHAM ENVTL L. REV. 433 (2010); Daniel
A. Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1605, 1640–55
(2007). But see Kysar, supra note 555, at 37 (critiquing the market share liability approach
and recommending that several liability is the appropriate form of recovery).
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the “market share” were defined as the share of GHG emissions, (in
which case this would be identical to the several liability
approach)—but if the “market share” is the share of fossil fuels
produced or electricity generated, then this approach might
overestimate the actual contribution to the injury (insofar as other
GHG sources, such as agriculture and land use change, would not
be accounted for in the contribution determination). Imposing
joint and several liability might also result in an overestimation of a
party’s contribution to the injury. However, there may be
compelling reasons to impose joint and several liability in certain
contexts—for example, in the municipal lawsuits against fossil fuel
companies, the plaintiffs note that the companies colluded in
climate change misinformation campaigns, and that each company
was “the agent, servant, partner, aider and abettor, co-conspirator,
and/or joint venture” of the other defendants to justify their
701
request for joint and several liability.
V. CONCLUSION
In this Article, we summarize the state of the art in climate
change detection and attribution science; describe how that
science is being used in policy, planning, and litigation; and discuss
further directions in the law and science of climate change
attribution. We focus, in particular, on the use of attribution
science in the courtroom. Attribution science has always been a
key component of climate change litigation. But, the recent waves
of cases brought against national and subnational governments,
seeking increased mitigation ambition, and against fossil fuel and
energy companies, seeking compensation or abatement funds for
the costs of adaptation, have made the relationship between the
science and law of climate change attribution all the more salient.
The political sphere in the United States continues to be clouded
with false debates over the validity of climate science. Things are
far clearer in the courtroom, where to our knowledge no judge has
questioned the scientific basis for the global community’s shared
understanding of the causes and effects of climate change. But
there are significant scientific issues that remain to be clarified, for
701. See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 40, Imperial Beach v. Chevon et al., No. C17-01227 (filed Cal.
Super. Ct., July 17, 2017); Complaint ¶ 44, Richmond v. Chevon et al., No. C18-00055 (filed
Cal. Super. Ct., Jan 22, 2018).
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law and policy purposes, and it may well be that litigation provides
the forum for achieving that clarity.

